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Milman Parry

JUNE 20, 1902 — DECEMBER 3, 1935

εἴ τι μέμηλε θεοῖς σοφίας ἀγανόφρονος ἀνδρῶν
κάνθρωποις μνήμῃ γίγνεται ἐξοπίσω,
ζωὸν ἄρ' εἴπ' ὃς ἄωτον ἔχων ἥβης ἐρατεινῆς
ἴκετο παντοίας ἐς κορυφὴν ἀρετῆς.

J. H. F., Jr.

SOME PASSAGES OF LATIN POETS

BY HERBERT JENNINGS ROSE

THE following remarks make no pretence to continuity, have no order but what a chronological arrangement of the lines treated can give them, and have no unifying idea save that all the passages in question seem to me to be misread or in some way misinterpreted in all the editions and other works bearing on them with which I am acquainted. That the present paper appears in this good company is due entirely to the flattering reception which my temporary colleagues at Harvard gave it when delivered in the form of an address to the Classical Club. If there are any of that pernicious tribe affected *qui ante nos nostra dixerunt*, their wrath is deprecated in advance.

I. Catullus' *Acme and Septimius* (No. 45), one of the most charming trifles ever written, has been damaged, if not spoiled, for many readers by long discussions of its refrain,

Hoc ut dixit Amor sinistra ut ante
dextra¹ sternuit approbationem.

The question where the commas should go is, I submit, one which Catullus would laugh at, for the point of the lines is that they cannot be misread. The words *hoc ut dixit* are unambiguous; since they immediately follow a speech of one of the lovers, the subject cannot be *Amor*. For the rest, whether one recites *Amor, sinistra ut ante, dextra sternuit approbationem* or *Amor sinistra, ut ante dextra, sternuit approbationem*, the couplet is true and appropriate to the situation both times. The pair are sitting, as many thousands of pairs have done before and since, with the lass on the lad's knees, or perhaps she is lying in his arms (*tenens in gremio*, 2, could mean either). Acme, in any case, is facing Septimius, for to kiss his eyes she has but to tilt her chin (*leuiter caput reflectens*; to speak pedantically to the pedants, the movement must be in the vertical, not the horizontal plane, for on the

¹ There is a variant *dextram*, which if right involves reading *sinistram* also, i.e., *a* for *a* both times; for the sense it is quite indifferent.

latter supposition she must turn her head clean around, which is anything but moving it *leviter*). Also, a gaze swimming with rapture (*ebrios ocellos*) is not very likely to be directed at the back of her head, however well her hair may have been arranged. So what is left to her is right to him. Thus, whichever side Love stands on, his sneeze comes from left and right also. Moreover, he is a Roman, she a Greek, in name and culture if not race. Therefore, her lucky side is right, his is left, by the usual rule of ancient divination, Greek and Italo-Etruscan respectively. So, by an arrangement of the omens quite good enough for any people as happy as they are, anything that happens must be construable as somehow favourable for one or the other, and therefore for both. Amor may shift from side to side of his favoured pair, or not, just as he pleases; it will make no difference to them.

II. Horace's ode to Chloe (*Carm. 1, 23*) is as delightful as Catullus' poem. Editors mostly have shown their good sense by printing, with the MSS, *ueris inhorruit aduentus* in lines 5–6, not the Gogavius-Muretus conjecture *uepris inhorruit ad uentum*, though, the lines having beauty enough and to spare, even that would be pretty. I take it that they, or some of them, know that the words mean, not "spring's coming has quivered on the leaves," for if spring is only coming there are no leaves to quiver as yet, but "spring's arrival has made every branch bristle with quivering leaves," and so there are plenty of rustlings and flickerings for Chloe to pretend to be frightened at, *uano metu* (3–4), fear which is both groundless and sham. But it does not seem to have been recognized that Horace is imitating Anakreon fairly closely, for one editor after another assures us that Chloe is compared to a fawn. Now this is doubtless a possible meaning of (*h*)*in(n)uleus*, and suits *pauidam matrem* (2–3) well enough; but it does not suit the last stanza. Horace's metaphors and allegories are neat and well worked out; they go on all fours and do not limp. Therefore the lines *atqui non ego te tigris ut aspera / Gaetulusue leo frangere persequor* must express something which, if the whole thing were literal, a man might really do to an *inuleus*, that is to say a young beast of some sort. He is following it, he says, but not to kill and eat it. Now if we suppose Chloe to be a fawn, this becomes absurd. In the first place, is it the habit of men, apart from a prodigy of speed like the young Achil-

les,¹ to run after deer of any age? Ancient hunters on occasion rode after them, with a full pack, but Horace is evidently alone and apparently unmounted; they used missiles against them, but he is merely following till he catches his quarry; they caught them in nets spread at the end of a run, but he has no net. And if they did run after them, and that in such advantageous ground for a well-grown fawn as a trackless mountain, the object would be the severely practical one of killing and eating them when caught, in other words *frangere persequebantur*, which is just what Horace says he is not doing and implies that only a wild beast would do. The whole picture is that of an actual or potential owner, not eater, running after a creature which he wants to use for his business or pleasure.

If now we turn from Horace and, taking his advice, turn over the Greek models,² we shall, I think, find his particular exemplar in the *Anthologia Lyrica* without much trouble. It is Anakreon, frag. 88 Diehl, really no fragment but a complete poem. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff has analysed it excellently, and, it is to be hoped, got rid for ever of the nonsensical variant *ιπποσείρην* for *ιπποπείρην* in the last line.³

Πώλε Θρηκίη, τί δή με λοξὸν ὅμμασι βλέπουσα
νηλεῶς φεύγεις, δοκεῖς δέ μ' οὐδὲν εἰδέναι σοφόν;
ἴσθι τοι, καλῶς μὲν ἄν τοι τὸν χαλινὸν ἐμβάλοιμι,
ἡνίας δ' ἔχων στρέφοιμι σ' ἀμφὶ τέρματα δρόμου.
νῦν δὲ λειμῶνάς τε βόσκεαι κοῦφά τε σκιρτῶσα παῖς·
δεξιὸν γὰρ ιπποπείρην οὐκ ἔχεις ἐπειβάτην.

As Wilamowitz points out, the Thracian filly is a two-legged one, a new arrival at the court of Polykrates, or at some place where youth, beauty and not too aggressive virtue might hope to gain prosperity. Anakreon, by way of starting her on her career, offers a *leçon d'amour* which should form her manners; the comparison of lover and mistress to horseman and mount is familiar throughout the erotic literature of antiquity.⁴ The allegory in its general lines is very like Horace's; a

¹ Pindar, *Nem.* 3, 51.

² Horace, *A. P.* 268-269.

³ *Sappho und Simonides*, pp. 117 sqq.

⁴ Even when the love is what might be described as spiritual, as Verg. *Aen.* 6, 77 sqq., especially 78-80, 100-101; Apollo is "riding" the Sibyl as the Bori ride

skilled horsemaster is trying to catch and break a shy young filly, which will not be caught ($\tauι \delta\acute{η} με . . . νηλεῶς φεύγεις;$), even as Chloe refuses (*uitas me*). She starts and shies at every excuse and none ($\kappaοῦφά τε σκιρτῶσα παιᾶς$) as readily as Chloe does at the breezes and the woodland sounds (*non sine uano aurarum et siluae metu*), and is still out at grass ($\lambdaειμῶνάς τε βόσκει$); so is Chloe, who is following her *pauida mater* about the mountain pastures (*montibus auiis*) and troubled if she cannot find her (*inuleo . . . quaerenti*). The Thracian filly has left hers behind in Thrace, it would seem, for a wrinkled and sun-burned old Balkan peasant-woman would be a poor advertisement for her still charming daughter in refined circles.

So the translation of *inuleus* is pretty obvious; it does not mean “fawn” but “mule-colt.” This is good Latin; it is true Varro says¹ that it means the offspring of a stallion and a she-ass, but Horace was neither grammarian nor stock-breeder, and the Sabine and Apulo-Lucanian uses of the word may have differed slightly in any case. The *pauida mater* is certainly not an ass, for a donkey is a most placid and self-possessed beast, but she may easily be a brood mare. To us, the mule is a rather comic creature, associated with stories of the tribulations of British soldiers or darker-skinned civilians in the Southern States when trying to manage their intractable charges. In antiquity, its associations were very different. From Homer’s day on it was highly valued, first for farm-work, because it was quicker than an ox² and horses were not used for ploughing, afterwards as the proper draught-beast for a really smart turn-out, far too fine to be taken along muddy roads,³ as the humbler and less carefully bred specimens of the same race were.⁴ It certainly would not be in the country (unless at a very gentlemanly villa) that Chloe would prove herself *tempstiua uiro*. Meanwhile, she does not see her way to accepting Horace’s advances, and behaves towards him with such cantankerousness as only a mule can show, of four-footed beasts, that is.

their Haussa mediums (see Tremearne, *Ban of the Bori*, p. 248, etc.). Other and less pleasant examples are easily found.

¹ *De Ling. Lat.* 9, 22.

² *Iliad*, 10, 352–353.

³ Juvenal, 7, 178–181: *porticus in qua / gestetur dominus quotiens pluit; anne serenum / expectet spargatque luto iumenta recenti? / hic potius, namque hic mundae nitet ungula mulae.*

⁴ For instance, in Vergil (?), *Catal.* 10 (8), especially line 12.

III. In Propertius, 3, 24, 7-8, we find an example of an idiom, or rhetorical figure rather, of which not enough has been said, at all events in the commentaries *ad loc.*, or in those on Aristophanes. The lines run as follows, being part of a passage in which he is bidding his mistress, be she Cynthia or another, good-bye, and telling her that she shall have no more poetical flatteries from him.

et color est roseo totiens collatus Eoo,
cum tibi quae situs candor in ore foret.

This is one of the many passages which deceive the unwary into literal translation, never realizing that they have made nonsense out of an extremely gifted writer who was not in the habit of giving meaningless verse to the public. "And your complexion has been so often compared to the blushing Dawn,¹ when . . ." There are, surely, but two possible completions of the taunt, either "you had a pale (or a sallow) skin" or, "I knew it was no true blush, but only rouge." But the next line states that she had artificially whitened her face, not reddened it. She was not *fucata* but *cerussata*. To make complete sense, indeed to make anything but nonsense, we must take the lines to mean, "How often have I compared your blush to the Dawn (when I knew it was only rouge, and your skin to lilies and snow) when it was obviously pearl-powder." And this, I think, it can quite fairly be taken to mean, especially in one so strongly under Greek influence as Propertius. Like hundreds of other passages, not in Latin only, this one needs understanding and not emendation. There is a figure which we may perhaps call the imperfect proportion, or, as a friendly critic suggests, a rhetorical enthymeme, and reduce to the following formula. When a Greek says "8:6: : 12: . . ." he often expects his hearer to be quick-witted enough to supply the missing "9" for himself. If the sum is very easy, he may go so far as to call for two terms out of the four, or, in a simple equation, one of the two from his listeners. In the domain of metaphor, Aristotle noticed and commented on a very similar figure. The shield, he says, is to Ares what the wine-cup is to Dionysos; therefore, it is a fair metaphor to call the shield the wine-cup of Ares, or the

¹ Strictly speaking, the dawn-horse, one of the Sun's team in Ovid, *Met.* 2, 153. Of him Hyginus (*Fab.* 183, 1; this part is not from Ovid, who has been dragged in later by the excerptor) says sagely, *per hunc caelum uerti solet*.

wine-cup the shield of Dionysos; we may even go further, and call the shield the wineless wine-cup.¹ Aristophanes was simply using a common idiom when he said ἐν μέσῳ γῆς and did not add καὶ οὐρανῷ.² Such proportions had been in vogue at all events since Pindar,³

οὐδὲ θερμὸν ὕδωρ τόσον γε μαλθακὰ τεύχει
γυῖα τόσσον εὐλογία φόρμιγγι συνάοπος.

What does praise, with or without musical accompaniment, soothe and sleek? Not the limbs, surely, of the tired athlete, but his excited spirit. Aristophanes himself has sorely puzzled some of his readers by using exactly that idiom in the famous comparison of good and bad citizens to good and bad money;⁴

πολλάκις γ' ἡμῖν ἔδοξεν ἡ πόλις πεπονθέναι
ταύτὸν ἔστε τῶν πολιτῶν τοὺς καλούς τε κάγαθοὺς
ἔστε τάρχαῖον νόμισμα καὶ τὸ καινὸν χρυσίον.

The proportion here is, good citizens : good old-fashioned silver :: bad citizens : bad new-fangled alleged gold, and he elaborates the comparison in the following verses with all his usual spirit and liveliness. If the numismatists, as I have seen stated, cannot find specimens of the bad money in question, so much the worse for the numismatists; Aristophanes is quite unmistakable, though, if it is true that Athenian coinage of that date was not debased (a most unlikely thing, seeing that it was almost the end of a desperate and very costly war), they may perhaps take refuge in the sound excuse that any unfamiliar coins are apt to be considered bad, at least at first. We know the traditional fondness of the French peasant for *gros sous*, and I have had a gold Napoleon refused by a Peloponnesian *agogiatis*, who had never heard that kind of thing called money before and was not satisfied till the local financier had changed it for a handful of the familiar drachma-

¹ Arist. *Poet.* 1457b16–33.

² Ar. *Birds*, 187.

³ Pindar, *Nem.* 4, 4–5.

⁴ For an epitome of modern misunderstandings of plain Greek, see any edition with full critical notes on the passage, *Frogs*, 718–720. Quaint emendations and quaint translations are to be found in abundance.

notes. But to return to our examples, prose furnishes them plentifully enough, for they are no monopoly of the poets. Plato is not in a dithyrambic mood in *Phileb.* 40e, where he writes as follows: *τι δέ; πονηρὰς δόξας καὶ χρηστὰς ἄλλως ή ψευδεῖς γιγνομένας ἔχομεν εἰπεῖν;* He leaves us to supply *καὶ ἀληθεῖς.* A simple enough example is to be found in the very matter-of-fact style of Aristoxenos,¹ who is discussing nothing more exalted than the notes of the scale: *τὸ δὲ παρυπάτης διάστημα ἐλαττον μὲν ὅτι οὐκ ἀν γένοιτο διέσεως ἐναρμονίου, φανερόν,* meaning thereby, "It is clear that the interval of the *parhypate* cannot be less than a quarter tone," i.e., as Marquard saw, the interval between that and the *hypate*.

Latin examples are less common, at least I have found fewer of them, but Father Ennius provides a good one, and that in a very well-known passage, quoted in Cicero, *Tusc.* 5, 49:

a sole ex oriente supra Maeoti' paludes
nemo me factis exsuperare queat,

which means "From the rising of the sun (to the going down thereof) no man could be found to outdo my deeds."

A Ciceronian quotation is not always secure from corruption by the scribes, and their fell work is sometimes patiently digested by the *duria*, not *messorum* but *editorum*. In the same work,² while reasoning gravely on the shortness of life, he cites a line and a half from some unknown poet, presumably a dramatist. That he was not writing prose was a secret unrevealed until Bentley pointed it out, and even the latest Teubner editor, Pohlenz, who has been at some pains to find out what Cicero wrote and what it means, prints without indication of corruption or doubt the following:

Quae uero aetas longa est, aut quid omnino homini longum? nonne
modo pueros, modo adulescentes in cursu a tergo insequens
nec opinantis adsecuta est
senectus? sed quia ultra nihil habemus, hoc longum dicimus.

¹ *Harmon.* 2, 46, p. 66, 33 Marquard, who needlessly inserts *καὶ ὑπάτης* before *διάστημα*.

² *Tusc.* 1, 94. It is labelled *com. pall. inc.* 43 in Ribbeck, though what shows it to be either comic or from a *palliala* only the gods who watch over collectors of fragments know.

Against the general sense there is nothing to be said; no human life is really long, for a boy or a young man wants but little time to become old. But when we try to analyse the details of the expression, hopeless difficulties arise.

Modo can mean one of two things, “just now” and “sometimes.” In the second meaning it is commonly doubled, as *modo me Thebis*, *modo ponit Athenis*,¹ while in the former it is usually, if not always, single, as *modo liberum esse iussi Nastam*.² The third meaning, “(if) only” (*charta salutatrix si modo uera refert*),³ does not come into question here. To suppose that it means “just now” involves proving that the doubled adverb is likely to have that sense, and when that has been proved, we have our unknown poet preaching the strange doctrine that, whereas those who were just now children or youths (incidentally, if that was what he meant, why did he not say *et* or *aut adulescentes*?) are now old, those who just now were full-grown men are still in their prime and apparently are immune from the attacks of senility. If it means “sometimes,” the passage becomes nonsense. To say that old age comes suddenly upon a boy, in other words that even a child has but a short time between him and old age, is possible; but to distinguish in this manner between children and youths, stating that the general rule holds good only for a part of either class, is rubbish; the word wanted to complete the sense is *mors*, for that does indeed come unexpectedly upon even the very young or those in their first flush of vigour; that it takes the mature and the old is too obvious to need expressing. *Mors*, therefore, was what the poet wrote, and Cicero certainly did not make nonsense of his sense by substituting *senectus*. But he meant something by the word, and that something, I suggest, has been lost in our far from perfect MSS. What originally stood there may have been not altogether unlike this:

nec opinantis adsecuta est
(mors. uerum, ut et pueri et adulescentes mortem uitemus, quam paucis post
annis adsequetur) senectus! sed quia, etc.

IV. However, to return to the poets, the author of the *Consolatio ad Liuiam* can hardly lay claim to that honourable title; but *manum ferulae subduxerat*, and they had taught him to make correct verses, if

¹ Horace, *Epp.* 2, 1, 213.

² Martial, 9, 87, 4-5.

³ *Id.* 9, 99, 2.

very uninspired ones, and to use the *loci communes* of comfort. Therefore he deserves better than to have it implied that the 379th line in Vollmer's text of him in the new *Poetae Latini minores* was what he supposed to be a hexameter. Dracontius wrote better verses than this, Prudentius much better:

nata quod alte es quodque es fetibus aucta duobus.

In justice to Baehrens, who although no scholar was a diligent man and not inerudite, it should be mentioned that he was not content with this, the reading of the Carolingian archetype of our MSS, and followed Heinsius in emending the line. But Heinsius had made a surprisingly bad emendation, and Baehrens could not better it. Therefore his text gives

nata quod, en, alte es, quod fetibus aucta duobus.

What the *en* means, I do not know, and I much doubt if either Heinsius or Baehrens knew. The word should call attention to something previously unnoticed, or in itself surprising; and the idea that the Empress Livia needed to be told as a great secret that she was of very respectable family is one worthy of the genius of the late Mr. Robert Montgomery. No such stop-gaps are needed here, for none but the simplest and commonest of corruptions have taken place; an accidental transposition of words and an innocent gloss by some indifferent Latinist. Read therefore

alte nata quod es, quod fetibus aucta duobus,

which is a verse, not three parcels of words; need it be said that *quod es* and *quod fetibus* are rhythmically one word each and not two? Incidentally, this leads up smoothly and neatly to the next line,

quodque etiam magno consociata Ioui.

V. Manilius has on the whole been so admirably edited by Housman that there is a wicked pleasure in catching that prince of expositors of the Silver poets napping for once. But I think he has nodded a little in 2, 672. Manilius says that signs of the zodiac which are in quadratil aspect to one another

adfinis signant gradibusque propinquis
accedunt unaque tenent sub imagine natos.

This second line Housman interprets as meaning those who resemble each other in personal appearance. But these are very oddly joined to connections and relations, for those who resemble one another, although to the extent of being doubles, need not be even the remotest of kin. To be born under one and the same *imago* is, in more modern parlance, to claim the same arms. The Romans had no heraldry, but the *imagines* of a famous family were very apt to be poached on one excuse or another by those less well known. There was occasional heartburning caused by this form of snobbery, though Pliny thinks it is a kind of love for worth that prompts it.¹ Manilius therefore means that the signs in question are concerned with those related, connected by marriage, or in some way claiming kinship.

In another passage, Manilius' text is past all peradventure corrupt, by the plainest of tests; it will not scan. The poet is speaking of the constellation Andromeda.²

hanc quondam poenae dirorum culpa parentum
prodidit, infestus totis cum finibus omnis
incubuit pontus, timuit naufragia tellus.

But the question arises whether, if it would scan, it would make sense. Housman is of opinion that it would not; "neque enim" he writes "apparet quid timuerit tellus iam naufragium passa³ . . . aptius nihil uidetur quam *fluitauit naufraga*." It is here that I do not quite agree with him. The earth was in a bad way, certainly; if we think of it as an immense ship, the decks were awash (*totis . . . finibus omnis incubuit pontus*); but a ship over which the waves are breaking is not necessarily wrecked, nor going to be wrecked; there is grave reason to fear that she will be, if the weather does not improve or she cannot

¹ Pliny, *N. H.* 35, 8: exstat Messallae oratoris indignatio quae prohibuit inseri genti suae Laeuinorum alienam imaginem. similis causa Messallae seni expressit uolumina illa quae de familiis condidit, etc.

² Man. 5, 540–542.

³ Housman on 542. He is commenting on the emendations *cum naufraga* and *nauifraga*, but I gather from correspondence with him that he would raise a similar objection to any such reading as mine. I leave readers to judge.

make harbour. The earth, in fact, is in much the same plight as the ship in *Hymn. Homer.* 33, just before the Dioskuroi appear in answer to the prayers of the mariners (8-12):

οὶ δ' ἀπὸ νηῶν
εὐχόμενοι καλέοντι Διὸς κούρους μεγάλοιο
ἄρνεσσιν λευκοῖσιν, ἐπ' ἀκρωτήρια βάντες
πρύμνης· τὴν δ' ἄνεμός τε μέγας καὶ κῦμα θαλάσσης
θῆκαν ὑποβρυχίην.

But the coming of the friendly gods, who calm the tempest, makes all right. Therefore, if only the second *a* of *naufragia* were long, I hold that the sense would be satisfactory, and so suggest that Manilius wrote *nauagia*. This is good enough Hellenistic Greek for shipwreck, and he has a passion for Greek words; a man who could write

et fidum Laertiadae genuere syboten¹

would be quite capable of such a turn, especially when it gave him a scannable word; *syboten* has not that plea, since the good Vergilian² *subulcum* gives the same quantities and occupies the same place in a line.

VI. Juvenal, despite the efforts of many scholars, bristles with difficulties still, as an author must do who has been copied for so many centuries by scribes who knew him too well, or not well enough, and therefore have filled scores of passages with untimely reminiscences of others. An instance is 5, 104. While the rich host eats the finest fish, the poor guest is given a suspiciously snaky-looking eel or else, if we will believe the manuscripts, for the scholiast read no such thing:

glacie aspersus maculis Tiberinus et ipse
uernula riparum, pinguis torrente cloaca
et solitus mediae cryptam penetrare Suburae.

Again to quote Housman,

glacie nemini, quantum scio, praeterquam mihi et Schrader et Hadriano Valesio admirationem mouit; ceteris exploratum est frigore pisces maculosos fieri, eos praesertim qui torrentem cloacam, locum frigidissimum, penetrare soleant.

¹ Man. 5, 126.

² Verg. *Ecl.* 10, 19: tardi uenere subulci.

The scribe, I fancy, had let his memory wander from one fish-passage to another, and was thinking of those monsters¹

quos operit *glacies* Maeotica ruptaque tandem
solibus effundit *torrentis* ad ostia Ponti
desidia tardos et longo frigore *pingues*.

My present business is to put on record, by way of warning, an unsuccessful attempt of mine to emend this *locus uexatus*. As *glacie* is nonsense and the scholiast notes *nomen piscis* (though the place of his gloss is rather uncertain), I had conjectured *glanis*. But, as usual in such matters, I submitted this to my colleague Professor D'Arcy W. Thompson, who tells me that the *glanis*, called, I believe, sheat-fish in English, is not Italian and does not come up estuaries, and so could not have been caught in the Tiber. Some better naturalist than I may hit upon the right name, for that a fish-name is to be supplied is surely indisputable. Two friendly critics suggest *gladius* and *glaucus*, of course altering *aspersus* to *sparsus*.

Another passage, again dealing with a dinner scene, has no uncertainty as to the reading, but a little as to the sense. It is in the same satire, in the description of the blissful state of the poor guest if he somehow manages to become rich. All will fawn on him, and the persistent legacy-hunter will even forgive his becoming a father, provided only that his children are not legitimate and so cannot inherit. Indeed, he will make great pets of them, when he is invited to dinner and they come down to dessert:²

loquaci
gaudebit nido, uiridem thoraca iubebit
adferri minimasque nuces assemque rogatum,
ad mensam quotiens parasitus uenerit infans.

This is generally taken to mean "he will order a green shell-jacket to be fetched, also the littlest nuts and a penny, if he asks for it, whenever a baby hanger-on appears at table." And, unlike some received interpretations, this one will make sense. The *thorax*, which is part of a charioteer's costume and of the most favoured faction, the Green, is for the child to dress up in; nuts and small change have been traditional presents for children for many centuries. Yet there are two

¹ Juvenal, 4, 42–44.

² Juvenal, 5, 142–144.

difficulties, not fatal, but enough to suggest that an alternative explanation, which is apparently old, may be the right one. First, why does the guest choose the smallest nuts? They are no easier for the child to crack, and a big specimen of anything edible usually delights a small recipient. Secondly, why does the scholiast, here as elsewhere preserving detritus of what was once a tolerably good commentary by some late ancient, note *armilausiam prasinam, ut simiae?* There is no monkey in the picture, and the one which does appear in lines 153–155 is dressed in a miniature suit of armour (*tegitur parma et galea*) and is evidently being taught the rudiments of cavalry drill by the Guardsmen, with a goat for his mount. But perhaps we can find a monkey at the table, too, if we look for it. Assume that the scholiast is right, and that the beast was dressed in a little green coat; it would not be unlike Juvenal to use the name of the costume for the name of the wearer. So he has *facinus maioris abollae* for *facinus philosophi*, 3, 115; *harena* means a gladiator in 6, 217, and *cithara* has the sense of *citharoedus*, *ibid.*, 391. If the enterprising currier of favour has really bought a monkey to amuse the *parasitus infans*, the rest slides smoothly into place; *rogatum* is a supine and the two *que*'s answer one another.¹ Also, it explains why he has to send for (*iubebit adferri*, surely from his own house, not his host's) the present; one would think that a little thing like a jacket small enough for a child could easily be tucked away in his attendant slave's clothing, or even his own *sinus*, but a monkey is apt to resent being thus suppressed, and perhaps the child will not come to table after all, in which case there is the trouble for nothing. It explains, moreover, the *minimas nuces*; one would not waste the best of the dessert on the beast; while *assem* is easily explicable, for what child does not like to see a monkey handling coppers and such things, or delight in the creature's ability to beg for them and pass them on, doubtless to its new master?

¹ It is best to mention a small stylistic point which makes against this interpretation. Juvenal seldom uses a pair of *que*'s in this fashion, and all the certain examples seem to be on the ends of lines, as *Alpemque niuemque*, 10, 152, or *uinoque ciboque*, 5, 49. But I do not think this objection fatal. The real difficulty in deciding is caused by our little knowledge of what metonymies of this type were so current in Juvenal's time as to be instantly understood (thus "redcoat" is intelligible wherever English is spoken, but an American might be puzzled by "bluecoat").

In 6, 157, I would enter a plea for the traditional text,

adamas notissimus et Beronices
in digito factus pretiosior. hunc dedit olim
barbarus incestae, dedit hunc Agrippa sorori.

Housman would emend to *incestae gestare*, because it is absurd to suppose Juvenal, a first-rate rhetorician, splitting one act into two in this fashion. And indeed, if the lines mean simply "Herod Agrippa gave this ring to his sister and mistress," no one with any feeling for style will fail to agree. But I see no reason why they should be so understood. The emphatic *hunc dedit . . . dedit hunc* is sound and commendable if Juvenal is listing two generations of the diamond's pedigree, which is what I think he is doing. The *barbarus* is not Agrippa but Ptolemy, king of *barbara Memphis*;¹ any Ptolemy who had married his sister would do, but the last of them has the advantage, for purposes of this piece of jewelry, of being the nominal husband of the best-known *incesta* of all to a Roman, Kleopatra VII. After her death, it would seem, Herod Agrippa got hold of it and gave it to Berenike, through whom it came to Rome, and so (from Titus?) into the market.²

I am not sure that Juvenal wrote the famous *sit pro ratione uoluntas*. The angry woman is speaking in very short and exceedingly concrete phrases, and her *hoc uolo, sic iubeo* (6, 223) loses rather than gains strength by the addition of the two abstract nouns, which form indeed a possible amplification of what she has said but also a possible gloss. If they go out, they take with them the feeble *imperat ergo uiro* of 224; she has been ordering him and all the household about for a dozen lines and it seems superfluous to say so, thus wasting a good *ergo*, which Juvenal is much more apt to use either as an *etra indignantis*, as 1, 3, or to introduce an emotional conclusion, as 6, 175. On the other hand, *ergo* reveals itself as a glossator's word by its non-Juvenalian quantity in 3, 281. I should be much inclined, if I were editing the *Satires*, to print

¹ Lucan, 8, 542; cf. Juvenal, 15, 46, where a *barbara turba* is a crowd of fellahin.

² Something like this may have stood in the commentary whose mangled remains are found in the scholium on verse 158: *barbarum Ptolomaeum significat et Beronicen sororem eius* (follows a long note in which Agrippa is taken to be Agrippa Postumus and his sister the younger Iulia). . . . *Beronice soror Ptolomaci*.

'hoc uolo, sic iubeo.' sed mox haec regna relinquit,

relegating the rest to the apparatus criticus. But in fairness to the suspected words I would not close without mentioning that I have not persuaded of their spuriousness one of my most reliable and candid critics, Miss A. Woodward of Royal Holloway College, London, my former colleague.

NOTE: It will be obvious, from the tone of the references to Professor Housman in the above article, that it was written while he was alive and, so far as the author knew, in tolerable health. Since then this greatest interpreter of Latin poets, himself a poet in their tongue and his own, has left us the poorer for his loss, the richer for his teaching and example. *δήεις δ' αὐτὸν ἐν εὐσεβεων.*

THE TERMINOLOGY OF THE IDEAS¹

BY GERALD FRANK ELSE

I

TO ADD another title to the unending list of books, dissertations, and pamphlets on the Platonic Ideas calls for a more specific reason than the feeling that "there is something more to be said" about them. Even in the comparatively narrow field of terminology, to mention only the most important studies, there is already the excellent short treatment by Lewis Campbell;² there is Daniel Peipers' laborious and all-inclusive work on the forms of *εἶναι*;³ and there is Constantin Ritter's exhaustive catalogue of the uses of *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα*.⁴ Yet Ritter himself confesses that other terms are more frequent than *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα*, and declares that the doctrine of Ideas "lässt sich nicht völlig aufhellen, wenn nicht viel mehr in die Untersuchung hereingezogen wird."⁵ And that is not all. Ritter's whole investigation was pointed toward the specific question whether the Ideas were transcendent, *χωριστά*, or immanent and working in nature; and his conclusion was that, although Plato had come perilously near to setting up the "fantastic doctrine" of transcendence in the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*, he completely renounced it in the dialogues which follow the *Theaetetus*. There is no evidence in any later dialogue, says Ritter, that the Ideas were *χωριστά*. On the contrary, the Idea in its final

¹ This article is based on a thesis, *Quo Modo Plato Ideas expresserit*, submitted to the Department of Classics of Harvard University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, 1934.

² In *Plato's Republic*, edited by B. Jowett and Lewis Campbell (London, 1894), II, pp. 294 ff.

³ *Ontologia Platonica*, Lipsiae, 1883.

⁴ "Εἶδος, *ἰδέα* und verwandte Wörter in den Schriften Platons," in *Neue Untersuchungen über Platon* (referred to hereafter as *N. U.*), (Munich, 1910), pp. 228-326; to which must be added pp. 42-44, 49-51 of the same book (on the *Sophist*) and pp. 91-94 (on the *Politicus*). Wilamowitz also has remarks on *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα* in *Platon* (Berlin, 1919), II, pp. 238-254.

⁵ *N. U.*, pp. 277-278. Similarly p. 326.

form was a principle of definiteness, so to speak, established and working in nature — the objective basis for our definition of a class or species.¹ Aristotle's talk about *χωριστά*, and the "fanciful interpretations" built up on such passages as *Timaeus* 51 ff., can simply be thrown out of court.

This result, based on minute investigation and supported by the authority of a great Platonic scholar, seemed final. But as I re-read the dialogues I came more and more to feel that, although most of the details were right, the conclusion to which they led was wrong. It seemed more and more clear that there were both immanent and transcendent Ideas to be found, and that in denying the latter Ritter had done violence to certain passages and neglected others. The problem was, not to choose between immanence and transcendence, but to say where each occurred and to define the sphere in which it was valid. Hence a complete survey of Plato's terminology for the Ideas seemed to be in order; and for this two things were needed. First, the key-passages for *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα* had to be re-examined — always on the basis of Ritter's work — and second, the results had to be amplified by a study of *δύναμις*, *φύσις*, *αὐτό*, *αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό*, *δὲ οἵστι*, and so on. But even before approaching Plato's use of *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα*, I thought it was necessary to look into the previous history of the two words, in order to see what they were likely to mean when he began to use them.

II

The words *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα* have a short but significant intellectual history before Plato.² They meant originally and predomi-

¹ *N. U.*, p. 319.

² The following section is based on A. E. Taylor, "The Words *εἶδος*, *ἰδέα* in Pre-Platonic Literature," in *Varia Socratica* (Oxford, 1911), pp. 178–267, and C. M. Gillespie, "The Use of *Εἶδος* and *Ιδέα* in Hippocrates," *Class. Quart.* VI (1912), pp. 179–203. Taylor's thesis was that in certain fifth-century writers, notably Hippocrates, these two words often mean 'substance,' 'real essence,' and never simply 'logical class,' 'kind'; the whole argument serving in turn to bolster his theory that the Ideas were already common property in the fifth century. The source of this usage would be Pythagorean geometry. Taylor's evidence, so far as it concerned Hippocrates, is ably refuted by Gillespie.

nantly *visible form or figure*,¹ especially that of a living creature; not, however, in the limited sense of ‘body,’ but including the whole external guise or appearance — shape, complexion, look, manner, actions.² Hence they could easily be applied to abstract things. So in Thuc. 2, 51, 1, *iδέα* means the *sympoms* of the plague, the guise in which it appeared.³ A. E. Taylor describes the usage thus: “‘phase,’ ‘manifestation,’ ‘fashion,’ i.e. the special form under which a universal such as ‘death,’ ‘wickedness,’ is found in a particular case.”⁴ We can take this meaning as established, then; but to see its bearing we must go to Hippocrates, from whom it was probably borrowed. A thing may appear in various guises or forms, and these can conveniently be taken as *subspecies* of it. Here is the angle from which the first Greek scientists, the physicians, approached the problem of classification. In Hippocrates “classification is more properly division; it is not regarded as collecting things and arranging them according to their common qualities, but rather as taking a unity . . . and dividing it.”⁵ The method is deductive, it proceeds from the genus (which is taken for granted) to the species; and these species are called *είδη* or *iδέαι*. *Εἰσὶ δὲ τέσσαρες ιδέαι τοῦ ὑγροῦ, αἷμα χολὴ ὕδωρ καὶ φλέγμα,* says Hippocrates; or *αὐγῆς μὲν δύο εἰδέα, τὸ μὲν κοινόν, τὸ δὲ τεχνητόν.*⁶ Primarily, then, *είδος* and *iδέα* meant *species*; but by a natural extension they were applied also to the genera themselves, and so could be used to mean ‘a natural class,’ ‘a kind of thing.’ This general use is found not only in Hippocrates,⁷ but also in Thucydides and Isocrates.⁸

¹ So, in Herodotus, in 27 cases out of 32; in Xenophon, in 20 out of 23: Taylor, *op. cit.*, pp. 184–186, 193–196.

² Cf. the meaning ‘policy,’ ‘course of action,’ in Thucydides (Taylor, *op. cit.*, pp. 187–190).

³ The use is medical. Cf. Aeschines 2, 47, and esp. Hippoc. *περὶ χυμῶν*, 1, and *περὶ φύσιος ἀνθρώπου*, 9, on which see Gillespie, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 190. Of the 9 relevant cases cited by him, 5 are of the phrase *πᾶσα ιδέα* (*θανάτου*, etc.).

⁵ Gillespie, *op. cit.*, p. 183.

⁶ *Περὶ γονῆς*, 3, and *κατ’ ιητρήτον*, 3.

⁷ Gillespie, *op. cit.*, pp. 184–190.

⁸ E.g., Thuc. 2, 41, 1, *ἐπὶ πλεῖστ’ ἀν εἴδη . . . τὸ σῶμα αὐταρκεῖ παρέχεσθαι*, and Isocrates’ phrase *είδη λόγων*, which notwithstanding Taylor’s Pythagoreanizing explanation must simply mean *genera dicendi*, kinds or types of oratory.

We can say, then, that before Plato *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα*¹ had acquired (1) the meaning of 'guise,' 'form,' 'token,' and (2) that of 'species,' with the extended and vaguer sense of 'kind of thing,' 'natural class' — or, to summarize them, *form* and *kind*. The first meaning, at least in its application to abstract things, probably originated with the Ionian physicians; the second certainly did. For it is important to note that in colloquial Attic the two words were uncommon, and seldom meant anything but 'visible form,' (human or animal) 'figure.'² If Plato used them in another sense, it is at least probable that he borrowed it from Hippocrates.

In applying these results to Plato, one must guard against thinking of *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα* as finished, logically precise terms when he took them over. On the contrary, they carried with them an aura of undefined, almost indefinable connotations; and these connotations are at least as important as the overt meaning. For example, the second of our two meanings is incurably ambiguous: the *εἶδος* is both a logical *class* and a natural *kind*, the one no more than the other. It was an ambiguity which had large consequences for Plato and for his interpreters. With this preface, we can examine the important passages for his use of *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα*.

*Euthyphro*³ — (5d). Socrates, searching for a definition of piety, asks if it is not always the same in every pious action, and its opposite likewise, ἔχον μίαν τινὰ ιδέαν κατὰ τὴν ἀνοσιότητα πᾶν ὅτιπερ ἀν μέλλῃ ἀνόσιον εἶναι. This *μία ιδέα* is the form in which piety appears, the characteristic token by which it is recognized (cf. 6e, *εἰς ἐκείνην ἀποβλέπων*) and seen to be one. *Εἶδος* is used in the same sense, 6d.⁴ We are already familiar with this meaning. To be

¹ So far as is discernible from the evidence, both words were used without difference of meaning in all the senses we have mentioned.

² Taylor, *op. cit.*, pp. 181, 199. Cf. Wilamowitz, *Platon*, II, pp. 249–250.

³ I follow the order of the dialogues which has been pretty generally accepted: that is, three groups, Socratic (*Apology* to *Gorgias* or *Meno*), middle (*Cratylus* to *Phaedrus* or *Theaetetus*, including the *Republic*), and later (*Parmenides* to *Laws*). For details, and variants in the order, see Ritter, *Platon* (Munich, 1910–23), I, pp. 199–273, and Überweg-Prächter, I, *Phil. des Altertums*, 12th ed. (Berlin, 1926), pp. 199–218.

⁴ The datives there, e.g., *μιᾷ ιδέᾳ τὰ ἀνόσια ἀνόσια εἶναι*, which apparently lead Ritter, *N. U.*, p. 258, to call the *ἰδέα* the *cause* of impiety, etc., seem to me datives of means rather than of cause. See below on *Meno*, 72c.

noted are the *τινά*, and the fact that piety and impiety are coupled together; further, that piety is spoken of as existing in pious actions.

The other Hippocratean usage first appears in the *Gorgias* (454e, δύο εἰδη θῶμεν πειθόντων, ‘let us assume two kinds of persuasion’), and recurs with increasing frequency in the dialogues, though it does not at once become important for us.

Meno — (72c). All the virtues have ἐν γέ τι εἶδος, δι' ὃ εἰσὶν ἀπεταί. This is the ‘single form’ of the *Euthyphro*; for Socrates goes on to say that by looking at it we can define what virtue is. The phrase δι' ὃ, ‘by virtue of which,’ is interesting. Formally, it makes the ‘token’ a principle of definition only: that by which the virtues are virtues and not something else. But it also suggests, like the ϕ of *Euthyphro* 5d, that the form is an objective quality as well as a logical criterion. Note again the *τι*.

Of the other Socratic dialogues, the *Apology*, *Crito*, *Hippias Minor*, *Lysis*, and *Republic*, Book I,¹ have no example of *εἶδος* or *ἰδέα*; the *Charmides* has them only in the colloquial sense. There are but 20 occurrences in the whole group, and of these only 8 have any relevance to the Ideas.² This rather surprising fact, as we shall see later, is not due to lack of opportunity for using the words; instead, it confirms Taylor’s conclusions³ on their scarcity in Attic speech.⁴

Cratylus — (389b). Socrates has just suggested that the maker of a κερκίς works with his eye on τοιοῦτον τι ὃ ἐπεφύκει κερκίζειν; and now this phrase is summed up in the words ἐκεῖνο τὸ εἶδος. How

¹ On this book as a Socratic dialogue see Lutoslawsky, *Origin and Growth of Plato’s Logic* (London, 1897), pp. 171, 272 ff., and Ritter, *Platon*, I, p. 278. A. E. Taylor, *Plato, the Man and his Work* (New York, 1927), pp. 214–215, thinks it inconceivable that *Rep.* I ever stood alone; P. Shorey, *What Plato Said* (Chicago, 1933), finds it conceivable, but impossible to prove.

² There are two passages in the *Hippias Maior*, 289d and 298b; but since the authenticity of the dialogue has been denied (see Prächter, *op. cit.*, p. 256, and Wilamowitz, *Platon*, II, pp. 327–328), it seems unsafe to appeal to it for early Platonic usage.

³ Above, p. 20, note 2.

⁴ It also agrees with Aristotle’s testimony, *Metaph.* A6, 987b 8 and M4, 1078b 32, that it was Plato (that is, by implication, not Socrates) who introduced the term *ἰδέα*.

shall we translate *εἰδος* here? It is a *form*; but the form of a tool seems to be identical with its function, and this function is an objective principle of definiteness (Ritter calls it ‘Grundbestimmtheit’) which the artisan sees in nature¹ and transfers to his product. It could equally well be called a natural class, one of the *kinds* of function involved in weaving. Socrates goes on to say that there is a special form of *κερκίς* (and, by implication, a special class of *κερκίσειν*) for each kind of web; this special form is called *ἰδέα*.

(424cd).² The objective side of the *εἰδος* — its aspect as a natural *kind* — appears more clearly in the application of the parable to the subject of the *Cratylus*, the science of naming. The man who wishes to name things properly must learn to analyze the elements of language by classes, *κατὰ εἴδη*, and then determine whether these *εἴδη* correspond to those present in the things to be named. It is useless to pursue Plato’s half-playful words too far; but at least the phrase *κατὰ εἴδη διελέσθαι*, which first occurs here, should be noted.

The *Symposium* has no example of *εἰδος* or *ἰδέα* which is of any importance for our subject. For the greater part of the dialogue, which so perfectly carries the flavor of Attic speech, this need not surprise us; but it is curious that Diotima never applies either word to the so-called ‘Idea of the Beautiful.’

The same must be said for most of the *Phaedo*. Not once is *εἰδος* or *ἰδέα* applied to the Ideas in the long discussion of immortality in which they are so often involved. Only in 102–106, where Socrates undertakes a *dialectical* proof of immortality, do the words appear.

(102b). Here Socrates, referring to 100b,³ says, ὡμολογεῖτο εἶναι τι ἔκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν, καὶ τούτων μεταλαμβάνοντα [sc. τὰλλα] . . . τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν ἴσχειν. The interpretation of *εἰδος* here is a crux for

¹ Its basis in *nature* is emphasized by the constant recurrence of *φύσις*, *ἐπεφύκει*, etc., 387–390. In fact, *φύσις* is used for *εἰδος*, 389c.

² Interesting negatively is 418e, ἀγαθοῦ *ἰδέα οὖσα τὸ δέον*, which has nothing to do with the ‘Idea of the Good.’ It is exactly like Thucydides’ *πᾶσα ίδέα θανάτου*: ‘variety,’ ‘species’ of good.

³ Which in turn is a summary of many similar passages earlier in the dialogue.

the whole question of its meaning in Plato. After a long exposition of the transcendent Ideas,¹ in which they are never called *εἶδη*, but simply *αὐτὸς τὸ ἵσον*, *αὐτὸς τὸ καλόν*, etc., he suddenly and casually speaks of '*τῶν εἰδῶν*'. Whence the definiteness of this *τῶν*? Either (1) *εἶδος* was already, at the time of the *Phaedo*, so well-established a term for the transcendent Idea that Plato could use it in that sense without any explanation, or (2) it is used in a non-technical sense understandable to any intelligent reader, and the meaning of 'Idea' lies not in the word *εἶδος* but in its context. We cannot fully refute (1) without more evidence; but we can say that there is no parallel and no basis for such a meaning of *εἶδος* in the dialogues up to the *Phaedo*. On the contrary, the sense which best fills the requirements of the case is that of *Crat.* 424d: the old Hippocratean 'kind,' 'natural class.' Good, Bad, Equal, Unequal, and so on are kinds of things or actions which we all distinguish in the world about us. To hear them called such would surprise no educated Athenian; and the word *εἶδος* would not be strange to him.²

To understand what follows, however, we must remember that the Hippocratean *εἶδος* combined in itself the notions of logical class and natural kind. For Socrates goes on to develop a curious train of argument. He is showing that contraries exclude each other, that a class, in itself, cannot partake of its opposite; and he phrases this logical principle as if it were a battle. The opposite *εἶδη*, e.g., Hot and Cold, advance and retreat alternately, capture and abandon a position (say a quantity of water) by turns.³ Plato's metaphorical language should not be pushed too far, but at least it is obvious that these *εἶδη* are not remote, transcendent, immobile Ideas. They are real powers existing and working in nature.⁴

¹ That they are so will appear later. Even Ritter (*N. U.*, p. 280) admits that these earlier pages are 'höchst bedenklich.'

² Cf. Isocrates' *εἶδη λόγων*, above, p. 19, note 8.

³ ιοζδ τὸ πῦρ γε αὖ [sc. δοκεῖ] προσιόντος τοῦ ψυχροῦ αὐτῷ η ὑπεξιέναι η ἀπολεῖσθαι. The substitution of *πῦρ* for *θερμόν*, concrete for abstract, is wholly in keeping.

⁴ Ritter's definition: the objective basis of our notions of a class (*N. U.*, p. 276), is good, though it needs to be amplified to include this aspect of real power and activity. But he gives it as a definition of the *Idea*, which is certainly something quite different.

Republic — (402c). We shall not be educated men, says Socrates, until we recognize τὰ σωφροσύνης εἶδη καὶ ἀνδρεῖας . . . καὶ τὰ τούτων αὖ ἐναντία πανταχοῦ περιφερόμενα . . . καὶ ἐνόντα ἐν οἷς ἔνεστιν. What are these *εἶδη* that move about in changing combinations and reside in men's souls? They are qualities, surely, but of what sort? They cannot be better defined than in the words of James Adam: “‘forms’ or ‘kinds,’ in the sense in which the immanent reality which every general notion attempts to express is a ‘form’ or ‘kind’ — a genus or species — of the totality of things. . . . The genitives are genitives of definition.”¹ The qualities of temperance, courage, and so on, are *kinds* which play their shifting parts in that sector of nature which includes human character. Similarly, in 434d, Socrates, having proposed τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν as a definition of justice, warns us that it must not be accepted until εἰς ἔνα ἔκαστον τῶν ἀνθρώπων λὸν τὸ εἶδος τοῦτο ὅμολογήται καὶ ἐκεῖ δικαιοσύνη εἴναι. Is this *εἶδος* (that is, τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν) a ‘way of acting’² or a ‘class of actions’? It is both: such a way of acting is *ipso facto* one of the many ‘kinds’ of moral action that reside in men.³

(476a). Socrates has just propounded the argument (475e) that *καλόν* and *αισχρόν* are two distinct things and that therefore each of them is one. He goes on: *καὶ περὶ δὴ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ ἄγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν πέρι ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος, . . . αὐτὸ μὲν ἐν ἔκαστον εἶναι, . . . πανταχοῦ [δὲ] φανταξόμενα πολλὰ φαίνεσθαι ἔκαστον*, ‘and for Justice and Injustice and Good and Bad, and for all the Kinds,⁴ the same thing is true: each, in itself, is one, but it appears in many relations and so seems to be many.’ The word *eidos* should need no further explanation; the similarity in thought

¹ Ed. of *The Republic* of Plato (Cambridge, 1902), I, p. 168. Ritter (*N. U.*, p. 291, note 63) admits this interpretation as possible; though he then takes *ēlōn* to mean *subspecies* of character.

² Cf. above, p. 10, note 2.

³ Cf. 432b, where justice is *τὸ λοιπὸν εἶδος*, namely, the remaining one of the four kinds of virtue.

⁴ Henceforth I use the word 'Kinds,' capitalized, for those $\epsilon\tilde{\delta}\eta$ out of which the Ideas developed. 'Class' would do equally well if its connotations were less exclusively logical.

and phrasing to *Phaedo* 102b ff. is obvious. The Kind, then, has a twofold aspect: there is a sense in which it is one, and a sense in which it is many.¹ But the interesting thing is the argument by which Plato arrives at the one-ness. The Kind 'in itself' is a unity, not because it stands apart from the 'many,' but because it is distinct from its opposite (475e)! The contrast between the one and the many is the second step in the argument, not the first. The full bearing of this curious fact will appear later.

(507b). Says Socrates, 'We are in the habit of distinguishing πολλὰ καλά and so on,' καὶ αὐτὸ δὴ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, . . . πάλιν αὖ κατ' ἰδέαν μίαν ἔκαστον, ὡς μᾶς οὕσης, τιθέντες, 'δὲ ἔστιν ἔκαστον'² προσαγορεύομεν, i.e., 'and in turn we posit a Beautiful-in-itself and a Good, in accordance with a single, unique form which we assume to exist for each of them; and we call them 'what each Kind³ really is.' ' Or, to restate it once more, each Kind is assumed to have a unique characteristic token, different from that of any other Kind; and on the basis of this assumption the real identity of the Kind, what it is, is concentrated in one essence, which Plato calls the αὐτὸ καλόν, etc., and which we call the Idea. The common use of the word 'Idea' to mean the essence itself rather than the formal token by which it is recognized, though perhaps not strictly accurate, has this justification: there cannot be any great difference between them,⁴ since the μία ἰδέα is not only intuited (*νοεῖσθαι*, 507b 10) but assumed to exist objectively (*ὡς μᾶς οὕσης*).⁵ In that

¹ It is significant that *εἴναι* and *φαίνεσθαι* have the same subject, namely τὰ εἶδη, with *ἔκαστον* in apposition.


² The quotation marks should include *ἔκαστον*, not merely δὲ ἔστιν.

³ That τῶν εἰδῶν is to be supplied after *ἔκαστον* (and *ἔκαστον*) is apparent from 476a.

⁴ Adam's suggestion, *καὶ* for *κατ'*, would remove any doubt. The next sentence (*τὰς δὲ αὖ ἰδέας νοεῖσθαι*) suggests that the word *ἰδέα* is more than a mere qualification of αὐτὸ καλόν.

⁵ By rights, αὐτὸ εἶδος ('the Kind itself') should be the natural term and *μία ἰδέα* ('single form') the logical; but see the next passage.

case the three essential elements of the scheme could be represented by a crude sketch:



Thus the *αὐτὸν εἶδος* is the citadel, the acropolis, as it were, of the Kind, whose particular embodiments spread out from this center like Athens from her sacred hill. In it the identity and meaning of the whole is enshrined.

It will be useful to remember that this scheme applies equally to nature and to logic and epistemology. The Kind, the particulars, and the Idea each have an objective and a subjective side. Thus the inner circle represents the real essence, the class-concept, and true knowledge (*νόησις*); the outer region, the physical particulars, sense-impressions, and sense-perception. But — and this is the key to much mystery and ambiguity in Plato — the Kind tends to be neglected on all these counts. Vital though it was as the organic link between the two circles, both in nature and in logic, it was nevertheless so completely taken for granted that it fell back into the shadow, obscured by the very brilliance and clarity of the Idea. This process is partly to be seen at work in

(511c). Socrates has just set up the famous ‘line’ of opinion and knowledge, of which only the highest division concerns us. Here (the method is called dialectic) the reasoner first ascends to the highest principle of all, and then descends to his conclusion, *αἰσθητῷ . . . οὐδενὶ προσχρώμενος, ἀλλ’ εἰδὲσιν αὐτοῖς δι’ αὐτῶν εἰς αὐτά, καὶ τελευτᾷ εἰς εἴδη*. These *εἴδη αὐτά* are Ideas, but Ideas in their logical aspect: that is, they are pure concepts. By the very nature of the discussion, their natural side is neglected and all the emphasis thrown on their conceptual purity.¹ But that the word

¹ Hence the curious repetition *αὐτοῖς . . . αὐτῶν . . . αὐτά*. This one-sidedness is corrected in *Phaedrus* 265d ff., and in subsequent dialogues.

εἶδος itself has not been appropriated to this meaning¹ is clear from Plato's speaking of *τὰ ὁρῶμενα εἴδη* (510d), as for example that of the triangle. Adam is certainly right in translating this 'visible kinds.'

(596a ff.). *εἶδος γάρ πού τι ἐν ἔκαστον εἰώθαμεν τίθεσθαι περὶ ἔκαστα τὰ πολλά.* Here the line of development of the *Phaedo* and *Republic* merges with that of the *Cratylus*. The examples are taken from the world of the craftsman, and the 'form' which he imitates is said to be grounded in nature (597b), as Socrates had maintained in the *Cratylus*; the language echoes *Rep.* 507b.² It is notable that here Plato neglects the Kind even more than before, and seems to say, like a modern logician, "We start with the particulars, and then assume them to have a common form"; but it has already been suggested, and will be made clearer later, that he really approached the problem from the opposite direction.

Before attacking the *Phaedrus* and the later dialogues, we must go back a little in the *Republic*. In 511c dialectic was described as the highest and purest form of reasoning, dealing only with *εἴδη αὐτά*. In 454a it has rather different implications. Socrates chides those ardent debaters and pursuers of distinctions who brawl rather than argue, *διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι κατ' εἴδη διαιρούμενοι τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ κατ' αὐτὸ τὸ σύνομα διώκειν . . . , ἔριδι, οὐ διαλέκτῳ . . . χρώμενοι.* Dialectic, then, consists, at least partly, in *κατ' εἴδη διαιρεῖσθαι*. This phrase — almost the motto of the later dialogues — first appeared in *Crat.* 424, where it was applied to the analysis of sounds and letters by classes. But not simply by classes. The contrast between *εἴδη* and *ὄνομα* is a contrast between true and false — between real, objective kinds and arbitrary, subjective classifications. In other words, whatever Plato meant by dialectic in *Rep.* 511c, here it is exactly what we call science.

This becomes even more obvious in the *Phaedrus*. Again it is

¹ The only case that could be cited is *εἴδη* in the passage just quoted; but there *αὐτά* has already been used to the point of surfeit.

² *Εἶδός τι ἐν = μία ἰδέα.* The *τι*, which appears here as in *Euthyphro* and *Meno*, is also found in 479a, the first mention of such a form in the *Republic*. In the present passage *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα* are used indifferently, the former twice, the latter three times.

worth remarking that Plato does not use *εἰδος* or *ἰδέα* in the sublime vision of the heavenly Ideas, *Phaedr.* 247c-e. In 249b, however, he descends abruptly from these heights and says, δεῖ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον συνιέναι κατ' εἰδος τὸ λεγόμενον, ἐκ πολλῶν ιόντων αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἐν λογισμῷ συναιρούμενον· τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἀνάμνησις ἐκείνων ἡ ποτ' εἰδεν ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχή. The point lies in the word *ἄνθρωπον*. For *κατ' εἰδος συνιέναι* is the *human*, mortal way of recalling the Ideas; the direct contemplation of them being reserved to gods and true philosophers. This, then, is the famous *ἀνάμνησις*: not simply a recollection of the Ideas, but the humble and prosaic method of induction. But induction is only one half of the complete discipline; the other half is added in 265de:² εἰς μίαν τε ἰδέαν συνορῶντα ἄγειν τὰ πολλαχῆ διεσπαρρένα . . . [καὶ] πάλιν κατ' εἰδη δύνασθαι διατέμνειν κατ' ἄρθρα ἢ πέφυκεν. Here every word is significant. This dialectic³ involves an ascent to a ‘single form’ and then a descent from it; but there is no question of pure Ideas. It is the method of *Rep.* 511c applied to nature. Its inductive half, leading to the *μία ἰδέα*, recalls the earlier dialogues, but with the great difference that the ‘single form’ is now a result attained by intellectual labor, and not something assumed or found ready-made in nature.⁴ On the deductive side, the notion of following the indications of *nature*, which was implied in *Rep.* 454a, is made explicit by *κατ' ἄρθρα ἢ πέφυκεν*.

The contrast with *Rep.* 511c becomes amply clear in *Phaedr.* 271b, when Plato proposes a science of — rhetoric! The orator’s business shall be to analyze τὰ λόγων τε καὶ ψυχῆς γένη (εἰδη, 271d) καὶ τὰ τούτων παθήματα, and adapt the one to the other. To apply the *νόησις* of the *Republic* to ‘kinds of speech’ would have been sacrilege; here they are assigned to dialectic as a matter of course.

Parmenides — This unique dialogue, the battle-ground of com-

¹ τὸ is required so that *συνιέναι* may have an object. Cf. the parallel passage *Rep.* 454a, above, and Ritter, *N. U.*, p. 302.

² It is really implied in 249b; see Stenzel, *Studien zur Entwicklung der platonischen Dialektik*, 2nd ed. (Leipzig, 1931), p. 110.

³ Specifically so called, 266b.

⁴ Compare *συναιρούμενον*, *συνορῶντα ἄγειν*, with the *ἀποβλέπων* of *Euthyphro* 6e or the *τιθέντες* of *Rep.* 507b.

mentators, is even more than the *Phaedrus* a bridge from the old, naïve Socratic method to the new. Here we meet *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα* in a profusion unmatched in any previous dialogue;¹ and we find them used in the old way for almost the last time. *Εἶδος* and *ἰδέα* were uncommon up to the *Phaedrus*; it is only in retrospect, saying farewell to his earlier philosophy, that Plato loses this reticence.

The clearest and most revealing summarization of the old view is to be found in *Parm.* 132a. Οἷμαι σε, says Parmenides, ἐκ τοῦ τοιοῦτοῦ ἐν ἔκαστον εἶδος οἴεσθαι εἶναι· ὅταν πόλλα ἄττα μεγάλα σοι δόξῃ εἶναι, μία τις ἵστως δοκεῖ ἰδέα ἡ αὐτὴ εἶναι ἐπὶ πάντα ἰδόντι, ὅθεν ἐν τῷ μέγα ἥγη εἶναι. The affinity of this with *Rep.* 476a, 507b, 596a is obvious: again we have the *ἔκαστον εἶδος*, the *ἔκαστα τὰ πολλά*, and the *μία τις ἰδέα*. 'Ιδόντι also is characteristic. To complete the terminology, we find *αὐτὸς καθ'* αὐτὸς εἶδός τι (129a) and *αὐτὰ τὰ εἰδή* (129c); and to complete the resemblance in thought, we see the forms introduced in pairs (*ὅμοιον, ἀνόμοιον*, 129a; *ἐν, πλῆθος*, 129b). It is beyond all question, then, that this is the theory of Ideas as we had it in the *Phaedo* and *Republic*, the only difference being that they are more unconstrainedly referred to as *τὰ εἰδή, τὰς ἰδέας*.² Now, what is it that wrecks the theory? Parmenides is able to reduce it to absurdity because there is no demonstrable connection between the *μία ἰδέα* and the *πολλά*. I say 'demonstrable' because, though Socrates believes firmly in such a connection, he cannot say just what it is.³ And this agrees with our analysis in the *Republic*. The only link between *μία ἰδέα* and *πολλά* was the old 'Kind,' which was unconsciously taken for granted as standing in the background. But the Kind remained in shadow while all the light of attention was focussed on the *μία ἰδέα*; and the result is that Socrates cannot put his finger on it when he needs it. Still, the fact remains that the 'separation' of the Ideas from reality is a logical consequence of his theory, not an original part of it.

¹ Ritter, *N. U.*, pp. 252–254 and 315–317, lists 50 occurrences of *εἶδος* and 5 of *ἰδέα*, in senses relevant to the Ideas, within the six Stephanus pages 129–135; in all the other dialogues combined he counts 31. But this latter figure is too low.

² E.g., 133d, 134c. But notice the *τις* in Parmenides' summary.

³ 131a is typical of the old naïveté. Parmenides asks, *πότερον οὖν δοκεῖ σοι ὅλον τὸ εἶδος ἐν ἔκάστῳ εἶναι τῶν πολλῶν ἐν ὅν;* and Socrates replies, *τι γὰρ κωλύει;*

Parmenides now goes on, in a very important passage (135a ff.), to draw his conclusion. "This doctrine of Ideas (*αὐτό τι ἔκαστον εἶδος*) cannot help leading to many difficulties and paradoxes, so that to unravel them requires a man of surpassing genius. On the other hand, he who altogether rejects *εἴδη τῶν ὄντων* or an *ἰδέαν τῶν ὄντων τὴν αὐτὴν* *ἀεὶ* destroys all science; for science [i.e., dialectic, *ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεοθαι δύναμις*, 135c] demands these tools, call them what you will.¹ What you need, Socrates, is practise in the handling of such *εἴδη*." The cardinal point is that Parmenides does not reject the absolute Ideas; he only lays them aside for the divine few who are capable of such high considerations, and turns to the less exacting demands of ordinary dialectic. We saw that this was also the gist of *Phaedrus* 249b. As for the *εἴδη τῶν ὄντων*, the important thing at this point is that they are not the same as the *αὐτὰ εἴδη*.² What they are will soon become clear.

In one aspect, the *Sophist* and *Politicus* are sample books of exercises, especially on the deductive side, in the dialectical method recommended by the *Phaedrus* and *Parmenides*. In seeking the definition of 'the angler,' for example, one proceeds by taking the general class 'art' or 'technique' (*τέχνη*), dividing it into two, again dividing the appropriate half, and so on until the definition is reached.³ As for the terms used, one example will do for all. *Τῶν γε τεχνῶν πασῶν σχεδὸν εἴδη δύο*, says the Eleatic stranger, *Soph.* 219a. Now this *εἴδη δύο* is not new; we met it in Hippocrates, and in Plato himself as early as *Gorg.* 454e, whence it is used continuously throughout the dialogues.⁴ It is necessary to emphasize the point, as against the supposition that these *εἴδη* must somehow be derived from the Ideas of the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*.

¹ This argument is unmistakably alluded to in *Philebus* 15–16, a passage which is steeped in the new dialectic; see Zeller, *Phil. der Griechen*, II, 1⁶ (Leipzig, 1922), p. 463, note 2.

² The difference lies in the dropping of *αὐτός* and *τις*; for the significance of these words see below, pp. 34–35, 38ff.

³ The general theory and practise of dialectic is brilliantly treated by Stenzel, *Studien*, pp. 45–105; the various *διαιρέσεις* of the *Sophist* and the *Politicus* are painstakingly analyzed by Ritter, *N. U.*, pp. 1 and 71–73.

⁴ For the occurrences of *εἶδος* in this use see Ritter's table, *N. U.*, opposite p. 323, under 'εἶδος = Gattung.'

It is true that in those dialogues *aντὸ εἶδος* was used to mean ‘form’ or ‘Idea’; but there was no evidence that the word *εἶδος* itself had acquired that meaning.¹ We can say, therefore, that when Plato distinguishes things by ‘kinds,’ as he does throughout the *Sophist* and the *Politicus*, both his act and his language are commonplace. The *εἶδος τῶν ὄντων* of the *Parmenides* is *εἶδος* in its original, non-technical sense of ‘kind’;² the novelty lies in its being used *systematically*, as the tool of a rigorous intellectual method.

(246b ff.). There is a group of philosophers, says the Eleatic, who believe that true Being resides in *νοητὰ ἄττα καὶ ἀσώματα εἰδῆ*. He also calls them *τοὺς τῶν εἰδῶν φίλους* (248a). In these two passages the *εἰδῆ* are unquestionably Ideas, pure forms. But notice that they are first introduced somewhat ironically, as *ἄττα εἰδῆ*, and are unmistakably set off from the ordinary ‘kinds’ by the adjectives *νοητά* and *ἀσώματα*. Hence there is no ambiguity when the Eleatic returns to the normal meaning in the following passage.

(253b ff.). After rejecting the Ideas as useless because of their rigidity and isolation from each other, the Eleatic sets up five categories (Being, Rest, Movement, the Same, and the Other) for the investigation of reality. These *γένη* or *εἰδῆ*, as he calls them, are in mutual connection with one another; and to analyze their relations is the task of dialectic. The categories, then, are ‘natural kinds’ like the others, but of higher rank³ and wider application. The dialectical method itself is described (253d) in terms reminiscent of the *Phaedrus*, but more elaborate. Suffice it to say that each of its two halves, inductive and deductive, ends in a *μία ἴδεα*. And this *ἴδεα* is not only an intellectual, but also a natural entity, a kind existing in nature.⁴ The old parallelism of nature and logic

¹ See above, p. 27.

² From the *Parmenides* on there is no need to capitalize the word ‘kind.’ The Kind has played out its peculiar rôle as the matrix of the Idea, and henceforth ceases to have any organic connection, at least in the old way, with the ideal world.

³ They are *μέγιστα εἰδῆ*, 254c, 255c, etc.

⁴ Cf. 235d ἡ ζητούμενη ἴδεα, 254a τῇ τοῦ ὄντος ἀεὶ διὰ λογισμῶν προσκείμενος ἴδεα with *Polit.* 258c τὴν πολιτικὴν ἀτραπὸν . . . χωρὶς ἀφελόντας ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἴδεαν αὐτῇ μίαν ἐπισφραγίσασθαι; and see Stenzel’s extraordinarily subtle analysis, *Studien*, pp. 62–94.

continues unchanged in the new system. This remark is well illustrated by the following.

(255de). Πέμπτον δὴ τὴν θατέρου φύσιν λεκτέον ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσιν . . . ἐν ἔκαστον γὰρ ἔτερον εἶναι . . . διὰ τὸ μετέχειν τῆς ἴδεας τῆς θατέρου. It should not be necessary to demonstrate that there is no 'Idea of the Other' here, since the five categories were explicitly offered as substitutes for the Ideas. Practically, *εἶδος*, *ἴδεα*, and *φύσις* are interchangeable terms for the natural 'kind'.

Politicus — (258c). One must distinguish one branch of science called the political, καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις ἐκτροπαῖς ἐν ἄλλῳ εἶδος ἐπισημηνα-*μένους πάσας τὰς ἐπιστήμας ὡς οὕσας δύο εἴδη διανοηθῆναι.* The two-fold aspect of *εἶδος* — logical and natural — could not be more clearly put. Again, the natural side is stronger in 262ab, where both *εἶδος* and *ἴδεα* mean *true* classes as they are found in nature, in contrast to mere arbitrary divisions.¹

Philebus — (16d ff.). In approaching a definition by the deductive method, one arrives at a point where one can make no more distinctions, that is, find no further *εἴδη*; and here one cries halt. Plato calls this 'applying the category of the undefined,' i.e., the undefinable (*τὴν τοῦ ἀπείρονος ίδεαν προσφέρειν*). The *ἀπείρον* is later (23c) said to be one of the 'kinds'; but one can sense in *τοῦ ἀπείρονος ίδεα* the broader (and vaguer) meaning of 'category.'² Three passages of the *Philebus* (25b, 60d, 64a) betray a tendency to use *ἴδεα* in an even looser sense, like our colloquial 'nature,' 'form,' 'kind of thing.' This casual use of *ἴδεα* is a 'late' characteristic.

Timaeus — Plato has described two of the three constituents of reality, the eternal model and its reproduction, and now comes (48e ff.) to the 'receptacle' or medium in which the products of creation are received. But just what are these products? Plato calls them *σώματα* (50b), *ἴδεαι* (50d), and *γένη* (50e), besides comparing them to the *σχήματα* (50a) which the goldsmith fashions in his material — in other words, he calls them bodies, forms, and kinds. This apparent confusion is cleared somewhat in 53c ff., where the origin of physical bodies is traced in some detail. The

¹ This was the sense of *κατ' εἴδη διαιρεῖσθαι* in *Rep.* 454a; the phrase also occurs in *Soph.* 264c, 267d, *Polit.* 262d, e, 285a, 286d, and *Phil.* 23d.

² Cf. also *Polit.* 289b.

four elements, of which all bodies are composed, are each based on a special geometrical form of atom, that of earth being cubical, that of fire pyramidal, etc. It is evident that these atoms are bodies, geometrical forms,¹ and kinds all at once; and all three aspects are epitomized in the key-words *γεγονότα εἴδη*.² This interesting phrase had already been used in *Theaet.* 203–205 for the syllable, considered as a natural unity, and in *Phil.* 32b for a ‘living (*έμψυχον*) creature.’ Apparently it can be applied to any created thing in its generic aspect.

(51b ff.). Seeking to describe the ‘model’ itself, Timaeus mentions it as a recognized fact that *εἶναι τι φαμεν εἶδος ἐκάστου νοητόν*. The phrase could stand in *Rep.* 507b or in the *Parmenides*. But he goes on (52a) to call the Idea *ἀγέννητον καὶ ἀνώλεθρον, οὐτε . . . εἰσδεχόμενον ἄλλο ἄλλοθεν οὔτε αὐτὸς εἰς ἄλλο ποι ιόν*. These are epithets that we did not find associated with *εἶδος* in the *Republic*; the only parallel passage is that on the ‘friends of the Ideas,’ *Soph.* 246–248.³ In these two passages there can be no doubt that we have to do with eternal, transcendent Ideas,⁴ which are called *εἴδη*.

It is striking how often *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα* are used in the *Timaeus*,⁵ and how often they have a loose, vague meaning. 42d is typical: *εἰς τὸ τῆς . . . ἀρίστης . . . εἶδος ἔξεως*, ‘to the best (sort of) condition’; or 49c, [πῦρ] *εἰς ιδέαν ἀπὶὸν αὐθὶς ἀέρος*, ‘back into (the form of) air.’⁶ I ascribe this watering down of meaning, which was also apparent in the *Philebus*, to the habit of using *εἶδος* and *μία ιδέα* as dialectical terms; they had become stock words in the lecture-rooms of the Academy.

It seems to me that the famous *ιδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* of the *Republic*,⁷

¹ The atoms themselves are made up of equilateral triangles — apparently incorporeal — in four types of combination.

² 54d, e, 55a, d, e, 56b, e.

³ The word *νοητόν* is common to all three: *Rep.* 507–511 *passim*, *Soph.* 246b, 249a–c, *Tim.* 51c.

⁴ This in spite of Ritter, *N. U.*, p. 241, who sees in these *εἴδη* nothing but the ordinary meanings of ‘form’ and ‘kind.’

⁵ Ritter lists 59 occurrences of *εἶδος* in all, and 14 of *ιδέα*; the *Rep.*, which is four times as long, has 73 and 21 respectively, the *Laws*, 30 and 2.

⁶ Similar cases 59c, 70c, 71b, 73c, 75a. As Ritter says, *N. U.*, p. 248, “Es ist zur nichtssagenden Umschreibungsformel geworden.”

⁷ 505a, 508e, 511c, 526e, 534c.

which I purposely omitted above, has to be understood in this light. The more carefully one traces the use of *iδέα* in the *Republic*, the clearer it becomes that the *iδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* is an exceptional case. It is generally admitted that the 'Idea of the Good' is not an ordinary Idea; but that is not all. Contrast the offhand manner in which Socrates introduces the word *iδέα* itself (505a, ὅτι γε ἡ ἀγαθοῦ *iδέα* μέγιστον μάθημα, πολλάκις ἀκήκοας), and especially the casual *ἡ*, with the caution in his first mention of the 'forms' (479a, *iδέαν τινὰ αὐτοῦ κάλλους*).¹ But the critical point is that the use of *iδέα* here seems to be quite casual. To *ἀγαθόν*, which is the important word, it adds little or no specific meaning,² only a slight infusion of 'kind' or 'category'. There is no space in an essay of this kind to discuss so difficult a subject as Plato's conception of the Good; but we can risk the statement that the phrase *iδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ* offers no basis for calling it an Idea.³

Now let us come to a small matter which is of considerable importance in Plato's use of *εἶδος* and *iδέα*: the significance of *τις* and *τι*. Up to the *Phaedrus* he habitually introduces the 'form' or 'token' of his Kinds as *μία τις iδέα* or *ἐν τι εἶδος*.⁴ This I take as a sort of apology for using *εἶδος* and *iδέα* in an unfamiliar context. But as the phrases reappear, introduced each time by *τις* or *τι*, they also take on the air of a quotation. These 'forms' are something novel and slightly recondite, and they are referred to as if they were known to the auditor or the reader from another context. The Kinds, on the other hand, Plato calls simply *τὰ εἴδη* — that is, the natural classes of things and actions that everybody is familiar with. In the *Parmenides*, where this early philosophy is surveyed for the last time, *μία τις iδέα* reappears and the discussion is full of *τι*, *τινά*, *ἄττα*. All the greater the contrast with the *εἴδη τῶν ὄντων* which Parmenides declares indispensable to science. It

¹ Cf. below on *τις*, *τι*.

² This is the judgment of Wilamowitz, *Platon*, II, p. 250. Τὸ *ἀγαθόν* (*nota bene*, rarely *αὐτὸ τὸ ἀγαθόν*) is more frequent than *iδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*, *Rep.* 505 ff.

³ It is perhaps significant that Simplicius, in his reference to the famous lost lecture of Plato on the Good (*τὴ περὶ τἀγαθοῦ συνονοσίᾳ*: in his note on Aristotle's *Physics* 3, 4, ed. Diels, I, p. 454, 18), does not use the word *iδέα*.

⁴ *Euthyphro* 5d, *Meno* 72c, *Rep.* 479a, 596a, *Parm.* 129a. After the first occurrence of *iδέα* in a passage, the *τις* can of course be dropped.

is natural that these latter *εἰδη*, being simply natural kinds, should not be qualified by *τις*; but neither is *μία ἴδεα* in the *Phaedrus* and succeeding dialogues.¹ This dialectical ‘form,’ which in its later use has no direct connection with the Ideas, is neither new nor recondite, and so the *τις* is dropped. Finally we have the two later passages in which transcendent *εἰδη* are mentioned — *Soph.* 246a ff. and *Tim.* 51c ff. — and here the indefinite reappears (*ἄττα, τις*). We can say, then, that in general *εἶδος* and *ἴδεα* meaning ‘pure form’ or ‘Idea’ are introduced afresh in each dialogue by a qualifying indefinite.

III

We can now pass to certain other words and phrases which have to do with the Idea. One of these is closely allied with the *ἴκαστον τῶν εἰδῶν* of *Phaedo* 102b and *Rep.* 476a, which, as we saw, meant “each of the natural Kinds.” The phrase is a summary, used in each case to label a group of Kinds which have come up for discussion, e.g., *τὸ ἀγαθόν, τὸ κακόν, τὸ μέγα, τὸ σμικρόν*. Now these same Kinds appear constantly in the earlier dialogues without ever being summarized in the word *ἴκαστον*; so for example the *ὅσιον* and *ἀνόσιον* of the *Euthyphro*. We can therefore draw material about the Kinds from territory where *εἶδος* does not occur. *Prot.* 332d ff. is a fruitful example. Socrates has asked whether there is one virtue or many; and he attacks the problem with the statement that different things have different causes; for example, *τὸ . . . σωφρόνως πραττόμενον ὑπὸ σωφροσύνης πράττεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἀφρόνως ὑπὸ ἀφροσύνης*. The interesting word here is *ὑπό*. A temperate action is performed by temperance, and so on! And lest this seem a mere figure of speech, consider *Rep.* 351de, where justice and injustice are said to create (*παρέχειν*) harmony and discord respectively. Further, they create them by ‘being in’ or ‘dwelling in’ a State (*ἐνῷ, ἐγγιγνομένῃ, ἐνοῦσα*).² In quite the same spirit, Glaucon, insisting that Socrates define justice, asks, “What does it *do* when a man has it in his soul?” (366e).

¹ *Phaedr.* 249b, 265d, 273e, *Polit.* 258c, *Phil.* 16d, and *Legg.* 965c — never with *τις*.

² Similarly, in *Lach.* 192a *ταχύτης* is said to reside in swift actions.

This notion that the Kinds are active is frequently summed up in the word *δύναμις*. Thus in *Prot.* 330a the virtues, and in *Rep.* 346a the arts, are said to be distinct from each other because each has its own special power or function. But not only do the Kinds have powers, they *are* powers. In *Lach.* 192b Socrates defines speed as the power that accomplishes much in a short time, and phrases his search for a definition of courage thus: *τις οὐσα δύναμις ἡ αὐτὴ ἐν ἡδονῇ καὶ ἐν λύπῃ . . . ἀνδρεία κέκληται*; Finally, in *Rep.* 443b, justice is the *power* that makes men just. All this confirms our judgment on *Phaedo* 102–106,¹ that the Kinds are real powers working and moving in nature. The cause of good actions is not the good man, but the Good, and so on.

The principle that a kind or class is defined by what it does remains as the foundation of dialectic throughout the dialogues. In *Phaedrus* 270d it is laid down on the authority of Hippocrates that the nature of a thing is to be found in its *δύναμις* or *τὸ τι ποιεῖν αὐτὸν πέφυκεν ἢ . . . τι παθεῖν*; and the succeeding dialogues amply illustrate the point. The objects so analyzed are of course still natural kinds, *εἶδος*. As before, we sometimes find *δύναμις* substituted for *εἶδος*, e.g., *Polit.* 280d, 304e. In fact, it shares the fate of *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα* in these later dialogues, being watered down until *ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ δύναμις* (*Phil.* 64e) means no more than ‘the Good’ or ‘this thing the Good.’

The career of the word *φύσις* is somewhat different. One might expect to hear a great deal about the ‘nature’ of the Kinds in the early dialogues; but not so. In the *Gorgias*, 483c ff., it is Callicles who expatiates on ‘natural,’ as opposed to conventional, justice; and Glaucon, in *Rep.* 358e ff., recapitulates the same argument as one he is anxious to hear refuted. It would seem that the term *φύσις* had been appropriated by the enemy camp. Add to this the fact that Socrates had deliberately turned his back on the *φύσεως ιστορία*² of the older philosophers, and we can understand a certain Platonic aversion to the use of the word. Curiously enough, it is in relation to the arts and crafts that it first appears. In *Crat.* 387a we are reminded that processes like weaving are carried on,

¹ Above, p. 23.

² *Phaedo* 96a; cf. Aristotle, *Metaph.* A6, 987b 3.

not according to our subjective whims, but κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν φύσιν. Each tool is shaped by the *nature* of its function (389a). But this nature is identical with the form which the craftsman observes in nature and builds into his tool; and Plato actually substitutes φύσις for *iδέα* in this sense in *Crat.* 389c. Similarly, in *Rep.* 597b the ‘form’ of Bed is ἡ ἐν τῇ φύσει οὐσία [κλίνη]. In the *Republic* we also find φύσις unmistakably used as a term for the essential form (*μία iδέα*) of the Necessary and the Good (493c), of Justice (501b), of numbers (525c), and even of Being itself (537c).

Quite distinct from these cases are those like *Rep.* 454a ff., where the point is whether men and women have different ‘natures.’ Since the discussion is preceded by Socrates’ remark on κατ’ εἶδη διαιρεῖσθαι (see above, p. 27), we can say that these φύσεις are kinds or classes existing in nature and subject to dialectical investigation.¹ The same is true in *Phaedr.* 270d (above, p. 36). Thus a thing that can be defined dialectically is a φύσις in so far as it is a part of nature,² an εἶδος in so far as it is a member of a hierarchy of kinds. But the two aspects melt into each other. A φύσις may be said to have various species, εἶδη (*Phaedrus, loc. cit.*), and vice versa. Hence in *Soph.* 255de it makes little difference whether ‘the Other’ is called an εἶδος, an *iδέα*, or a φύσις. *Phil.* 18a, 28a, *Tim.* 56c present similar examples.³ Finally the word becomes as colorless as *iδέα* or δύναμις. At the end of the *Philebus* Socrates sums up the result of the discussion by saying, “The Good has escaped us,” καταπέφευγεν . . . ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ δύναμις εἰς τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ φύσιν.

There remain the interesting words μέρος and μόριον. In the Socratic dialogues they are commoner than εἶδος and *iδέα*;⁴ and the fact is significant. It is well known, for example, that one of the central Socratic problems is whether virtue is one or many.

¹ In 454b (τὸ εἶδος τὸ τῆς ἐτέρας τε καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεως . . . ὥριζόμεθα;) εἶδος is the logical distinction or classification and φύσις its counterpart in nature.

² Ritter, *N. U.*, p. 247, calls φύσις “der objektive Bestand der Gattungen”; cf. with this p. 23, note 4, above, on τὰ εἶδη.

³ It should be noted specifically that ἡ τοῦ ἀπείρου φύσις, for example (*Phil.* 18a), does not mean “the nature, i.e., character, of the Unlimited,” but the Unlimited itself.

⁴ I have counted 54 cases, mostly of μόριον, in *Euthyphro*, *Prot.*, *Lach.*, and *Gorg.*

Plato attacks the question in *Prot.* 329e ff., *Lach.* 198a ff., and *Meno* 78c ff., and each time he phrases it thus, "Is virtue one or does it have parts (*μόρια*)?" He might have said, "Does the kind or class 'virtue' have various species?" The word *μόρια* is naïve; it belongs to Hippocratic usage, wherein a 'kind' was taken as a real unity containing its species in the form of actual parts. As for the question itself, it does not get answered in these dialogues; and the reason is the lack of a systematic dialectic. It was for this very reason that Plato set up his new dialectical method, beginning in the *Republic* and *Phaedrus*. Here division or 'cutting' of species is the most prominent feature; and so *μέρος* and *μόριον* continue in the old sense. Hence they are equivalents of *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα* when the latter mean 'species' in the dialectical scheme.¹ At the same time, *μέρος* can be used to mean an arbitrary part (of a class or thing), one which is not a true species: e.g., *Polit.* 262b, 263b; and then it is opposed to *εἶδος*.

The word *γένος* is of less importance. Meaning, by its very nature, 'kind,' in the *Republic* and later dialogues it is often substituted for *εἶδος* — but only in those dialogues. In the *Republic* it first makes its appearance in connection with the three orders of citizens (429a, 434b, c, 435b), then with the 'kinds in the soul' (441d, 443d, 444b), and finally as a general word for kind, class (477c, d, 507c, e, etc.). From the *Phaedrus* on it gradually comes to be even commoner than *εἶδος*. But here too it never means anything but 'natural kind,'² sometimes with the added force of a 'true kind' as opposed to a false or arbitrary one (e.g., *κατὰ γένη διαιρεῖσθαι*, *Soph.* 253d, e). It is not a term for the Idea.

IV

Αὐτό and *αὐτὸ καθ'* *αὐτό* demand a chapter to themselves. I have already gone so far as to set up an entity called the *αὐτὸ εἶδος*, and to suggest how it is related to the Kind; but the origin and implica-

¹ An example of the three used interchangeably, *Soph.* 229bc.

² In *Parm.* 129c, *αὐτὰ τὰ γένη τε καὶ εἴδη* (similarly 135b, c, 135a), it is the word *αὐτά* which changes 'Kind' into 'Idea.' But this use of *γένος* is rare.

tions of the phrase need more light. The original sense of *aὐτό* in connection with *εἶδος* is undoubtedly “by itself, apart from other things.” On the usual interpretation, this means “the Idea apart from the particulars.” Let us see if it does. When Euthyphro defines piety as the act of prosecuting a murderer or temple-robbert (*Euthyphro* 5d), Socrates replies (6d), “I did not ask you to give me one or two τῶν πολλῶν ὅσιων, ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνο αὐτὸ τὸ εἶδος ὡς πάντα τὰ ὅσια ὅσιά ἔστιν.”¹ Here it would be more correct to say that the ‘single form’ stands apart from any particular case of piety only in order to include them all. And yet it is not even accurate to speak of ‘particular cases.’ To prosecute a murderer is a *species* of piety, not an individual instance. We must say, therefore, that *aὐτό* here marks the distinction between genus and species, not between universal and particular.² And the same situation recurs in every Socratic dialogue. In every one Socrates asks for the single form — of virtue, temperance, good — which sums up all the varieties, species, of the class in question; and this demand is pointed by the word *aὐτό*.

But *aὐτό* also has another sort of background. In *Rep.* 479a Socrates, having described the man who recognizes τὰ πολλὰ καλά but refuses to accept an *aὐτὸ καλόν*, answers him by pointing out that there is no beautiful thing *which is not also ugly*.³ He states the case more fully in 476a (see also above, p. 24), where he says that each Kind is in itself one, τῇ δὲ τῶν πράξεων καὶ σωμάτων καὶ ἀλλήλων κοινωνίᾳ . . . πολλὰ φαίνεσθαι. The much abused and tortured word ἀλλήλων is the key to the passage.⁴ The habit of taking the Kinds in pairs reaches its climax here. Justice and Injustice, Good and Bad, are inextricably bound up with men’s


¹ Cf. *Lach.* 191de, where Socrates calls for a definition of courage which shall include *all* its varieties; and the Socratic dialogues *passim*.

² Cf. *Rep.* 437d-439a: although thirst has many varieties, and a large thirst will call for a large drink, nevertheless *αὐτοῦ πώματος μόνον αὐτὸ διψος πέφυκεν*.

³ This argument was apparently a favorite one with Plato. Cf. *Phaedo* 102b (Simmias partakes of both largeness and smallness) and *Symp.* 211a.

⁴ There is no need to conjecture ἄλλη ἀλλῶν (Badham) or ἄλλ’ ἀλλῶν (Bywater). For the various efforts to interpret ἀλλήλων see Adam’s ed. of *Rep.*, I, pp. 362-364.

actions and with physical bodies, in all their variety and complexity; but above all they are bound up with each other. There is no question here of a *κοινωνία* of the Ideas; on the contrary, it is just the *αὐτὸς εἶδος* of each Kind which is clear of any entanglement. But before the *αὐτὸς εἶδος* can be defined it must be disengaged from



the mass that surrounds it, which is full of contradictory elements properly belonging to other Kinds, and shown to be unique. The simplest approach to the problem (and it is obvious that in this passage Plato is giving only the most cursory hint of the reasoning involved) was to confront each Kind with its opposite. I have represented this in the sketch. Of course the figure is inadequate, since all the *πολλὰ δίκαια* have an admixture of *ἀδίκια*, as well as of other Kinds, and vice versa. Nevertheless it serves to make visible the strange method, peculiar to Plato's early logic, of working by antinomies. The two Kinds operate like diamond on diamond, each cutting away the surface of the other so that the essence is revealed. This method is perhaps best illustrated in *Prot.* 332a–333b, but crops out everywhere in the Socratic dialogues. In the absence of a real logical scheme, with the relations between genera and between genus and species clearly set out, Plato could hardly get at the *αὐτὰ εἰδη* in any other way. It was to fill this lack that he formulated his system of dialectic.

All our evidence has shown that the Kinds, far from having no link with the 'particulars,' were actually present *in* them; and the *αὐτὸς εἶδος* was assuredly not sought out for the purpose of breaking this link. But the phrase in itself implies a claim to precedence

and special attention: this is the Kind 'proper,' the only one worthy of the name. The *aντὸ καλόν* is what ordinary beautiful things strive to be but fall short of (*Phaedo* 74de). It is perfect and free from all admixture of ugliness, as they are not. For a long time Plato introduces the phrase with a *τι*: e.g., *Crat.* 439c φῶμέν τι εἶναι αντὸ καλόν; *Phaedo* 65d φαμέν τι εἶναι δίκαιον αντό; 74a, etc. The *τι* serves as quotation marks, and suggests that *αντὸ καλόν* is already a set term.¹ This it certainly is in the *Phaedo* and *Republic*.

And now, in the *Phaedo* and the *Symposium*, the famous *χωρισμός* makes its appearance. In *Phaedo* 64c Socrates asks whether death does not consist in *χωρὶς μὲν . . . αντὸ καθ' αντὸ τὸ σῶμα γεγονέναι, χωρὶς δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν . . . αντὴν καθ' αντὴν*. This latter phrase recurs on every page of the argument. It is while separated from the body that the soul drinks in its truest, because purest, knowledge, *αὐτῇ καθ' αντὴν εἰλικρινεῖ τῇ διανοίᾳ . . . αντὸ καθ' αντὸ εἰλικρινὲς ἔκαστον . . . θηρεύειν τῶν ὄντων* (66a). The parallelism is striking. The 'separation' of the Ideas, if such it be, stands in exact proportion to the separation of the soul from the body. That *αντὸ καθ' αντό* in itself is hardly strong enough to carry this meaning of 'separation'² is evident from the addition of *εἰλικρινές*. In the *Symposium*, 211b, we find the even more striking phrase *αντὸ καθ' αντὸ μεθ' αντοῦ μονοειδὲς ἀεὶ ὅν*, and the isolation of the Idea is finally summed up (211e) in *αντὸ τὸ θεῖον καλόν*. The same exaltation appears in the 'place above Heaven' of the *Phaedrus* myth (247c-e). The *αντὸ δικαιοσύνη* and so on which dwell there are properly and constantly seen by the gods alone; the human soul, straining upward from the body, glimpses them for a single moment.

It seems, then, that *αντό* and *αντὸ καθ'* *αντό* mean 'transcendent' only in the myths, and then only when the whole context, or words like *εἰλικρινές* or *θεῖον*, make the meaning unmistakable. One must be wary in transferring it to a passage like the parable of the

¹ See above, pp. 34-35, on *μία τις ίδεα*.

² In Plato's ordinary use it serves, like *αντό*, merely to distinguish the generic form of a class from its species and accidents, without any idea of transcendence: e.g., *Rep.* 358b, Glaucon asks of justice and injustice, *τι τ' ἔστιν ἔκατερον καὶ τίνα ἔχει δύναμιν αντὸ καθ' αντὸ ἐνὸν ἐν τῷ ψυχῆ;* cf. *Meno* 88c, 100b, *Lysis* 220c, *Euthyd.* 281d.

Cave, *Rep.*, Book VII. Here the echoing of what might be called transcendental language (*πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸ φῶς*, 515e; *τὸν ἥλιον . . . αὐτὸν καθ' αὐτόν*, 516b) must be deliberate; and Plato speaks of the Ideas as *θεῖαι θεωρίαι* (517d). Yet the passage as a whole is logical and epistemological, not mythical, and the parable is a parable, not a true myth. Plato is not talking about the divine meeting of soul and Ideas face to face, as in the *Phaedo* and the *Phaedrus*, but about a logical hierarchy in which the soul rises step by step toward the divine level.

After the *Republic* (except in the *Phaedrus* myth and in *Tim.* 51c) *αὐτὸν καθ' αὐτό* ceases to have any transcendental meaning, and appears with the *εἶδη* or natural kinds as of old — but often with a new implication. For this use *Phil.* 18c is characteristic:¹ the phonetician, the investigator of spoken sounds, *οὐδὲ ἀνὲν εἰς αὐτὸν καθ' αὐτὸν ἄνευ πάντων τούτων μάθοι*. To the scientist, relationships are everything, and no sound is knowable or worth knowing which is not in relation to all the rest. In such a context, *αὐτὸν καθ' αὐτό* is almost a reproach.

V

The last important chapter in the terminology of the Ideas concerns the forms of the verb *εἶναι*. Peipers² has pursued this word into its remotest lair and amassed a staggering number of examples. For my purpose the uses of *εἶναι* are less important as a basis than as a confirmation; and so I can be brief.

Tà ὄντα appears everywhere in the dialogues in the quite untechnical sense of 'existing things.' But even this use is worth inquiring into. In the *Cratylus* Plato half-jokingly investigates the problem of names, and concludes that the name must be scientifically fitted to the thing. The parallel ὄνόματα: *πράγματα* or ὄντα runs through the whole second half of the dialogue. But words are generic in their very nature; and we have already seen³ that 'things,' in order to be properly named, must be analyzed *κατ'*

¹ Similarly in *Soph.* 238c.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 17 above.

³ P. 22 above, on *Crat.* 424c.

$\epsilon\ddot{\imath}\delta\eta$, by genera and species. Hence, when we come to the phrasing of *Crat.* 439c, $\phi\hat{\omega}m\acute{e}n\tau i\epsilon\bar{n}ai\alpha\bar{u}t\bar{o}\kappa\bar{a}l\bar{o}n\kappa\bar{a}l\dot{\alpha}\gamma\bar{a}\theta\bar{o}n\kappa\bar{a}l\bar{\epsilon}\bar{n}\bar{\epsilon}\bar{k}\bar{a}\bar{s}\bar{t}\bar{o}n\tau\bar{\omega}n\bar{\delta}\bar{\nu}\tau\bar{\omega}n\bar{o}\bar{\nu}\tau\bar{\omega}$; it is obvious that $\bar{\epsilon}\bar{k}\bar{a}\bar{s}\bar{t}\bar{o}n\tau\bar{\omega}n\bar{\delta}\bar{\nu}\tau\bar{\omega}n$ is the precise equivalent of $\bar{\epsilon}\bar{k}\bar{a}\bar{s}\bar{t}\bar{o}n\tau\bar{\omega}n\bar{\epsilon}\bar{l}\bar{\delta}\bar{\omega}n$ in *Phaedo* 102b. The $\bar{\delta}\bar{\nu}\tau\bar{\omega}$ are Kinds,¹ $\bar{\epsilon}\bar{i}\bar{\delta}\bar{\eta}$, not individual things; and each of them has an $\alpha\bar{u}t\bar{o}\bar{\epsilon}\bar{l}\bar{\delta}\bar{o}s$.²

The same principle is at work in another Platonic phrase, the famous $\delta\bar{\epsilon}\bar{s}\bar{t}\bar{i}$. What, for example, is behind the words $\delta\bar{\epsilon}\bar{s}\bar{t}\bar{i}\kappa\bar{l}\bar{i}\bar{n}\bar{\eta}$, *Rep.* 597a? Here again Peipers has done yeoman work, though he has not made the application. He sums up his analysis in these words:³ “Verba enim, quae sunt $\delta\bar{\epsilon}\bar{s}\bar{t}\bar{i}$, per se si spectas, tria significare possunt: aut quod exstat, aut quod (quae res) est aliquid, ubi δ est subjectum, aut quidquid (quod) est aliqua res, ubi δ est praedicatum.” On this seemingly trivial point a great deal depends. Most interpreters have taken the first alternative: $\delta\bar{\epsilon}\bar{s}\bar{t}\bar{i}$ is absolute and means ‘that which *is*,’ i.e., pure Being. Peipers demonstrates, on the contrary, that only the third will fit all the cases: δ must be predicate, and $\bar{\epsilon}\bar{s}\bar{t}\bar{i}$ is not absolute. But then what is the subject? Let us go back to *Rep.* 507b. “We assume,” says Plato, “an $\alpha\bar{u}t\bar{o}\bar{\epsilon}\bar{l}\bar{\delta}\bar{o}s$, and we name it ‘ $\delta\bar{\epsilon}\bar{s}\bar{t}\bar{i}\bar{\epsilon}\bar{k}\bar{a}\bar{s}\bar{t}\bar{o}n$.’” Here is our subject: $\bar{\epsilon}\bar{k}\bar{a}\bar{s}\bar{t}\bar{o}n$. And we have long since seen that the word can only stand for $\bar{\epsilon}\bar{k}\bar{a}\bar{s}\bar{t}\bar{o}n\tau\bar{\omega}n\bar{\epsilon}\bar{l}\bar{\delta}\bar{\omega}n$. Hence $\delta\bar{\epsilon}\bar{s}\bar{t}\bar{i}\bar{\epsilon}\bar{k}\bar{a}\bar{s}\bar{t}\bar{o}n$ means ‘that which each Kind is.’⁴ This is another way of expressing what we noted before, under $\alpha\bar{u}t\bar{o}$. The real identity of the Kind, its being what it is, is concentrated in the $\alpha\bar{u}t\bar{o}\bar{\epsilon}\bar{l}\bar{\delta}\bar{o}s$. That is its true self, free from the intermixture and contradictions of its appearance in the $\pi\bar{o}\bar{l}\bar{l}\bar{a}$. In short, this use of $\bar{\epsilon}\bar{n}ai$ is a direct outgrowth of the primary meaning of the word: that of identity.⁵ “ $O\bar{\epsilon}\bar{s}\bar{t}\bar{i}$ does not of itself mean ‘pure, transcendent Being.’

This once established, we can admit that $\delta\bar{\epsilon}\bar{s}\bar{t}\bar{i}$, like $\alpha\bar{u}t\bar{o}\kappa\bar{a}l\bar{o}n$, has the earmarks of a set term as early as the *Phaedo* (75d, *épi**sphra-*

¹ The words $\tau\bar{a}\bar{\delta}\bar{\nu}\tau\bar{\omega}$ themselves cannot be equivalent to $\alpha\bar{u}t\bar{o}\kappa\bar{a}l\bar{o}n$, etc.; they cannot mean ‘things’ in 438e and ‘Ideas’ in 439c.

² The same is true of $\pi\bar{r}\bar{a}\bar{y}\bar{m}\bar{a}\bar{t}\bar{a}$; cf. *Phaedo* 66e, $\alpha\bar{u}t\bar{a}\tau\bar{a}\pi\bar{r}\bar{a}\bar{y}\bar{m}\bar{a}\bar{t}\bar{a}$.

³ *Op. cit.*, pp. 41–42.

⁴ Cf. *Phaedo* 65d, 78d, *Parm.* 129b, 133d, e, 134a, c. One can see the origin of the phrase in sentences like $\bar{\delta}\bar{\rho}\bar{\theta}\bar{\omega}s\lambda\bar{e}\bar{g}\bar{e}is\pi\bar{e}\bar{p}\bar{l}\sigma\bar{w}\bar{f}\bar{r}\bar{o}\bar{s}\bar{u}\bar{n}\bar{\eta}s$, $\delta\bar{\epsilon}\bar{s}\bar{t}\bar{i}\bar{\epsilon}\bar{k}\bar{a}\bar{s}\bar{t}\bar{o}n$, *Charm.* 169c; cf. *Meno* 76d, *Crat.* 423e, *Phaedo* 74b, *Rep.* 332c, 354c, *Phaedr.* 262b.

⁵ Cf., of course, Parmenides’ δ .

γιγόμεθα τοῦτο τὸ 'δ ἔστιν') and remains so in the *Timaeus* (39e, τῷ δ ἔστι γῶν); and that in these passages it is unmistakably applied to what is an eternal, 'separate' Idea. It has absorbed a meaning which it did not have in its own nature and origin.

The same history can be traced for *οὐσία* and *τὸ ὅν*. In the *Cratylus* Socrates speaks of *τὰ ὄντα*, i.e., the Kinds, as having a *φύσις* or *οὐσία τις βέβαιος* (cf. 386e); the terms are interchangeable. This is harmless enough. Soon, however, *οὐσία* comes into association with those eternal verities which we can truly see only in the other life; it is becoming 'separate.' In the *Phaedo*, *οὐσία* in this meaning is still qualified by *αὕτη*¹ or some such word. But in *Rep.*, Book VII, it suddenly appears stripped of all modifiers — *πρὸς οὐσίαν*, towards Being.² The same thing happens to *τὸ ὅν* in *Phaedo* 65a-c, 66a, and *Rep.* 508d, 582c, etc. In both dialogues Truth and Being are linked together as aspects of the same thing; and I think this agrees with our results on δ ἔστι. *Tὸ ὅν* is that which is what it is. Hence phrases like *τὸ ὅν τάχος καὶ η οὐσία βραδύτης ἐν τῷ ἀληθινῷ ἀριθμῷ . . .*, *Rep.* 529d: these things are true because they are eternally what they are. But it cannot be denied that they are also transcendent, 'separate.' *Οὐσία* appears again in this sense in *Phaedr.* 247c and *Phil.* 53c, 54c,³ and *τὸ ὅν* in *Phaedr.* 247d, *Phil.* 58a, *Tim.* 29e, 52d⁴ — often in opposition to *γένεσις*. And yet *οὐσία* also figures in the dialectical dialogues in its original sense, as in *Crat.* 386e, and in connection with the natural Kinds. It is their definition, and implies no transcendence at all.⁵ It is safe to say that, except in the myths and in passages where the context makes the meaning 'transcendent' clear, this is the normal use of *οὐσία*.

In certain passages the transcendent meaning of *οὐσία* and *τὸ ὅν* is clinched by the addition of *ὄντως*. There are four cases in the

¹ 76d, 77a, 78d, 92d; also *Rep.* 485b.

² 523a; cf. 525b, c, 526e, 434a, and *Tim.* 29e.

³ One might be tempted to add *Soph.* 248a; but there both the 'friends of the Ideas' and the materialists claim the word *οὐσία* for their own kind of Being.

⁴ ὅν τε καὶ χώραν καὶ γένεσιν. Here *ὅν* (no article) is used quite as if it were a set term for transcendent Being.

⁵ So *Phaedr.* 237c, 270e, *Theaet.* *passim*, *Polit.* 285b, *Phil.* 32b.

Phaedrus myth (247c, e twice, 249c), and others in *Rep.* 490b, *Soph.* 248a, *Phil.* 58a, 59d, *Tim.* 52c.¹ In these passages, especially in the *Phaedrus*, the heaping up of words to suggest the perfection and aloofness of the Ideas is very remarkable; it is as if all human speech taken together were hardly adequate to express so lofty a truth.

The same feeling is accountable, I think, for the frequent use of *καθαρός* and *εἰλικρινής* in *Phaedo*, *Republic*, and *Philebus*. In the *Phaedo*, where they are first applied to the Ideas, the usage is closely connected with the doctrine of the separation of soul from body.² For Socrates is not merely the philosopher, but the initiate who *κεκαθαρμένος τε καὶ τετελεσμένος ἐκεῖσε* [sc. εἰς "Αἰδον] ἀφικόμενος μετὰ θεῶν οἰκήσει (69c); and only there, among the gods, is *pure* knowledge to be found (68d). It seems clear that, unlike *αὐτό* and *αὐτὸς καθ' αὐτό*, the words *καθαρός* and *εἰλικρινής* from the very beginning imply a separation from this world; though at bottom there is the same logical notion of the Kind being set off, disentangled from its fellows and seen in its full purity. Cf. the *Symposium*, where the Beautiful-in-itself is not only *αὐτὸς καθ' αὐτὸς μεθ' αὐτοῦ μονοειδὴς ἀεὶ ὄν*, but *εἰλικρινές, καθαρόν, ἀμεικτον* (211e).

The word *θεῖος* has a similar connotation. In the *Phaedo* the Ideas are called divine four times;³ similarly in the *Republic* and the *Philebus*.⁴ I should like to explain this epithet on the basis of *Tim.* 51e: *νοῦ δὲ θεούς* [sc. *μετέχειν*], *ἀνθρώπων δὲ γένος βραχύ τι*. Likewise, the *θεῖον παράδειγμα* of the State in *Rep.* 500c,e inevitably calls to mind the eternal 'model' in the *Timaeus*, to which the fashioner of the cosmos looked as his pattern. The Ideas are divine because only the gods — and a very few men — are capable of truly knowing them.

¹ Here again is a parallel between the *Phaedrus* myth, the 'friends of the Ideas' passage, and the *Timaeus*. "Οὐτως is specifically a 'late' characteristic of Platonic style; see Lutoslawsky, *Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic*, p. 120.

² Cf. *Phaedo* 66a, quoted above, p. 41.

³ 66a, 67a, b, 81c.

⁴ 477a, 479d; 29b, 30b, 52d, 59c, 63b.

VI

It is time to sum up these scattered observations and show their bearing on the doctrine of the Ideas. But first a few general remarks. The hope of reducing the terminology of the dialogues to a concise scheme, with exact terms standing in fixed relations to each other, is an illusion. *Eidōs* and *ἰδέα* in particular have such a kaleidoscopic variety of meanings that each case must be treated by itself, in its own context. Indeed, the best judges of Platonic style are agreed that they never become really technical terms.¹ The obvious explanation would be that Plato is a literary artist with all the suggestiveness and flexibility of language at his command, not a grubber after precise terms and exact formulae. But this is not the whole truth. Most critics have noted the decline in literary power, or even the absence of a literary aim, in the later dialogues. Surely in the *Sophist* or *Timaeus* there could be no objection to the use of technical terms. There are indications of such a use. And in most cases the terms thus introduced have the air of being quoted from a source outside the dialogues.

This observation leads directly to a much more general one on the whole body of Plato's writings. One of the most remarkable facts about the theory of Ideas is that it is constantly *referred to* in the dialogues, but never, except in the first half of the *Parmenides*,² formally introduced and explained on its own account. The only conclusion is that it belongs to a body of doctrine *behind* the dialogues, in Plato's teaching and thinking, which comes forward in his writings only in the form of references and allusions. But why should this be so? Plato himself hints at the reason in *Phaedrus* 275d: books are lifeless and mechanical things, capable of only one answer no matter what question is put to them. They are not a fit receptacle for living truth. In the seventh Epistle³ he goes

¹ Campbell, ed. of *Rep.*, II, p. 296; Ritter, *N. U.*, p. 276; Wilamowitz, *Platon*, II, p. 250.

² But even that is only a cursory sketch of the theory in a defective form.

³ The consensus of learned opinion now favors the authenticity of this Epistle; see R. Hackforth, *Authorship of the Platonic Epistles* (Manchester, 1913), pp. 84–131, and E. Hoffman, "Der gegenwärtige Stand der Platonforschung," appendix to Zeller's *Phil. d. Griechen*, II, 1⁵ (1922), p. 1055.

much farther (341c-e): the highest truth is not even expressible in words, like other doctrines, and *not good for men*, except for a certain few. I therefore take as a basic principle Jaeger's statement:¹ "Nie hat sie [i.e., Plato's philosophy] sich der Dialogform bedient, um ihre Wissenschaft zu lehren und zu verbreiten. Wir vergessen mit Unrecht, dass es doch stets blosser Notbehelf bleibt, wenn wir aus Mangel an anderen Quellen über Platons Ideenlehre aus seinen Dialogen Auskunft schöpfen."

If, then, the doctrine of Ideas is reflected, alluded to, and commented on, but neither developed nor fully contained in the dialogues, why were they written? The earlier ones, certainly, to satisfy an artistic desire — to dramatize the search for truth; the later ones to serve as introductions to scientific method,² or to discuss subsidiary questions in mathematics, ethics, politics, and cosmology. The later dialogues, in other words, are an outgrowth of Plato's work in the Academy, and a supplement to it. If there are technical terms in the earlier dialogues, they come from the discussions in Plato's circle of friends; if in the later, they come from the lecture-rooms of the Academy.

We saw at the beginning that Plato probably derived his use of *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα* from Hippocrates. When he took them over they had two important meanings: 'form,' 'guise,' 'characteristic token,' and 'kind' or 'class.' We saw, moreover, that in the latter meaning two elements, logical and natural, were combined, so that the word signified both 'natural kind' and 'logical class.' This ambiguity is never wholly lost in Plato; the two elements are never quite separated. Related to this difficulty is another, namely that Plato takes the word *εἶδος* meaning 'kind' completely for granted, and so never focusses his attention on it.³ And this has far-reaching consequences. The meaning 'form' or 'token,' on the other hand, he uses in a definitely new application.

As for the occurrences of *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα* in Plato, both words are rare in the Socratic dialogues, for the reason that they did

¹ *Studien zur Entsteh. d. Met. des Arist.* (Berlin, 1912), p. 140.

² Thus one might call the *Sophist* and *Politicus* exercise-books in dialectic; cf. above, p. 30.

³ Stenzel, *Studien*, p. 161.

not belong to the usual Attic vocabulary. From the *Cratylus* on they become more frequent, until four dialogues, *Parmenides*, *Sophist*, *Politicus*, and *Timaeus*, contain almost half the examples of *εἶδος* and one-third of those of *ἰδέα*.¹ It is no accident that three of these dialogues belong to the dialectical group. Nor is it an accident that in the myths *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα* appear only in the colloquial sense of 'figure,' 'shape.'² In their philosophical use these words are logical terms (always in the logico-natural sense we have pointed out), not metaphysical.

Plato begins his approach toward the Ideas, not from the particulars, but by trying to define certain classes of things which he later calls 'the Kinds' (*τὰ εἴδη*). At first he has no generic term for them, but simply speaks of 'piety' (*ὅσιότης* or *τὸ ὅσιον*), 'temperance' (*σωφροσύνη*), and so on. He does assume, however, that each Kind has a characteristic token by which it can be recognized wherever it is found; and this he calls "a certain 'single form'" (*μία τις ἰδέα*, *Euthyphro*; *ἐν τι εἴδος*, *Meno*). The *τις*, as we have seen, can be taken as a kind of deprecation or apology for the strangeness of using *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα* in this manner, or more particularly as a variety of quotation marks. This 'single form' is both a logical affair, the definition or concept of the Kind, and a natural essence (also called *φύσις* and *οὐσία*). To pursue the latter aspect for a moment, the essence of a Kind like piety or justice lies in what it does — in other words, in its power or function (*δύναμις*). One could, in fact, call the Kinds themselves powers; for they are at work in nature, residing (*ἐνόρτα*) in men's souls and actions. Plato habitually introduces these Kinds in pairs, Good and Evil, Large and Small, etc. On the question whether they have subspecies (*μόρια*; *ἰδέαι*, *Crat.* 418b), and how the latter are related to them, he spends a good

¹ The *Cratylus* has 14 cases of *εἶδος* and 3 of *ἰδέα*, *Phaedo* 16: 8, *Rep.* 73: 21, *Parm.* 55: 7, *Soph.* 48: 4, *Polit.* 29: 6, *Tim.* 59: 14. In *Phil.* (15: 7) and *Legg.* (30: 2) the frequency diminishes. All this from Ritter's table, *N. U.*, p. 323. The falling off in *Philebus* and *Laws* must be ascribed to their subject-matter. It does not vitiate the general statement that *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα* increase in frequency in the later dialogues.

² *Phaedo* 108b, 109b, 110d, *Rep.* 618a, *Phaedr.* 246a, b, 253d. Once, in *Phaedo* 110d, *εἶδος* = 'kind.' In *Phaedr.* 249b the very introduction of the word betokens the descent from heaven to earth.

deal of time (e.g., in the *Protagoras* and the *Meno*), but with little result; the reason, as he himself indicates later, being his lack of a systematic dialectic.

The first hint of such a dialectic is the mention of ‘division by classes’ (*κατ’ εἰδη διαιρέσθαι*), *Crat.* 424c; but it is not developed until the *Republic* and the *Phaedrus*. The use of *εἶδος* to mean ‘class,’ ‘Kind,’ first appears in *Gorg.* 454e, and then several times in the *Cratylus*. It is still comparatively rare, since Plato designates most of the Kinds simply by their own names, or by *ἔκαστον*, *τὰ πράγματα*, or *τὰ ὄντα*. *Ίδεα*, so far as I know, is not used in this sense until much later; on the other hand it is commoner than *εἶδος* in the sense of ‘form.’ The *Cratylus* continues the exposition of the ‘form’ in so far as it applies to the crafts. There is a natural kind, for example, *κερκίζειν* (i.e., again a function or activity), of which the form is *ὅ ἔστι κερκίζειν*. And the form is specifically said to be found in *nature* and built by the artisan into his product.

Another line of development comes to the fore in *Crat.* 439c. In this passage, the first of a series which extends to the *Timaeus*,¹ Plato asks, “Shall we say that there is a certain ‘Beautiful-in-itself’ (*αὐτὸς καλόν*), and so on?” Beginning with the *Phaedo* he speaks more casually: “We are always saying that there is a certain ‘Beautiful-in-itself’ or ‘single form’ (*μία ίδεα*) of the Beautiful,” and in *Rep.* 476a he adds that this is true of “all the Kinds” (*εἰδη*). I have already said that these references can only point to a context outside the dialogues. There is thus a strong presumption that *αὐτὸς καλόν*, etc., and *μία ίδεα* are technical terms quoted from Plato’s own conversation or from his lectures in the Academy. The two phrases are very nearly synonymous, though *μία ίδεα* is perhaps more commonly used of the essence in its logical aspect. As for the word *αὐτός*, although in the *Phaedo* it had already coalesced with *καλόν*, etc., to form a single term, we nevertheless caught a sufficient glimpse of its original meaning. It served to set the Kind off from its own sub-species and from its fellow-Kinds, as a class which in its true self is distinct from all others. The same thing was expressed in a stronger form by *αὐτὸς καθ’ αὐτό*, and it was also the original sense of *ὅ ἔστιν* [*ἔκαστον*], ‘what each Kind is’ — though

¹ *Phaedo* 76d, *Rep.* 507b, 596a, *Parm.* 129a, *Tim.* 51b.

the latter formula, like *αὐτὸν καλόν*, gives evidence as early as *Phaedo* 75d and *Rep.* 507b of having become a set term.

So far, then, we have a Kind, *εἶδος*, present and working in nature, and its *αὐτὸν εἶδος*, 'the Kind proper,' in which all its uniqueness and self-identity are concentrated. There is nothing in all this to justify us in talking of 'separate' or transcendent Ideas. But in the *Phaedo* a new development begins. It appears that the Kind can be seen in its full purity (*αὐτὸν καθ' αὐτόν*) only when the soul is completely pure, that is, when it is separated from the body. There is a place where soul and Ideas (for from this point on we can call the essences or forms 'Ideas') meet face to face. And in describing this meeting Plato exhausts his vocabulary. The Ideas are eternal, pure (*καθαρά, εἰλικρινῆ*), unmixed (*ἄμεικτα*), divine (*θεῖα*), true and perfect Being (*ὄντως οὐσία, τὸ ὃν ὄντως*). Such epithets first appear in the *Phaedo*, and recur in the myths of the *Symposium* and the *Phaedrus*. That is a fact of cardinal importance. It is in the myths¹ that the Ideas pass from logic to metaphysics; it is only from the myths, and the separation of soul and body shadowed forth in them, that we are justified in speaking of the Ideas as separate from this world; and it is only in such a context that 'transcendence' has any reasonable meaning.

This principle is especially important in judging Books VI and VII of the *Republic*. Here the context is logical, not mythical; the difference is signalized by the fact that *εἶδος* and *ἰδέα*, which are absent from the myths except in their colloquial meaning, are used freely in these two books. All the terms used — *οὐσία, τὸ ὃν, δὲ στι, αὐτὸν εἶδος* — have a double aspect, transcendental in so far as the whole passage represents an ascent toward the Ideas we know from the *Phaedo* and the *Phaedrus*, immanent in so far as it represents the old indwelling of the Kinds. In 476a and 507b we could still see the shadow of the Kind in the background, with its division into Many and One, *πολλά* and *αὐτὸν εἶδος*. Likewise, in *Phaedo* 102b ff. the Kinds were still the moving, working, natural powers that they had been in the Socratic dialogues. Even the *εἰδη αὐτά*, pure concepts, of *Rep.* 511c are not transcendental by

¹ The relevant passages of the *Phaedo* are certainly mythical in the Platonic sense.

virtue of their logical quality of distinctness and purity, but because the context draws us on at every step toward the ‘place above heaven’ of the *Phaedrus*.¹ The words *οὐ καταλάμπει ἀλήθειά τε καὶ τὸ ὄν* (*Rep.* 508d) are an echo whose full meaning is to be found only in *ὑπερουράνιος τόπος*.

The truth is that the *Phaedo* and *Republic* display the Ideas at a peculiar half-way stage, where they are both immanent and transcendent — or rather, where the ‘form’ has not yet wholly disentangled itself from the immanence proper to the Kind. Plato certainly never intended that it should become transcendent at the cost of losing its immanence in nature; and yet that is precisely the dilemma in which Socrates is caught in the *Parmenides*. Here we have for the last time the distinctive features of these betwixt-and-between Ideas, and the trio of distinctive terms, *εἶδος*, *μία τις ιδέα* or *αὐτὸς εἶδος*, and *πολλά*. Socrates is convinced that the Idea is really present in the Many, but he cannot tell how, and so ends by seeing it cut off and left in rigid isolation (134de). The old, half-forgotten link — the Kind — has been broken for good and all, and it becomes clear that the *εἰδη αὐτά* must inevitably be transcendent. Then follows the passage (135a ff.) which is the key to the later dialogues. Parmenides says to the young Socrates — or rather, Plato says to his own younger self and to the young spirits round him — “Your fault in this matter is lack of scientific training. To find out and elucidate such Ideas (*αὐτό τι ἔκαστον εἶδος*) is a work of genius, and of genius schooled by a long training in dialectic. Meanwhile, science itself cannot exist without the concept of ‘classes of things’ (*εἰδη τῶν ὄντων*) which are permanent and knowable. Exercise yourself, therefore, in the handling of such *εἰδη*.” It cannot be said too often or too strongly that in these words Plato is marking the dividing line between two realms: Ideas, *εἰδη αὐτά*, and kinds, *εἰδη*. The science of the Ideas² is a divine pursuit; the ordinary pabulum of the student of philosophy, and the ordinary subject-matter of dialectic, is *εἰδη τῶν ὄντων*.

¹ There is even less reason to call the ‘forms’ of *Rep.* 596a ff. transcendent, for they are created by God and exist in nature. There is no mythical language here.

² *τῷ τῶν εἰδῶν σοφίᾳ τῷ καλῷ*, *Eph.* VI, 322d.

The full theory of dialectic in this limited sense¹ is not expounded anywhere in the later dialogues; but it is referred to with sufficient clearness in *Phaedr.* 265de, *Soph.* 253d, *Phil.* 16d ff.² The distinctive feature of the method is that for the first time it combines induction and deduction into one process. For neither of the two halves is new in itself. Inductive reasoning is the very heart and soul of the Socratic dialogues,³ where it takes the form of searching for the *μία ιδέα* of each Kind. This term, therefore, is taken over into the new system, but not unchanged. The old 'form' was assumed to be at hand in nature, ready to be found simply by 'looking' for it (*ἰδόντι*, *Parm.* 132a); the new one is reached by a process of assembling (*συναρπεῖσθαι*, *Phaedr.* 249b; *συνορῶντα ἄγειν*, 265d) the particulars, that is, by a real synthesis. Hence *μία ιδέα* from the *Phaedrus* on is a definitely intellectual term; it means a class-concept. The other half of the dialectical scheme — analysis or deduction — also has parallels before the *Phaedrus*, though it was not emphasized in the earlier and middle dialogues. *Crat.* 424cd and *Rep.* 454a introduced the key-term *κατ' εἶδη διαιρεῖσθαι*, "to divide according to classes" — where, as we saw, the word *εἶδη* meant not merely 'classes,' but objective kinds existing in nature. This procedure is canonized, so to speak, in *Phaedr.* 265e as the second step in the procedure of defining a thing by means of dialectic. Having got his *μία ιδέα* by induction,⁴ the reasoner divides it in half, again divides the appropriate half, and so on until he reaches a class which cannot be divided any further (an *ἄτμητον*, *Phaedr.* 277b).⁵ This class must then be located, so to speak, in the system of which it is the last member, that is, it must be defined by summing up the whole series of 'divisions' (*διαιρέσεις*) through which the reasoner has passed; and

¹ Of course dialectic also includes the investigation of the Ideas (see *Rep.* 511c); but that branch of it does not appear in any of the later dialogues.

² Also, for the inductive side, in *Phaedr.* 249b, *Legg.* 965c.

³ Cf. Stenzel, *Studien*, p. 8.

⁴ Unlike *Rep.* 511c, this more modest dialectic does not demand that one ascend to the highest principle of all (*ἀνυπόθετος ἀρχή*) before beginning his deductions, but accepts any which is sufficient (cf. the *ικανὸν τι* of *Phaedo* 101e) for the purpose in hand.

⁵ See Stenzel, *Studien*, pp. 54–62, on the *ἄτομον εἶδος*.

the summing up produces a second *μία ιδέα*, namely the definition for which he was searching.¹

Thus each half of the scheme, ascending and descending, inductive and deductive, ends in a *μία ιδέα*, a complex, systematic idea. It is significant that the *τις* of the *Euthyphro*, *Meno*, and *Republic* is henceforth dropped: the *μία ιδέα* has lost its air of being a quotation from another realm, and become a familiar tool in the world of science. In fact, it becomes so familiar that in several of the dialectical dialogues *ιδέα* is used quite vaguely to mean any concept or category of things. This also, in spite of the chronological difficulties, seems to be the force of the word in the famous phrase 'Idea of the Good,' *ιδέα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ*, in *Rep.*, Books VI and VII, where *ιδέα* adds little by way of specific meaning to *ἀγαθόν*, or at least does not stamp it as an Idea in the usual sense.

So much for the dialectical structure of the later dialogues. The crucial point is not so much the scheme itself as its subject-matter. And here we find a peculiar turn of events. The Kind, *εἶδος*, which had served its turn as begetter of the Idea and finally been lost to view in the ideal realm, reappears in full strength in the lower sphere of ordinary dialectic. The deductive method especially (to which Plato devotes most of his attention in the *Sophist* and *Politicus*) deals entirely with *εἴδη* in the old sense. 'There are two kinds of art, *τῶν τεχνῶν εἴδη δύο*,' says Plato (*Soph.* 219a), 'of which we can again divide the one into two halves,' and so on. Here it is important to see that both the word *εἶδος* and the notion behind it are *not* derived from the theory of Ideas, but go back directly to the stage of thought and expression out of which the Ideas themselves arose. The pedigree of *εἶδος* = 'kind' goes back to Hippocrates, and can be traced straight through the dialogues beginning with the *Gorgias*. These classes or kinds, *εἴδη* or *γένη*, of the *Sophist*, like those of the Socratic dialogues, are at work in nature, and so can be called 'natures' (*φύσεις*);² they are defined by their functions (*Phaedr.* 270d), and so can be called *δυνάμεις*. Moreover, since the old parallelism of nature and logic continues unabated,

¹ Stenzel, *op. cit.*, pp. 60–62.

² The same notion is expressed by *γεγονότα εἴδη*, *Tim.* 54d ff.; see above, p. 33.

iδέα can on occasion be used for the class as well as for its concept. The subordinate classes, being singled out by a process of division within a larger class, can be called ‘parts’ of it (*μέρη, μόρια*).¹ And finally, the old term *τὰ ὄντα* is always available. Thus we get a whole repertory of names: *εἴδος, γένος, φύσις, δύναμις, iδέα, μέρος, τὰ ὄντα*. In all of them there is implicit a principle which Plato also states explicitly (*Phaedr.* 265e, *Polit.* 287c): that the ‘divisions’ of dialectic must follow the objective divisions of nature. We have already seen that this was the meaning of *κατ’ εἰδῆ διαιρέσθαι*. Further, the very nature of the dialectical method presupposes that scientific objects — that is, classes — form a system in which every part is related to every other, so that the definition of any single class must take the whole hierarchy into account;² and this principle too is explicitly stated by Plato, *Phil.* 18c (cf. *Rep.* 537c). There is no place in this system for a class ‘by itself’ (*αὐτὸς καθ’ αὐτό*).

Such is the ordinary, ‘human’ (*Phaedr.* 249b) dialectic taught and illustrated in the later dialogues. In both its subject-matter and its method it is precisely what we call science. It is not a vision of the Ideas, but a ‘recollection’ of them (*Phaedr.* 249c) on the only level which is accessible to most of us in this world. There can be no doubt that it is meant as a first preparation for the science of the Ideas; but that science is arduous, and in any case lies outside the scope of a dialogue. It is a striking fact that after the *Parmenides* the Ideas are directly mentioned only in the ‘friends of the Ideas’ passage of the *Sophist* (246b ff.), in *Philebus* 15b, 58a ff., in the *Timaeus*, and in *Epistles* VI (322d) and VII (342 ff.).³ The references in *Phil.* 58a and *Tim.* 51b ff. are clear enough to preclude any notion that the doctrine of transcendent Ideas had been given up; but they do not give us much specific information. What the doctrine of Ideas was in its final and complete form is something we cannot learn from the dialogues.

To summarize our results once more in the briefest possible compass,

¹ Sometimes, however, *μέρος* means an arbitrary, subjective division in contrast to one that is really found in nature; see *Polit.* 263b.

² Cf. above on the *μία iδέα* as definition.

³ They are not mentioned in the *Laws*; 965b refers only to ordinary dialectic.

the Ideas grow out of certain entities which Plato calls Kinds, that is, genera and species of the totality of things. These Kinds are not abstractions, but concrete elements of the physical and moral world and almost living actors in its drama. Plato's method of defining a Kind, its true identity as distinguished from the variety and complexity of its manifestations in this world, is to search for the single characteristic token, *μία ιδέα*, which it presents to the mind. This 'single form' is both a naturally given essence and an intuited concept; it concentrates in itself all that which makes the Kind what it is, as against what it is not, and so constitutes the 'Kind proper,' *αὐτὸς καλόν*, etc., or, as we call it, the Idea.

The Idea at this stage is not necessarily 'separate' from the world of sense; but it is free from the contradictions of that world, and accessible only to reason. The question then presents itself: how can such an entity be grasped by beings whose minds are entangled in the body and its net of physical relations? Plato's answer is that it can be grasped in its full purity only by a mind which is freed from the body, and in a place which is invisible to mortal sight. This exaltation of the true seat of the Ideas to a 'place beyond heaven' is the transcendence of which Aristotle speaks. Plato himself makes it clear in the *Parmenides* that to justify such a doctrine in logical terms is a task for demi-gods and heroes. Meanwhile, he lays down as a necessary preparation for the task a discipline which contains the essential elements of scientific reasoning as we know them, namely induction and deduction. The subject-matter of this lower sphere of dialectic is the natural world, with its kinds or classes of things, *εἴδη τῶν ὄντων*, and its basic principle that everything knowable is part of one interrelated system. Thus the Kinds, out of which the ideal world had sprung, are taken over almost unchanged into the realm of what we call science, and form the subject for discussion in most of the later dialogues; while the Ideas, soaring far above their terrestrial origin, almost vanish from the dialogues after the *Parmenides*, to become the subject of lectures and speculations which are lost, perhaps irrecoverably, to us.

MOVEMENT IN THE DIVIDED LINE OF PLATO'S *REPUBLIC*

BY JAMES ANASTASIOS NOTOPOULOS

καὶ γέρα τῷ ὀξύτατα καθορῶντι τὰ παριόντα,
καὶ μημονεύοντι μάλιστα ὅσα τε πρότερα
ἀντῶν καὶ ὕστερα . . .

(*Republic*, 516c)

I

THE interpreter of the Divided Line moves, as in art, in a realm of half-revealing and half-concealing. Its correlation with the Simile of the Light and the Myth of the Cave enriches its pithy and geometric character with symbolic and dramatic concreteness. Yet the task of transposing these factors into a metaphysical equation is a perennial problem in which the discovery of anything new yields usually a deeper insight into Plato's text.

It is a common philosophic tradition in interpreting Plato to attribute movement to the world of Becoming and rest to the world of Being. It is natural to think of movement as a character of Becoming. We must educate ourselves, however, after a deeper study of the Divided Line to think of it also as a character of the world of Being, and to see wherein the difference lies. It is a naïve fallacy to suppose that because we remove from material objects the property of change and movement, and with it place and time, we have done away with movement and change in the world of Being. This conception is fostered mainly by Plato's language, which stresses the transcendent and immutable character of the Ideas. If we pierce through his language, which is inevitably limited as an image of his living thought,¹ we get an insight into the dynamic Plato who defines Being as *δύναμις*.² The mind, he says, is active, and

¹ *Phaedrus*, 276a.

² *Sophist*, 247e.

there must correspond motion and life in the object to the activity in the soul; purely static Ideas would be as unknowable as the flux of Heraclitus. Certainly what is fully real and knowable as such must be stable and self-identical, but it must also possess life and thought, and therefore soul. Hence we must say that Reality as a whole both rests and moves. Thus movement and rest are all-pervasive characters of Reality.¹ In the study of Plato's thought, however, rest has been overemphasized as a character of Being to the exclusion of its correlative character, movement.

In Plato movement is one of the *μέγιστα γένη*; ² it is a category inherent in every phase of thought. Philosophy is a movement of thought, an *όρμή*,³ appearing in the *Symposium* as Eros ascending various stages of insight to the vision of the Beautiful, in the *Republic* as mind ascending the stages of the Divided Line. Thought is called by Plato a living organism⁴ whose activity is movement of apprehension. It is galvanized to action by wonder, contradiction, and love of the Good, which is its fixed goal. It is creative, seeking immortality through substitution;⁵ it begins with one set of contents and ends with another more comprehensive in character. Thought moves from simple to complex, from concrete to abstract, from old to new and *vice versa*. If it cannot go directly to the core of meaning it moves through symbolism. It exhibits a constant flux among its objects, theories pass and give way to new ones; an hypothesis is only a point of departure for other hypotheses.⁶ Thought is movement with direction, toward a conclusion, toward the eternal, toward the Good. It has movements within movement, taking the same object and viewing it in relation to itself and to the universe. It is rhythmical, now plodding along immersed in details, now leaping with flashes of understanding.⁷ Like music it reveals its nature through moving activity. The study of movement in the Divided Line illustrates and amplifies these aspects of thought.

¹ *Sophist*, 249a-d.

² *Sophist*, 254d.

³ *Philebus*, 57d.

⁴ *Phaedrus*, 276a.

⁵ *Symposium*, 208a.

⁶ *Republic*, 511b.

⁷ *Epistles*, 7, 341c.

The Divided Line is not a mere classification of four kinds of knowledge. It is a line of *movement* and the four kinds of knowledge are stages in the creative advance of thought. The key to the understanding of the Divided Line is movement. It is implicit in every part of it, and its expression is varied:

(1) *Line as movement.* The use of the line as a diagram to illustrate the movement of thought is most apt. It is consonant with Plato's geometrical conception of the line, not as a series of points, but as the "fluxion" or *ρύσις* of a point. The line is made not by addition of points but by a point "flowing."¹ Thus the line is a geometrical illustration of movement. Plato's use of it, therefore, is purposeful and analytically significant.

(2) *Symbolism as movement.* The integration of the parts of the Line through the technique of image vs. original is symbolical of movement. The image is referential, forcing the mind to move to the source of the reflection. It stimulates thought to move beyond it, for by its nature the image is partial and unsatisfactory. Furthermore the use of the image vs. original symbolism is repetitive throughout the whole range of the Line. Between Non-Being and Being there is a series of stages of image vs. original, e.g., images of natural objects, images of ideal realities by sensible nature, the symbolical objects of science between these images and their patterns, and lastly the Good whose image in respect to the sensible world is the sun. Through this ascending movement of symbolism Plato shows that the life of the mind is a movement of generation into Being — *γένεσις εἰς οὐσίαν*.² Thought, as this symbolism infers, is a process of achievement; and to stop with any achievement is to yield to dogma, which is truth in a state of inertia. Thus the symbolism of the Line is a technique illustrative of movement.

(3) *Language of movement.* The language and the vocabulary which Plato uses to explain the Divided Line are essentially con-

¹ Philoponus, *de Anima*, ed. M. Hayduck (Berlin, 1897), p. 77, 27; cf. J. Stenzel, *Zahl und Gestalt bei Platon und Aristoteles* (Leipzig, 1933), pp. 96 ff.; A. E. Taylor, *Plato, the Man and his Work* (New York, 1927), p. 506.

² *Philebus*, 26d.

cerned with the movement of thought.¹ The phrases are highly metaphorical of movement; the words denote and connote move-

¹ I have collected from the passages in the *Republic* which deal with the Simile of the Light, the Divided Line, and the Myth of the Cave, the following words and phrases which signify movement and rest: μακροτέρα εἰη περιόδος (504b 2), δοκεῖ δ' ἐνίστε τισιν ίκανως ἥδη ἔχειν καὶ οὐδὲν δεῖν περαιτέρω ζῆτειν (504c 3), τὴν μακροτέραν . . . περιτέον (504c 9), ἐπὶ τέλος οὐποτε ἥξει (504d 3), τελευτῶντες (505b 9), δὸς διώκει μὲν ἄπασα ψυχή (505d 11), τυφλῶν . . . δόδον ὄρθως πορευομένων (506c 8), κατὰ τὴν παρούσαν ὄρμην ἐφικέσθαι (506e 2), πάλιν αὖ (507b 6), εἰς τοῦτο ἀπερίσηται (508d 5), ἄνω καὶ κάτω τὰς δόξας μεταβάλλον (508d 8), ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας (509b 9), ψυχὴ ζῆτειν ἀναγκάζεται ἐξ ὑποθέσεων, οὐκ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν πορευομένη ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τελευτὴν (510b 5-7), ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ιοῦσα (510b 7), τὴν μέθοδον ποιουμένη (510b 8), ἐκ τούτων δ' ἀρχόμενοι τὰ λοιπὰ ἥδη διεξιόντες τελευτῶσιν ὄμολογονμένως ἐπὶ τοῦτο οὐ ἀν ἐπὶ σκέψιν ὄρμήσωσι (510d 1-3), οὐκ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ιοῦσαν, ὡς οὐ δυναμένην τῶν ὑποθέσεων ἀνωτέρω ἐκβαίνειν (511a 5-6), τὰς ὑποθέσεις ποιούμενος οὐκ ἀρχὰς ἀλλὰ τῷ ὅντι ὑποθέσεις, οἷον ἐπιβάσεις τε καὶ ὄρμᾶς, ἵνα μέχρι τοῦ ἀνυποθέτου ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ παντὸς ἀρχὴν ίών, ἀψάμενος αὐτῆς . . . ἐπὶ τελευτὴν καταβαίνῃ (511b 5-8), διὰ δὲ τὸ μὴ ἐπ' ἀρχὴν ἀνελθόντες σκοπεῖν (511c 8), ὅντας ἐν δεσμοῖς (514a 5), κύκλῳ δὲ τὰς κεφαλὰς ὑπὸ τοῦ δεσμοῦ ἀδυνάτους περιάγειν (514b 1), ἐπάνω δόδον (514b 4), τις τῶν παριόντων (515b 8), λύσιν . . . δεσμῶν (515c 4), δόπτε τις λυθείν καὶ ἀναγκάζοιτο ἔξαιφνης ἀνίστασθαι τε καὶ περιάγειν τὸν αὐχένα καὶ βαδίζειν καὶ πρὸς τὸ φῶς ἀναβλέπειν (515c 6-8), τραχεῖας τῆς ἀναβάσεως καὶ ἀνάντους (515e 7), καὶ πρῶτον μὲν τὰς σκιὰς ἀν ῥᾶστα καθορῷ . . . τρόπον τινὰ πάντων αἴτως (516a 6-8), καθορῶντι τὰ παριόντα (516c 9), ἀναβὰς ἄνω (517a 3), λύειν τε καὶ ἀνάγειν (517a 5), τὴν δὲ ἄνω ἀνάβασιν καὶ θέαν τῶν ἄνω (517b 4), στρέφειν πρὸς τὸ φανὸν ἐκ τοῦ σκοτώδους (518c 7), περιαγωγῆς (518d 4), κάτω στρέφουσι τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ὄψιν (519b 3), ἀναβῆναι ἐκείνην τὴν ἀνάβασιν (519d 1), πάλιν καταβαίνειν (519d 4), ἀνάξει αὐτὸὺς εἰς φῶς (521c 2), ψυχῆς περιαγωγὴ ἐκ νυκτερινῆς τινος ἡμέρας εἰς ἀληθινήν, τοῦ ὅντος οὖσαν ἐπάνοδον (521c 6-7), μάθημα ψυχῆς ὀλκὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ γιγνομένου ἐπὶ τὸ ὄν (521d 3-4), κινοῦσα ἐν ἑαυτῇ τὴν ἔννοιαν (524e 5), ἀφίκωνται τῇ νοήσει αὐτῇ (525c 3), αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς ῥᾶστώντης μεταστροφῆς ἀπὸ γενέσεως ἐπ' ἀληθειάν τε καὶ οὖσιαν (525c 5-6), ἄνω ποι ἄγει τὴν ψυχὴν (525d 5), ὀλκὸν . . . ψυχῆς πρὸς ἀληθειαν εἴη ἀν καὶ ἀπεργαστικὸν φιλοσόφου διανοίας πρὸς τὸ ἄνω σχεῖν ἀ νῦν κάτω οὐ δέον ἔχομεν (527b 9-11), ἀναγκάζει ψυχὴν εἰς τὸ ἄνω ὄραν καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε ἄγει (529a 1-2), οὕτε ἄνω ἀλλὰ κάτω αὐτοῦ βλέπειν τὴν ψυχὴν (529c 1), μέθοδος ἐὰν μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀλλήλων κοινωνίαν ἀφίκεται καὶ συγγένειαν (531d 1), ἀποβλέπειν καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ τὰ ἀστρα τε καὶ τελευταῖον δὴ πρὸς αὐτὸν τὸν ἥλιον (532a 4), ἐπ' αὐτὸ δ ἔστιν ἔκαστον ὄρμᾶν (532a 7), διαλεκτικὴν ταῦτην τὴν πορείαν καλεῖς (532b 4), λύσις τε ἀπὸ τῶν δεσμῶν . . . καὶ ἐπαναγωγὴν τοῦ βελτίστου ἐν ψυχῇ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ἀριστού ἐν τοῖς οὖσι θέαν (532b 6-8), δόδοι (532c 1), αἱ πρὸς αὐτὸ ἄγονσαι εἰεν, οἱ ἀφικομένω ὕστερο δόδον ἀνάπαυλα ἀν εἴη καὶ τέλος τῆς πορείας (532c 2), ταῦτα ἀκινήτους ἔωσι (533c 2), ἡ διαλεκτικὴ μέθοδος μόνη ταῦτη πορεύεται (533c 7), τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄμμα κατωρωρυγμένον ἥρεμα ἔλκει καὶ ἀνάγει ἄνω (533d 2), διὰ πάντων ἐλέγχων διεξιῶν (534c 1), ἔχειν ἥδη τέλος τὰ τῶν μαθημάτων (535a 1). The line-references in the above are to Burnet's edition (*Script. Class. Bibl. Oxon.*, 1902).

ment; the sentences are rich with allusion to a road of travel, a goal to be reached. Thought pursues, leaping at something beyond its grasp, it moves to a conclusion, to and from a hypothesis, it makes a higher ascent, it transcends, descends, it turns its whole being around, it stirs itself in the face of contradiction. The language of the Cave is dramatic movement with philosophical implications. The men in the Cave move gradually from a perception of shadows on the wall to the direct glimpse of the sun; escape is through an upward road. Dialectic is described as a passage of thought; like a soldier in battle it goes through all kinds of ordeals. The sciences are called roads, the hypotheses stepping-stones. Furthermore, since rest is equally a character of Being, there is also a language of rest. The soul is fixed upon an object, the geometrician stops with his premises, there is an end of movement in the conclusion and finally in the Good.

All this vocabulary is neither accidental nor employed only for literary effect. It is descriptive of the nature of thought. Plato, however, does not arrest the movement of thought to develop the notion of movement as a metaphysical factor in the Divided Line. It is inherent in thought as movement in a runner. The aim of this paper is to study its character in the movement of the Line. It will not attempt to abstract it from its context, but to bring it into relief with the other two metaphysical factors of the Line, mind and its appropriate object. It has been traditional to study only mind and object, without movement. But this has resulted in a limited understanding of the symbolical and mythological canvas on which the Divided Line is set. Fully to understand Plato, who defines Being as *δύναμις*, we must include movement as a metaphysical factor in the Divided Line.

For Plato movement is not an abstraction. Like Eros in the *Symposium* it has, as it were, a father and a mother. Its mother is the soul, which is the fountain and source of movement,¹ and since it is immortal, movement is perpetual. Its father is the Good, the ultimate source.² Its home is both in the realm of Becoming and in the realm of Being, in the former appearing as temporal

¹ *Phaedrus*, 245c; *Laws*, 896a, 897a.

² *Republic*, 511b.

movement, in the latter as ideal movement. Temporal movement in itself is indeterminate and has no value except as an image of ideal movement. The movement of the lower Line is, like time, the fleeting image of the eternal movement of the upper Line.¹

The nature of movement is further defined through its direction. Movement in the Line has both a general and a specific objective. The Good is its general objective; the Ideas, which are the articulation and determinations of the Good, are its specific objective. It is a movement from multiplicity to unity, an integrating process in the pattern of the Good. The impetus to the movement of thought is furnished by the element of the *beyond*, the *ἐπέκεινα*,² inherent in the interplay of thought and its object. Wonder and love point to a *beyond* for thought; contradiction in the face of a dilemma points to a *beyond* for solution. The contradictions involved in the flux of sense-experience, as the example of the two fingers shows,³ force the mind to travel on the road of *beyondness* to unity. Even in the realm of Being there is no rest, for there is still a higher point of view to be reached, e.g., the definition of Justice leads to the Good.⁴ Thus each stage and segment of the Divided Line is reached through the beckoning element of the *beyond*, culminating in the Idea of the Good.⁵

The direction of movement is not only from the incoherence of the world of Becoming to the abstract clearness of the Good; its direction is also toward the concrete world of flux. The Divided Line shows only the upward direction of the movement of thought, but the return of the philosopher to the Cave is the dramatic rendering of the downward movement of thought. The true philosopher "seasons" his mind in the realm of the ultimate perfect, then comes down with added insight into the common stages of experience and the world of affairs. If philosophy is an escape from sense-perception, from shadows of justice, from contradictions,

¹ *Republic*, 529c-e; *Timaeus*, 37d.


² *Republic*, 509b.

³ *Republic*, 523.

⁴ *Republic*, 504d.

⁵ The movement of thought is also determined by a condition of *κέρωσις*. See *Symposium*, 204a.

it is only an escape for a better training with which to meet them again. The movement of thought not only aims to reach the Good, but also to weave its elements into the pattern of experience.¹ This downward movement is symbolized by the return to the Cave.² There must be no "useless" rest in philosophy. The philosophers



A → B': Direction of Movement (516a 5-c 2)

A → C: Realm of δόξα: Rhythm of up and down (508d 8)

C → E: διάβολα: Rhythm of Deduction — movement from fixed premises to conclusion (510b 5, 6)

E → B' → B: Rhythm of up and down: movement of thought to the Good and its descent to Ideas (511b 5-8)

B → A-C: Movement of thought to the Cave (519d 1-2)

are not to be allowed to live forever in the blessed isles of the undisturbed intelligible. Abstraction is only one phase in the movement, return to concreteness is the other. This upward and downward flow of movement may be called the rhythm of thought "writ large."³ In the Divided Line the rhythm is described in a more detailed manner.

In the Line the rhythm of thought is in contrast to the direc-

¹ In the descent the philosopher gives concrete interpretation to the conceptual pattern of his education. He uses the logical system as a set of coördinates by which to *place* the things of sense.

² *Republic*, 519d.

³ Cf. *Republic*, 368d.

tion of its movement; for thought, like a vessel sailing against the wind, does not proceed directly to its destination but, as it were, "tacks" its way through intermediate off-tangent stages. The diagram on page 63 illustrates the rhythm of thought, the direction of its movement and their contrast.

Though the movement is a single process culminating in the Good, it is a process of many and diverse rhythmical phases which symbolize different conceptions of reality. The movement of thought, according to Plato, has direction and at the same time a rhythm of apprehension. The four stages represent different rhythms determined by the degree of reality they apprehend. The limitations of each stage are expressed in the type of rhythms, e.g., unstable rhythm with no direction or purpose, downward rhythm, ascending and integrating rhythm, etc. They represent, as it were, the heartbeat of the life of thought, and in a subtle way Plato criticizes the various rhythms of thought as he does the various rhythms of music. The rhythm of thought which is aimless, without stability or underlying pattern of unity, he condemns; that directed by reason to the Good he praises. Thus in the *Divided Line* Plato portrays the life of the mind in general as movement and specifically as rhythmic phases of movement.

The rhythm of thought in the realm of $\delta\delta\xi\alpha$ is an indeterminate movement of up and down. It is symbolic of the flux of moods, opinions, beliefs, notions which change and contradict one another. The movement is aimless, flickering, confusing as may be expected in a realm of thought which has no objective standards in terms of which different minds may control their experiences and come together. The rhythm of $\delta\delta\xi\alpha$ is, as Mr. Demos aptly describes it, "the indiscriminate mingling of all forms and all things. It is objective confusion. In the manifold, there are no distinctions, but each thing passes into its opposite. Judgments are both true and false and neither; hence no significant judgment is possible, for thought is division. There is no individuality, for individuality is definiteness — being this, not that. Consider the poet: he is one with the river, and the forest and the wind and everything that touches his sensibility. He is in the present and also in the past, among the scenes he depicts. He is Protean and promiscuous, par-

ticipating in all nature and all time. He has no central focus and no individuality of his own."¹ Thus the up and down rhythm is an appropriate symbol for the character of thought in the realm of *δόξα*.

The contrast between the realm of Becoming and the realm of Being is that of pattern with lack of pattern, chaos with order, limit with the unlimited. The movement in the world of Being is the progressive formation of a pattern which images the Good as perfectly and as accurately as it can. Thought is of a hypothetical nature, hence it is moving, never final.² Reason creates this pattern through recollection,³ contradiction,⁴ and love for the perfect and the abiding.⁵ The movement of thought in this pattern "ties down" judgments to the anchor of cause and explanation.⁶ Thus it is also a movement of fixation. Its rhythm is up and down as in the realm of Becoming, yet it differs from it in being created, guided and controlled by the all-embracing Good. It is a rhythm modulated with variation. One phase of it is deductive, assuming self-evident hypotheses and descending logically to fresh conclusions. Another is inductive, criticizing these hypotheses and lifting them in a rhythmical integration up to the touchstone of the Good. In contrast to the more dramatic and impressionistic rhythm in the world of Becoming, it is subtle, unseen and unheard. It is ideal movement, creating harmony, definiteness of structure, limit and proportion in the realm of the Ideas. The world of the senses is only the occasion for its expression. Operating in the world of Becoming, ideal movement separates the chaff of the flux from the seed of the real and the abiding. In the world of Being it determines the Ideas; hence its rhythm is intrinsic, distinct and eternal. It preserves its unity and identity even in the world of Becoming, like a ship moving amid the ever shifting waves of flux.

The movements of thought in Becoming and Being, though contrasted as image and original, are linked together in a long and arduous ascent to the Good. They are two phases of the ascent, and in turn each phase is subdivided into image and original. The

¹ R. Demos, "Eros," *The Journal of Philosophy*, XXXI (1934), p. 338.

² *Republic*, 511b.

³ *Meno*, 81 ff.

⁴ *Republic*, 524a.

⁵ *Symposium*, 212

⁶ *Meno*, 98a.

subdivisions are called states of mind, *πάθη*, each having its own appropriate movement and object. They are four: *eikasίa*, *πίστις*, *διάνοια*, *νόησις*, whose symbol-expressed meaning has been the subject of much literature. An examination, however, of the rhythm of their movements shows that they are more than four. From *Republic* 515 and 532 we learn that there are at least seven stages of advancement within the four states of mind. Thus each state of mind includes stages within itself. This point of Plato's symbolic technique in the Divided Line was set forth by the writer in a study of *eikasίa*,¹ which attempted to show that the two general interpretations of *eikasίa* were not contradictory, but actually two stages in the same movement of thought. The object of this paper is to study the various stages of the movement of thought within each state of mind, and the character of the movement. It is essentially a study of the Line not as mere rest or movement of thought, but as the complex interplay of these two factors.

Eikasίa has two stages within itself, (*a*) that in which it confuses the image with the original and (*b*) that in which it apprehends the image, not as an end in itself, but as the image of something other than itself.² *Eikasίa* is not to be identified with either, but with both stages, the one being prior to the other in the process of movement. The first stage is the attitude of placidity, fixation, inertia, the second that of wonder, *ἀπορία*, creative doubt. In the first we are satisfied with our images,³ in the second we view them as symbols of something more general, nobler, of something beyond.⁴

These two stages in *eikasίa* present no less an opposition than a connection. Thus there is movement and arrest of movement; the image is treated now as a point of departure and now as a resting place. In Plato there is not only a principle of movement but also a principle of inertia.⁵ Instead of wonder, we have the inertia

¹ J. A. Notopoulos, "The Meaning of *Eikasίa* in the Divided Line of Plato's *Republic*," *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, XLIV (1933), pp. 193-203.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 194-196.

³ Or our *ὑποθέσεις* in *διάνοια*.

⁴ E.g., in religion we have good and bad idolatry, wherein we treat the idol either as an image of God, or as God himself.

⁵ *Republic*, 515a 9.

of people who are smug and satisfied with their limitations. Plato constantly refers to such inert factors as $\tau\pi\beta\dot{\eta}$,¹ routine, habit, mechanism, the obstructive and obstinate element outside God (in the *Timaeus*) resisting his persuasive appeal. In short, instead of movement there is also fixation at a given stage. Ultimately this fixation leads to dissolution, to a downward tendency, to regression.² Thus we have in Plato two factors, (a) fixation, and (b) movement to the Good. *Eikas̄tia* involves both. It is potentiality which may be actualized either as a principle of ascent or as an end in itself, a resting-place. It is by its nature indeterminate and therefore includes both contradictory interpretations.

The Divided Line foreshadows the important rôle which movement and rest play as categories of Being in the *Sophist*. They are basic metaphysical factors of knowledge as well as of Being, and to understand fully their importance one must study their character and function in the Line. The evolution of thought through its four stages involves the interplay of movement and rest. Thought is determined by both, for to be ever in movement yields no knowledge, and to be ever in rest leads to dogma. Movement and rest are correlative conditions of thought. Rest is a fixation where thought sees its object from a certain point of view. It is a definiteness through limitation, a concentration on one of the many facets of an object. But to see an object forever from the same point of view or limitation leads to inertia. There is a healthy and an unhealthy aspect of rest. To treat the image as a resting-place is one phase of knowledge, but thought must yield to the claim of the *beyond* and treat the image as a point of departure. This seems to be Plato's procedure in the Line. The keynote is struck in *eikas̄tia*, and it is applicable to the other three states of mind.

P̄l̄stis is specifically the state of mind concerned with the world of events, the unphilosophic truths or falsehoods of our ordinary sense-experience. It is mostly instinctive, untutored, pragmatic guesswork as to standards and values. The convictions are those of common sense, but since *p̄l̄stis* cannot tie them down to a

¹ *Phaedrus*, 260e; *Gorgias*, 463b.

² Cf. the political degeneration in the *Republic*.

scientific and finally to a philosophic explanation,¹ it is the victim of incoherence, contradiction, instability. This is symbolically expressed as the vibratory movement of up and down between Being and Non-Being. Its instability is furthermore the result of a concern for pleasure rather than for truth. The movement of $\delta\acute{o}\xi\alpha$ is the search for pleasure and not metaphysical truth. The men in the Cave, though bound by the chains of ignorance, are, as in a cinema, enjoying the spectacle of shadows on the wall.² The contrast between $\delta\acute{o}\xi\alpha$ and $\acute{e}pi\sigma\tau\acute{h}\mu\eta$ is not only that of image vs. original, but also that of pleasure vs. knowledge. Whatever element of truth occurs in $\delta\acute{o}\xi\alpha$ is either the achievement of philosophy or the purposeful design of the Good.³

The objects of $\pi\acute{e}\sigma\tau\acute{is}$ are the images of the mathematical and philosophical hypotheses of $\delta\acute{a}\nu\o\iota\alpha$. The procedure of treating these images first as a resting-place and then as a point of departure still holds. $\Pi\acute{e}\sigma\tau\acute{is}$ involves both stages. There is first a stage of fixation in which thought through the influence of pleasure⁴ apprehends the world of Becoming without an awareness of its ultimate metaphysical roots. In the symbolism of the Line it confuses the image with the original. $\Pi\acute{e}\sigma\tau\acute{is}$ in this stage accepts convenient standards of morality, action, and thought, without venturing to question their validity. As in $e\acute{k}\alpha\sigma\iota\alpha$ it is in a state of fixation and inertia. The transition from treating the image as the original to treating it as an image of a higher reality is brought about by contradiction which stimulates the movement of thought. In speaking of the propaedeutic sciences Socrates says that there are two kinds of sensations, (*a*) those that do not stir the mind to reflection and (*b*) those that do ($\tau\acute{a}\ \pi\acute{a}\rho\acute{a}\kappa\alpha\lambda\o\acute{u}\n\tau\alpha$).⁵ Those which do not stir the mind are the objects of $\pi\acute{e}\sigma\tau\acute{is}$ in its first stage of fixation. They tend to fix the mind entirely upon the image and to exclude alternative possibilities of thought. Since they suggest no *beyond*, thought remains a static devotee of the image. There is, however, another kind of sensation, which effects the transition to the second stage. The objects described as $\tau\acute{a}\ \pi\acute{a}\rho\acute{a}\kappa\alpha\lambda\o\acute{u}\n\tau\alpha$ stimu-

¹ *Meno*, 98a.

² *Republic*, 514b.

³ Notopoulos, *op. cit.*, p. 201.

⁴ *Republic*, 519b.

⁵ *Republic*, 523b.

late the soul from its stage of fixation so that it treats the image as the reflection of something beyond. They perplex the mind with contradiction, as Plato illustrates in the case of the fingers.¹ As a result the soul then stirs in itself the power of thinking, and the movement of thought reaches a stage called "recollection" whereby it slowly remembers the world of Being. There it is finally freed from contradiction by a knowledge of the Ideas. Thus *πίστις* has moved through the two stages of fixation and creative doubt into the superior state of mind known as *διάνοια*.

The ratios of the Divided Line reveal a parallel relation between the states of mind in the upper part of the Line. As *εἰκασία* is to *πίστις*, so is *διάνοια* to *νόησις*.² Therefore we find a similar, though fuller, account of movement in the upper states of mind. Like *εἰκασία*, which is its symbolic parallel, *διάνοια* as a process of thought goes through two similar stages, (a) confusion of the image with the original, and (b) the imperfect perception of the original through its image. Plato illustrates the stage of fixation in *διάνοια* with the mathematician who leaves his premises unexamined because, he thinks, they require no examination: οὐδένα λόγον οὔτε αὐτοῖς οὔτε ἄλλοις ἔτι ἀξιοῦσι περὶ αὐτῶν διδόναι ὡς παντὶ φανερῶν.³ In so far as he does this, even though there is movement of thought from the premises to the conclusion, the mathematician is in a stage of fixation. It represents the confusion of those who identify science and philosophy,⁴ or any system of philosophy, with philosophy itself. It is the dogmatic entrenchment of science or philosophy in the partial and fragmentary. It is, in general, any intellectual inertia in respect to the examination of initial assumptions. The second stage of *εἰκασία*, the perception of the image as the imperfect perception of the original, finds a counterpart in *διάνοια*; this is the study of hypotheses that dream about Being: ὀνειρώττουσι μὲν περὶ τὸ ὅν.⁵ It is representative of the mathematician, scientist, or philosopher who is aware of the limitation of hypotheses and looks upon them simply as stages in the movement

¹ *Republic*, 523c–524c.

² See page 70, note 2, below.

³ *Republic*, 510c.

⁴ Cf. *Phaedo*, 101e, and Burnet's note, *Plato's Phaedo* (Oxford, 1911), p. 114.

⁵ *Republic*, 533b.

of thought.¹ Thus *διάνοια*, like *εἰκασία*, exhibits two stages within its process of movement, (a) treating the image as an end in itself, and (b) treating it as a point of departure.

Plato's technique in the Line, like that of a composer, is sometimes one of transposition. In *διάνοια* we find the limitation involved in that state of mind expressed in two different ways. In the first place it is symbolically expressed as an image of the final segment of the Line,² and secondly as the fixation of thought at a certain stage.³ Thus the limitation of the image is equal to the metaphysical fixation of the movement of thought. The symbolical and metaphysical factors are equal to each other and are mutually explanatory. It has been traditional, however, to view the limitation of *διάνοια* simply as that of an image. In this study it will be considered as the fixation of the movement of thought in contrast to the boundless movement of dialectic in the superior segment of *νόησις*.

At the outset it must not be assumed that the limitation of mathematics which is the content of *διάνοια* is due to obscurity, as the symbolic use of the image may naturally suggest. Stocks is right in asserting that "it could hardly be said that because an image is inadequate its apprehension is inadequate, or that because mathematical truth is incomplete therefore its apprehension is blurred or obscure. . . . Mathematical knowledge may be somehow inadequate and yet be in itself the perfection of lucidity."⁴ The limitation is essentially that of movement. A study of *διάνοια* reveals this.

The hypothesis, which is the object of *διάνοια*, is an intellectual point of view, a perspective of thought limited to the explanation

¹ This is symbolized by the men emerging from the Cave and seeing the sun through its reflections. See *Republic*, 532b-c.

² In the Line,

<i>εἰκασία</i>	:	<i>πίστις</i>	:	<i>διάνοια</i>	:	<i>νόησις</i>	—
A	D	C	E	B			

since AD:DC::AC:CB, and CE:EB::AC:CB, it follows that AD:DC::CE:EB.

³ *Republic*, 533c: ἔως ἀν ὑποθέσεσι χρώμεναι ταῦτα ἀκινήτους ἔωσι, μὴ δυνάμεναι λόγον διδόναι αὐτῶν.

⁴ J. L. Stocks, "The Divided Line," *Classical Quarterly*, V (1911), p. 77.

of data. There are two kinds of hypotheses, (*a*) those deduced from a higher first principle and (*b*) those deduced from experience. The first class of hypotheses is the object of *νόησις*, the second is the object of *διάνοια*. The hypotheses of *διάνοια* are, like the class-concept or law of nature, referential to the sensible world,¹ even though they themselves are apart from it. They are arrived at by analytic reflection which passes from phenomena to theory. They are, in brief, *explanations* which understand the *εἶδος* with sensuous assistance. Their limitation arises from the following considerations. In the first place they are *private* perspectives, like those of science, religion, art, or history. Each limits itself to a definite and unique point of view which is not correlated with those of the others. To effect such correlation is the task of philosophy. Consequently *διάνοια* is lacking in the movement of synthesis. Secondly, the limitation of *διάνοια* arises from its lack of *self-criticism*; in it there is criticism, but not of fundamentals. The movement of thought in *διάνοια* is derived from unrelated and uncriticized perspectives. The nature of its movement is exclusion. In it only certain aspects of the real are observed, while the rest is left to *νόησις*, which sees a thing in its complete character. It is a movement of separation, a movement toward distinct hypotheses in contrast to dialectic, which is a transcendence of a special point of view. *Διάνοια*, therefore, is an image, not in respect to any falseness or obscurity of its truth (for it is in the realm of the *νοητόν*), but in respect to its movement from a fixed and uncriticized point of view. Its limitation is deductive movement,² in which thought, though it moves from one set of contents and emerges with a new set, cannot inductively integrate its conclusions with reality as a whole. It descends into novelty, but does not transcend it as the moving character of thought requires. The hypotheses of *διάνοια* are *ἀκίνητοι*, as Plato neatly sums up their limitation.

The movement of thought reaches its perfection in *νόησις*, the

¹ The two kinds of hypotheses correspond roughly to the Idea in its immanent and transcendent character. The language of *μέθεξις* applies to the *εἶδος* in its immanent nature, and the language of *παράδειγμα* and *μίμησις* to its transcendent nature. As such the former is the object of *διάνοια*, and the latter the object of *νόησις*.

² *Republic*, 510b.

highest level of the Divided Line. It is not only movement in the realm of perfection, but, in contrast to the movements of thought in the other levels, it is perpetual movement. The essence of dialectic, which is the coping-stone in the structure of thought, is movement. It is the activity of a state of mind called *νόησις*, and is the peculiar method and technique of the philosopher. Dialectic is entirely a movement of thought, for, despite the immovable impression of Plato's language about the Good, there is no place for absolutism in the final segment of the Line. Philosophy is movement, for the philosopher realizes that thought is fragmentary at any stage; hypotheses are provisional, ever a stage in the quest for truth, ever yielding to new ones in the process of criticism. The movement of dialectic is a movement weaving the pattern of relationship between the hypotheses; it is self-criticism; it criticizes the fundamental assumptions, methods, and criteria of *διάνοια*. It transcends its limitation and exclusion by a synoptic movement that reveals new and wider significance and meaning. It is the Eros of the Good, embracing the perfect. The goal of its movement is the whole universe in all its dimensions of Being.

In contrast to the hypotheses of *διάνοια*, those of *νόησις* are deduced from and referential to the Idea of the Good. They are not isolated but an integrated pattern or, as Plato calls them, a *κοινωνία*, an organism. It is thus not only a movement of points in a pattern, but also the movement of the pattern itself.¹ In this pattern

¹ Plato gives no systematic account of movement in the object of each state of mind. In the Line he is concerned mostly with the four states of mind rather than their objects; cf. *Rep.* 534a 5–8. It is evident, however, that he does not exclude movement in the objective reality, for he makes the states of mind and their objects analogous (511e). Movement in the world of *γένεσις*, which is the object of *εικασία* and *πλοτίσις*, is obvious. It is the movement of *τὸ γιγνόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον* (508d 7), and is illustrated by the moving objects of the Cave (516c 9). There is also movement in the world of *οὐσία*, which is the object of *διάνοια* and *ἐπιστήμη*. (a) The hypotheses of astronomy, which are among the objects of *διάνοια*, are concerned with the invisible movement of “true number” and “true forms” (529d); the varieties of motions are the province of the philosopher (530d); hypotheses, as objects of *διάνοια*, move from premise to conclusion (510b). (b) Movement among the hypotheses of *ἐπιστήμη* takes place *pari passu* with the movement of dialectic, which destroys their fixation (see p. 73) and lifts them up to the Good for a test of their validity. The notion of *κοινωνία* among the Ideas (476a) is suggestive of a move-

the Ideas are images of the Good.¹ Thus the image vs. original motivation of movement is continuous even in the final segment of the Line. Whether the two stages, that of fixation and that of movement beyond it, exist in *vóησις*, is not specifically mentioned. There are, however, hints of this. Plato alludes to the stage of fixation in the case of some philosophers who confuse the Good with Pleasure and Practical Wisdom;² then to the transcendence of this fixation in the case of the dialectician who looks upon the hypotheses as mere stepping-stones to the attainment of the Good.³ The movement of thought in *vóησις* possibly contains such stages, but they are not stressed. In the upper segments of the Line Plato's interest lies mainly in the search for truth and not in developing any theory of error.

The movement of dialectic toward the Idea of the Good is a movement of diversity as well as of relatedness.⁴ Thought in *vóησις* discovers the distinct Ideas in the process of ascending to the Good. The movement of thought in this stage does not require images of nature as an aid; it travels by itself. Its chief function is, as Plato puts it, “τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀναιροῦσα.”⁵ The difficulty of interpreting this phrase is notorious,⁶ yet in relating it to the process of movement in *vóησις* it finds a new and significant meaning. Dialectic destroys the fixation, the dogmatism of the limited perspective, and releases thought framed in any partial outlook. It is the movement of thought which treats the image, the hypothesis, the theory not as a stopping point, but as a point of departure. Thus *ἀναιροῦσα* is descriptive of the “releasing” movement of

ment of relation between themselves, the Good (508e ff.), and particulars (476a). Cf. J. Adam, *The Republic of Plato* (Cambridge, Eng., 1902), I, pp. 362–364; also R. Demos, “The One and the Many in Plato,” in *Philosophical Essays for Alfred North Whitehead* (New York, 1936), p. 52. The Good, which is the cause of all (517c), is the source of movement in the corresponding mental and objective relation of the Line.

¹ *Republic*, 532c.

² *Republic*, 505b; also cf. Arist. *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1095a 18 ff.

³ *Republic*, 511b.

⁴ Cf. the categories in the *Sophist* which are distinct yet include each other.

⁵ *Republic*, 533c.

⁶ J. Adam, *op. cit.*, II, Appendices III and XV to Book VII.

thought and not of the destruction of hypotheses, as is commonly held. The movement of dialectic does not destroy them, but their fixation, for they are by nature intelligibles.¹ It destroys the hypotheses as absolutes, as *ἀκίνητοι*, and envelops their limited point of view into the synoptic horizon of the Good.

The movement of dialectic up to the Good is logical, yet when it approaches the Good itself, its rhythm changes: logic gives way to vision.² The movement of the final step is a "leap," for the Good is *ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας*.³ The philosopher cannot by unifying reach the one; it requires a flash of revelation. That only comes at the end of a long arduous process described in *Epistle 7*: "There is no way of putting it in words like other studies, but after much communion and constant intercourse with the thing itself, suddenly, like a light kindled from a leaping fire, it is born within the soul and henceforth nourishes itself."⁴ It is not wise to explain this, unless it be supplemented by other remarks of Plato in the final rhythm of thought. It is a movement which dazzles like gazing at the sun; it is long, and difficult.⁵ Its movement must be well modulated and not immediate, for too much knowledge is blinding. Furthermore, the movement of thought is not infinite, it is finite and the journey of thought has an end.⁶

The movement of descent from the Good has two stages: (*a*) it stops with Ideas, and (*b*) then the philosopher is graduated and sent out into the world symbolized by the Cave. This downward movement, however, must be distinguished from that of degeneration and decay.⁷ The latter starts from a too long fixation and inactivity of thought. It may start at any stage of fixation in the

¹ *Republic*, 511d, "καίτοι νοητῶν ὄντων μετὰ ἀρχῆς."

² *Symposium*, 210d.

³ *Republic*, 509b.

⁴ *Epistles*, 7, 341c.

⁵ *Republic*, 515c, e; cf. *Theaetetus*, 186c.

⁶ *Republic*, 532e.

⁷ In the downward movement we must also distinguish between the descent and the 'fall.' In the descent one clings to the Good (*ἐχθμενος τῶν ἐκείνης ἔχομένων*); in the 'fall' one loses one's hold and tumbles down. Cf. the pupils of Socrates (like Alcibiades) who received proper instruction, but when they returned to the world, forgot it.

Line. That is why happiness for Plato is the activity of mind, and education is training in studies which engender, foster, and direct the movement of the soul. The preparatory sciences of the *Republic* are a training of thought in movement from the world of sense to the world of thought, from the indeterminate to the determinate, from the many to the one, from the visible movements of the heavens to the ideal movement of thought. They serve as a prelude which motivates the apprehension of the Good. In this training ground thought discovers the definite principles of the sciences and thereby fertilizes philosophy, which is a vision of totality with special studies, interests, and methods. Without the preparatory sciences philosophy itself is sterile, for to observe everything is to observe nothing.

Thus far the study of movement in the Divided Line illustrates concretely Plato's conception of movement and rest as all-pervading characters of Reality. The Line both illustrates and foreshadows Plato's interest in motion as a metaphysical factor in the *Sophist*. The life of the mind is seen to be the interplay of three metaphysical factors, mind, object, and movement. To abstract movement from thought is to make it static and inert. For knowledge is the relation of mind and object *in movement*, and ignorance is mind and object *in undue fixation*. Realization of this from a study of the Line reveals why movement is, in the mind of Plato, if not in that of some of his interpreters, the greatest category or form of thought.

II

There remains now a reconsideration of several problems in the Divided Line in the light of our conclusions on the function of movement. Among these is the problem of $\tau\alpha\ \mu\epsilon\tau\alpha\xi\acute{v}$. In the Line there is not only mind and its appropriate object in movement, but in movement among $\tau\alpha\ \mu\epsilon\tau\alpha\xi\acute{v}$, the intermediaries. The notion of $\tau\alpha\ \mu\epsilon\tau\alpha\xi\acute{v}$ gives location and definiteness to movement. Thought moves in a certain pattern of intermediate steps; this pattern is the "one and the many."¹ The Line is the symbolical

¹ *Philebus*, 15d.

expression of the pattern, and movement is an intermediate factor between the polarity of the one and the many. In the *Philebus* we have a straightforward and unadorned explanation of important aspects of the Line. In speaking of the problem of the one and the many Socrates says, "If a person begins with some unity or other, he must, as I was saying, not turn immediately to infinity, but to some definite number; now just so, conversely, when he has to take the infinite first, he must not turn immediately to the one, but must think of some number which possesses in each case some plurality, and must end by passing from all to one."¹ Then he illustrates with music and its varieties and with the letters of the alphabet the principle "that none of us could learn any one of them alone by itself without learning them all, and considering that this was a common bond which made them in a way all one."²

These terse statements about the one and the many are also applicable to the Line. We glean from them two important points which throw light on the relation of movement and $\tau\alpha\mu\epsilon\tau\alpha\xi\nu$ and on the perplexing problem of mathematics conceived as intermediates between Ideas and sensibles in the Divided Line:

(1) Knowledge is created by an intermediate movement of thought between the one and the many. The soul proceeds from the one to the many and *vice versa*, not directly ($\epsilon i\theta\upsilon s$), but through a definite number of intermediate stages in the process; the movement is not an infinite regress,³ for infinity is a principle of unintelligibility. The Divided Line represents a selective number of stages between the one and the many; it delineates the essential definite stages, the $\delta\pi\circ\sigma a$, in the process, and it offers a contrast to the "wise men of the present day who make the one and the many too quickly or too slowly, in haphazard fashion, and they put infinity immediately after unity; they disregard all that lies between them."⁴ Thus we see that in the Divided Line Plato does not move too quickly, so as to omit all stages, or too slowly, so as to fill in every detailed stage. He selects the main important stages of thought and connotes or omits the rest. From this method we

¹ *Philebus*, 18a.

³ *Philebus*, 16d; cf. *Republic*, 532e.

² *Philebus*, 18c.

⁴ *Philebus*, 17a.

learn that the Line may contain more stages of thought, and correspondingly more objects, than is revealed in each segment. Plato illustrates by selection and not by enumeration. This accounts for omissions and suggestive inferences in the treatment of the Line.

(2) From the statements in the *Philebus* about the one and the many we also learn that mere apprehension of the many is not knowledge; conversely, the mere apprehension of the one without the intermediation of the many is equally not knowledge. It is the relation of the two in an organic movement of stages that makes knowledge possible. Sheer unity does not give knowledge; we must have diversity of species. The philosopher like the musician¹ must break up the general notion into derivatives. For example, the one is music; the many are the varieties of sound. Similarly in mathematics the one is the ideal triangle;² the many are the diversity of the species triangle such as right-angle triangle, isosceles triangle, scalene triangle, equilateral triangle. Thus before the philosopher or the scientist grasps unity, he must grasp the diversity of the unity.

This metaphysical procedure is found in all the aspects of the Divided Line, e.g., the relation of Becoming to Being is that of the many to the one; the relation of the Ideas to the Good is the relation of the many to the one. Similarly the relation of mathematical numbers to ideal numbers in the segment of *διάνοια* is the relation of the many to the one. The movement of thought in the Line is motivated not only by the symbolism of image vs. original, but also by the relation of the many to the one in a hierarchical ascent. It is in Plato a principle of movement which explains the position of *τὰ μαθηματικά*, according to the view ascribed to him by Aristotle,³ as intermediates between Ideas and sensibles. In the same way that the Ideas are the diversity of the Good, so is mathe-

¹ *Philebus*, 17d.

² *Republic*, 510d.

³ Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 987b 14 ff.: ἐπὶ δὲ παρὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ καὶ τὰ εἴδη τὰ μαθηματικὰ τῶν πραγμάτων εἶναι φησι μεταξύ, διαφέροντα τῶν μὲν αἰσθητῶν τῷ ἀτόιᾳ καὶ ἀκίνητῳ εἶναι, τῶν δ' εἴδῶν τῷ τὰ μὲν πόλλα ἄττα δύοια εἶναι τὸ δὲ εἴδος αὐτὸν ἐν ἔκαστον μόνον. Aristotle's reference to *μαθηματικά* as being *ἀκίνητα* corresponds exactly with Plato's description of *ὑποθέσεις* as *ἀκίνητοι* (*Republic*, 533c 2). This similarity of language points to the identification of the *μαθηματικά* with the *ὑποθέσεις* of *διάνοια* in the Line.

matics the diversity of ideal numbers. The error in the clouded controversy as to whether the *μαθηματικά* of Aristotle's statement are the intermediate constituents of *διάνοια* lies in abstracting two different stages from the process of the movement of *διάνοια* and making them contradictory. The point at issue is whether the object of *διάνοια* is the many non-sensible species of triangle or the ideal Triangle: is it the mathematical numbers or ideal numbers? On this issue scholars have divided themselves into two camps, each basing its interpretation on certain passages of the *Republic*.

A. One group of scholars¹ interprets the content of the third segment as the *πολλά*, yet *ἀεὶ ὄντα* mathematics that Aristotle attributes to Plato. Adam defines the contents of *διάνοια* thus: "That the lower *νοητά* are the subjects of Plato's propaedeutic studies, viz., mathematical numbers, mathematical plane surfaces, mathematical *βάθος*, mathematical *φοραὶ βάθους* and 'consonant' mathematical numbers, appears from 510c-e, 511a, b, 511c, 525c-526a, 527b, 532c, 533d . . . , and 534a. They are *ἀεὶ ὄντα* but nevertheless *πολλά*, i.e., there are many mathematical units, etc., many mathematical triangles, squares, etc., many mathematical cubes, etc., many specimens . . . of each mathematical *φορά*, many of each particular set of *ξύμφωνοι ἀριθμοί*. Finally these *μαθηματικά* occupy an intermediate position between *αἰσθητά* (*δοξαστά*) and Ideas. We learn this (1) from their position in the line, (2) from the statement that the mathematical intelligence or *διάνοια*, which cognizes them, is *μεταξύ τι δόξης τε καὶ νοῦ* (511d), (3) from the constantly repeated observation that such studies 'tend to drag us toward Being,' etc. (523a, 525a, 527b; cf. also 525c, 526b), (4) from the fact that while *αἰσθητά* are perishable and *πολλά*, *μαθηματικά* are *πολλά* (526a) and *ἀεὶ ὄντα* (527b), whereas the Idea is *ἀεὶ ὄν* and *ἴνη*."² Adam then cites other passages in Plato which corroborate these passages and those of Aristotle.

¹ F. A. Trendelenburg, *Platonis de Ideis et Numeris Doctrina ex Aristotele illustrata* (Leipzig, 1826), pp. 70-80; E. Zeller, *Die Philosophie der Griechen* (Leipzig, 1889), II⁴, I, pp. 679 ff.; J. Adam, *op. cit.*, II, pp. 159-163; J. Burnet, *Greek Philosophy* (London, 1914), Part I, pp. 317-319.

² Adam, *op. cit.*, II, p. 159.

B. The other group of scholars¹ rejects this interpretation and refuses to apply the doctrine to the contents of the Divided Line. Jackson says, "if the inferior νοητόν may be regarded as an image or reflection of the superior νοητόν, it would seem that the objects of the two sorts of intellectual method are not distinct existences, but the same existences viewed in the one case indirectly and in the other case directly."² This group of interpreters agrees that the content of διάνοια is the mathematical Ideas which are ἀεὶ and ἐν. The Ideas which fall under διάνοια are, in brief, the ideal numbers.³ Their interpretation is based on Plato's precise statement that the object of the geometrician's thought in the segment of διάνοια is the ideal Square, the ideal Diameter . . . τοῦ τετραγώνου αὐτοῦ . . . διαμέτρου αὐτῆς (510d). Consequently the object of διάνοια can only be the Idea which is ἀεὶ ὅν and ἐν.⁴ Adam makes a desperate effort to get around that phrase of Plato, which forms an insurmountable obstacle to his interpretation, by saying that the τετράγωνον αὐτό is a generic plural.⁵ The only legitimate interpretation of τετράγωνον αὐτό is the ideal Square and it differs in no way from αὐτὸ τὸ καλόν, or αὐτὸ τὸ δίκαιον, or αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος, which are Plato's typical phrases for the Idea. In the third segment the μαθηματικά are types of the νοητά⁶ and hence Ideas prior to their connexion with the Good.⁷

Both interpretations find supporting evidence in the text of the

¹ P. Shorey, *De Platonis Idearum Doctrina atque Mentis humanae Notionibus Commenatio* (Munich, 1884), p. 33; H. Jackson, *Journal of Philology*, X (1881), p. 141; C. Wilson, *Classical Review*, XVIII (1904), pp. 257-259; G. Milhaud, *Les Philosophes géomètres de la Grèce: Platon et ses Prédecesseurs* (Paris, 1900), pp. 257 ff.

² Jackson, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

³ The relation of ideal numbers to the other Ideas, e.g., of whiteness to threeness, etc., is not explicit. Are ideas higher or lower than ideal numbers? I suggest they are correlative expressions of the same thing; that a form can be expressed either qualitatively or quantitatively — man is man and also a ratio. Cf. Spinoza's parallelism of thought and extension.

⁴ Cf. with Aristotle's phraseology of the Idea: εἶδος αὐτὸ ἐν ἔκαστον μόνον. *Met.* 987b 18.

⁵ Adam, *op. cit.*, p. 68, n.

⁶ *Republic*, 507b: τὰς δ' αὐτὰς νοεῖσθαι; 511d 2: νοητῶν ὄντων μετὰ ἀρχῆς.

⁷ For the difference between the Ideas of διάνοια and νόησις see p. 71 above; cf. Wilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 258-259.

*Republic.*¹ Each has been adequately defended and no amount of ingenuity will do away with their divergence. They are stubborn and irreducible in the strength of their position to the extent that we find some scholars on the fence, admitting both, but unable to choose. Thus Mure says: "There is evidence both for and against its ("mathematicals") presence in the *Republic*. . . . In the text I have decided against it, but without confidence."² This indecision and hesitation to accept one or the other in the face of ambiguous, yet valid, evidence points to a solution which will do justice to both interpretations. This, I venture to suggest, is to be found in relating the contradictory interpretations to the process of movement inherent in each segment of the Line.

In their interpretations the two groups of scholars have abstracted their interpretations from the process of movement in *διάνοια* and made them contradictory. The group which interprets mathematics as *πολλά* sees and fixes upon the initial stage in the movement from the many to the one; they see diverse Ideal Triangles but do not move to apprehend the Idea of Triangle which lies at the end of the process. For, as the propaedeutic training shows,³ the process of movement in *διάνοια* is from the many to the one. Consequently the first interpretation is found to be only the first stage in the process; it has been abstracted from the process of the movement of *διάνοια* and has suffered "fixation."

The group which interprets mathematics as mathematical Ideas or ideal numbers has suffered a similar fate of abstraction. They see rightly the Idea of Triangle, the *τρίγωνον αὐτό*, which is the final stage in the process, but they have not become aware of a prior stage in which mathematics is the *αεὶ ὄντα*, yet *πολλά*, which Aristotle saw. They have isolated their basic passage in Plato from the movement of thought and consequently have suffered a "fixation" in their interpretation. For, as in the *Philebus*, knowledge of unity is not *εἰδῆς*; it requires the *διπόσα*,⁴ the definite number of determinations. Therefore knowledge of mathematics as *πολλά*

¹ Evidence for both interpretations in Plato is set forth by W. D. Ross in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (Oxford, 1924), I, Commentary, pp. 167-168.

² G. Mure, *Aristotle* (New York, 1932), p. 41, n. 1; cf. J. L. Stocks, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

³ *Republic*, 524c ff.

⁴ *Philebus*, 16d.

is a necessary prelude to forward movement. Just as in the final segment we proceed to the Good, which is one, from the diversity of its Ideas, so in the segment of *διάνοια* we proceed to mathematical unity, e.g., to the Idea of Triangle, through the intermediation of its diversity. The parallel structure of the one and the many in the superior segments of the Line is thus made exact by viewing *διάνοια* as a process of movement from mathematical diversity to mathematical unity. Both stages of the process are illustrated by Plato himself. The *διάνοια* of the geometer passes through two stages: (1) with the aid of sensible triangles, it concerns itself with the diversity of triangles which are non-sensible, apprehended by thought alone, e.g., the right, the scalene, the isosceles, the equilateral triangles; (2) then it concerns itself with the Idea of Triangle, *τὸ τρίγωνον αὐτό*, of which the various species of triangles are the diversity.¹ The movement to the unity is through the intermediate *διπόσα*. The two schools of interpretation have abstracted one of the stages from the context of process and consequently their insight has been atomic, not synoptic, as Plato would have it.² Both interpretations blend in harmony when taken as stages in the movement of thought. The text of the Divided Line and the character of thought as movement require such a synthesis.

Finally there is a movement of entire patterns of thought as well as elements within a pattern in the Divided Line. A pattern of a more elementary structure enters into another more complex. For example, mathematics in the third segment is an elementary pattern of thought which enters into a more complex pattern in the final segment. Philosophy in its synoptic function involves such a movement. Plato's technique is that of *synecdoche*;³ mathematics is only a type of *νοητά*,⁴ illustrative of clarity of thought, definiteness of structure, measure, limit. *Διάνοια* is not the ex-

¹ Cf. *Phaedo*, 74c: *αὐτὰ τὰ ίσα*. These are not identical with the more or less equal things of sense, nor yet with *αὐτὸ τὸ ίσον*.

² *Republic*, 537c.

³ Plato's use of art in the Line is a technique of metaphysical *synecdoche*. The Simile of Light, and the Myth of the Cave illustrate through symbolic extension wider spheres of meaning. Their suggestiveness implicates thought with an extending and synoptic view of its objects.

⁴ Wilson, *op. cit.*, p. 259.

clusive intelligence of the geometrician; the *εν* has various avenues of approach and by extension has also for its objects moral, aesthetic, and scientific or metaphysical Ideas. As has been noted, Plato is not one of the wise men of the present day who make the one and the many too quickly or too slowly. He does not enumerate in the *Republic* all the stages of *τὰ μεταξύ*, but selects mathematics in the realm of *διάνοια* and illustrates by *synecdoche* the other moral, aesthetic, and scientific contents of *διάνοια*.¹ The *πολλά* of *διάνοια* must be found in the dialogues; in the Line only mathematics is chosen for specific illustration. Consequently the movement of thought in the Divided Line involves only certain essential stages of *τὰ μεταξύ*. As in harmony, it selects the keynote structure and leaves it to the dialectician, like a composer, to fill out the fullness of pattern from significant keynotes. The Line is the perspective diagram of thought, but not its mosaic pattern.

Misunderstanding of the movement of patterns of thought as well as of elements within a pattern has led to an abstraction of patterns from the context of movement; this, too, has resulted in seeming contradiction. Thus Mure says:

"Plato's meaning in this passage (510c-511c) is not altogether clear. . . . Alternative extremes of interpretation seem possible. (1) We may stress the letter of Plato's words and hold that he exalts mathematics as the group of sciences which interpret the most important character revealed in things by sight, the noblest of the senses. We shall then explain the 'destruction' which dialectic performs as the reduction of the current mathematical sciences with their groups of isolated *ὑποθέσεις* to a single articulated whole of necessary connexions, each stage of which is then transparently deduced in the light of the Form of the Good; a whole in which no bare fact — no indefinable or indemonstrable — survives. And this single whole will be a single science of numbers, a 'sort of teleological algebra,' as Burnet calls it. This view we

¹ The moon and stars in the Myth of the Cave (516b) imply more than one set of objects in *διάνοια*. The δέντρος *πλοῦς* of the *Phaedo* (100a ff.) follows the same method as *διάνοια* (Jackson, *J. of Ph.* X, p. 149), and we find among its objects not only mathematical but also ethical hypotheses.

might support by appeal to Aristotle's account of Platonism and his complaint that 'philosophy has become mathematics.'

"On the other hand (2) . . . we may point out that the line is only a simile, and claim the right to extend the narrow limits which the analogy from sight imposes. . . . We shall see in the whole line a continuous development from potential to actual or real. The Form of the Good will be the universe as a single teleological system to which all lesser ends and purposes contribute as constituents; in and as which they culminate. . . . We have seemingly to choose between algebra and teleology, for the two are scarcely compatible."¹

These two "alternative extremes of interpretation" are hardly more than abstraction of patterns from their stages in movement. The mathematical or algebraic pattern of thought and the teleological interpretation are two patterns or modes of thought found in the Line. They both exist, as Mure points out, but not in contradiction. They are two stages in a movement of patterns or modes of thought. The algebraic pattern moves into the higher teleological pattern of philosophy. This movement is the all-embracing movement of philosophy, which merges the scientific or algebraic pattern of thought with the teleological pattern, which is the Good. Thus the harmony of the Line is preserved by resolving the contradiction into the two phases of a final movement.

In this essay I have examined the Divided Line in the light of movement and process. The soul in Plato is *κίνησις*, and as such he depicts in the Line its movement, rhythm, direction, and progress in apprehension. The points which I have made are not all new, and some of them are quite obvious. Yet they have been raised into relief to reveal a dynamic and creative Plato to whom philosophy is a life of movement and ignorance a fixation; to free the student of Plato's thought from a static conception of the world of Ideas; and finally to clear away certain limited or contradictory interpretations of the Line which arose from abstracting passages in the text from the context of living thought.

¹ Mure, *op. cit.*, pp. 41 ff.

FATE, GOOD, AND EVIL IN PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY¹

BY WILLIAM CHASE GREENE

THE tradition of Greek poetry from Homer through Theognis tended to recognize powers beyond the control of man, whether conceived as Fate, as shadowy *daimones*, or as fully individualized divinities; it also recognized a certain degree of freedom on the part of man. More and more it tended to find such good as man may hope for less in the dispensations of external Fate or of the gods than in man's own activity and attitude. This is an incipient

¹ The following works, cited more than once in this paper, are referred to merely by the author's name, or by abbreviated title:

Adam, J., *The Religious Teachers of Greece*. (Edinburgh, 1909.)
Bailey, C., *The Greek Atomists and Epicurus*. (Oxford, 1928.)
Burnet, J., *Early Greek Philosophy*⁴. (London, 1930.) (E. G. P.)
Burnet, J., *Greek Philosophy*. I, *Thales to Plato*. (London, 1914.) (T.-P.)
Bywater, I., *Heracliti Ephesii Reliquiae*. (Oxford, 1877.) (B.)
Cherniss, H., *Aristotle's Criticism of Pre-Socratic Philosophy*. (Baltimore, 1935.)
Cornford, F. M., *From Religion to Philosophy*. (London, 1912.) (Rel.-Phil.)
Cornford, F. M., "Parmenides' Two Ways," *C. Q.* XXVII, 2 (April, 1933), pp. 97-111. (*Parm.*)
Coxon, A. H., "The Philosophy of Parmenides," *C. Q.* XXVIII, 3, 4 (July-Oct., 1934), pp. 134-144.
Diels, H., *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*⁵ (ed. W. Kranz, Berlin, 1934-). (D.) (Cited except for Heraclitus.)
Fuller, B. A. G., *History of Greek Philosophy, Thales to Democritus*. (New York, 1923.)
Gundel, W., *Ananke und Heimarmene*. (Giessen, 1914.)
Hack, R. K., *God in Greek Philosophy to the Time of Socrates*. (Princeton, 1931.)
Heidel, W. A., "Qualitative Change in Pre-Socratic Philosophy," *Arch. f. Gesch. der Phil.* XIX, 3 (1906), pp. 333-379. (Qual. Change.)
Heidel, W. A., "Περὶ Φύσεως. A Study of the Conception of Nature among the Pre-Socratics," *Proc. Am. Acad. Arts and Sciences*, XLV, 4 (Jan. 1910), pp. 77-133. (Nature.)

humanism.¹ Behind this gradual breakdown of orthodoxy grew the various mystical movements which sought to bridge the gap between man and the greater powers by means of ritual and the cult of the $\psi\chi\eta$, by myth and cosmogony; this is in a sense a return to a more primitive attitude toward Nature. From both these sources grew the great current of ideas that is reflected in Pindar and the tragic poets; this is the full tide of Greek humanism. Yet a third stream of ideas meets us in the pre-Socratic philosophers. It is difficult to-day to suppose that they suddenly began, without precursors, to speculate about Nature; for it is recognized that their activity was only a continuation, in a new spirit, of the work of the earlier cosmogonists and cosmologists who had asked questions about origins and materials and powers and relationships, and who were interested also in good and evil; moreover it is possible to realize that they were the heirs also of poets and men of religion who had deified whatever living powers they could discover in the world.² The activity of the pre-Socratic philosophers, though more rational than that of their forerunners, came to an abrupt halt by the end of the fifth century, as the more humanistic and more practical philosophies carried the day; yet even to the Sophists and to the Academy they made valuable contributions,

Hommel, H., "Das Problem des Übels im Altertum," *N. Jbb. f. Wiss. u. Jug.* I (1925), pp. 186-196.

Lovejoy, A. O., and Boas, G., *Primitivism and related Ideas in Antiquity*. (Baltimore, 1935.)

Ritter, H., and Preller, L., *Historia Philosophiae Graecae*⁹. (Gotha, 1913.) (R. P.)

Scoon, R., *Greek Philosophy before Plato*. (Princeton, 1928.)

Theiler, W., *Zur Geschichte der teleologischen Naturbetrachtung bis auf Aristoteles*. (Zurich, 1924.)

Zeller, E., *History of Greek Philosophy*. Eng. Trans. (London, 1881.)

¹ Cf. W. C. Greene, "Fate, Good, and Evil in Early Greek Poetry," *H. S. C. P.* XLVI (1935), pp. 1-36.

² Cf. Cornford, *Rel.-Phil.*, whose book is devoted largely to establishing this continuity; cf. on the other hand Burnet, *E. G. P.*, whose "aim has been to show that a new thing came into the world with the Ionian teachers — the thing we call science" (p. v). The two points of view, it seems to me, are mutually compatible: old problems are treated in a new spirit. Cf. also Heidel, *Nature*, pp. 82-88; Hack, pp. 1-22; 38-40.

and it is only just to see their lengthened shadow both in later Greek science and mathematics and in the philosophies of the Schools.

If we recall the preoccupation of the earlier Greek poets and of the mystics in the problem of Fate, Good, and Evil, it would be somewhat surprising if we were to find that their successors the pre-Socratic philosophers had lost all interest in the question, even if they limited the field of inquiry and changed the method. They were still concerned with divine powers, however much these powers might doff their anthropomorphic guise. Moreover non-anthropomorphic divinities were older than Homer, and stood also in Homer no less than did the individualized gods as the causes of existence and of change, and often, though not consistently, of Good. If the divine and living cause of all things was henceforth to be defined as one or more divine substances or forces, and was to be conceived no longer as being capricious or arbitrary but as being at least as regular in operation as human institutions,¹ it would be reasonable to inquire whether the fixed and regularly operating divine cause of things could be described as good and as productive of Good, and what origin was to be assigned to Evil. How far the pre-Socratic philosophers dealt with these questions it is the purpose of this paper to investigate.

I

The prime interest of the pre-Socratics, of course, was not so much ethical as physical, or perhaps one should say rather physical and metaphysical; that is, they sought an adequate description or theory of the *φύσις* or nature of all things. That "nature" is an appropriate translation of *φύσις* will hardly be denied, though the exact denotation of the word remains a matter of controversy.

¹ Cf. C. Huit, *La Philosophie de la Nature chez les Anciens* (Paris, 1901), p. 231; Scoon, pp. 7-24. The concept of the regularity of Nature lies behind most of the examples of the rhetorical figure Ἀδύνατον (cf. H. V. Canter, *A. J. P.* LI (1930), pp. 32-41), though in a reversed form: as, "sooner shall X happen (which Nature's laws make impossible) than shall Y occur." The figure is commoner in Latin than in Greek poetry; but it begins in Homer (*Il. A.*, 233-244).

Burnet held that it meant simply "the 'stuff' of which anything is made."¹ I am inclined to agree with Heidel² that the term includes also the idea of origin and of the causal nexus of all things in a whole.³ For by an adequate description of Nature the pre-Socratics meant more than an answer to the question "What is the world made of?"⁴ They sought to find the *διότι*, as well as the *ὅτι*. Now it is a commonplace that both Plato, speaking through the mouth of Socrates, and Aristotle went out of their way to declare that the pre-Socratics had no real idea of causality, and that in particular Anaxagoras, who at first seemed to promise better things, proved to have nothing better than a mechanical explanation.⁵ What both Plato and Aristotle really mean, as we shall see, is that the forerunners of Socrates did not conceive of Nature as teleological, as Socrates and as they themselves did, and moreover that without such a conception (Aristotle's final cause) there is no

¹ *E. G. P.* pp. 10 f.; in the second edition (p. 14) Burnet's phrase was "the permanent and primary substance." Cf. his "Law and Nature in Greek Ethics," in *Essays and Addresses* (New York, 1930); and his *T.-P.* p. 27. His view is supported on the whole by A. O. Lovejoy, "The Meaning of *Φύσις* in the Greek Physiologists," *Phil. Rev.* XVIII, 4 (July, 1909); *n.b.* p. 369, defining *φύσις* in pre-Socratic usage as "the intrinsic and permanent qualitative constitution of things, what things really are." Cf. Lovejoy's review of Heidel's *Nature*, *Phil. Rev.* XIX, 6 (Nov., 1910), pp. 665-667; Lovejoy and Boas, *Primitivism*, pp. 103-116, "Genesis of the Conception of Nature as Norm"; pp. 447-456 (Appendix), "Some Meanings of 'Nature'"; J. W. Beardslee, *The Use of *φύσις* in Fifth Century Greek Literature* (Chicago, 1918).

² *Nature*, p. 129, and *passim*. For a still different interpretation of *φύσις*, cf. Cornford, *Rel.-Phil.* pp. 125-142.

³ Not sufficiently stressed, I think, is the fact that Aristotle in his *ex parte* account of the pre-Socratics and their explanations of *αἰτίαι* frequently substitutes for *φύσις* the term *ἀρχή*, which for him means both "beginning" and "cause"; and Aristotle is not disposed to grant his predecessors any more than he can help in the way of an explanation of causality. Cf. Plato, *Phaedo*, 95e9: the discussion involves an inquiry into causality (*δεῖ περὶ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς τὴν αἰτίαν διαπραγματεύσασθαι*), and reminds Socrates of his youthful interest in the investigations of his predecessors and contemporaries into the question of *φύσις*, that is, of causes (*περὶ φύσεως ιστορίαν . . . εἰδέναι τὰς αἰτίας ἐκάστου, διὰ τὸ γλυκεῖται ἔκαστον καὶ διὰ τὸ ἀπόλληται καὶ διὰ τὸ ἔστι*).

⁴ To which Burnet seeks to reduce their activity; cf. "Law and Nature," p. 2.

⁵ See below, pp. 120-123.

room in the world for ethical distinctions. In terms of our problem, they attribute to the pre-Socratics a conception of Fate, but not of Good and Evil. We shall return from time to time to their criticism.

Let us now pass in review those points in the remains of the pre-Socratic philosophers which are relevant to our problem. The *φύσις* of Thales is alive and creative, and is in fact water, — an adaptation of the Homeric and Hesiodic Oceanus and Tethys, made doubly plausible by the observation of a coast-dweller. To call water the *ὑλή* of the world, as Aristotle says that Thales and others did,¹ introduces a later distinction between matter and spirit which did not yet exist, and is so far confusing; to argue that Thales was a “materialist” on this ground is positively misleading.² Aristotle supposed, on the other hand, that Thales believed that soul, a living, moving force such as animates the magnet and amber, is mingled in the whole, and conjectured that it was for this reason that Thales held that all things are full of gods.³ Just how much Aristotle made of this, is uncertain; Aëtius and Cicero go so far as to attribute to Thales what is apparently a considerably later doctrine, that of a “world-soul.”⁴ At any rate, the *ψυχή* implies divinity, though not yet anything in the way of purpose or of moral goodness. The *θεοί*, of which the world is “full,” are powers, but no longer personalities. And if we ask whether Thales had any other notion of causality beyond the idea of Water as a living, cosmogenetic god, we can only refer, with some scepticism, to his apothegms, as recorded by Diogenes Laertius.⁵ These seem to me quite unprofessional utterances; and I should no more regard the saying *ἰσχυρότατον ἀνάγκην κρατεῖ γὰρ πάντων* as evidence for the “materialism” of Thales than I should

¹ *Met.* A, 3, 983b6 (= D₁₁A₁₂).

² Or that he was a “hylozoist,” or a “monist,” or a “physicist”; cf. Fuller, pp. 96 f. Less dangerous, though anachronistic, is Aristotle’s description of Thales’ Water as the *ἀρχή* of all things (ref. in the previous note).

³ *De Anima*, 1, 5, 411a7 (= D₁₁A₂₂).

⁴ D₁₁A₂₃; cf. R. P. 14. Adam, p. 185, is inclined to accept as possible the idea of the world-soul in Thales, and compares the saying of Heraclitus, inviting friends to approach his fireside, “Even here there are gods” (D₂₂A₉). For a sceptical view, cf. Burnet, *E. G. P.* pp. 49 f.

⁵ D. L. 1, 35 (= D₁₁A₁, 35).

accept the saying κάλλιστον κόσμος· ποίημα γὰρ θεοῦ as proof of his religious orthodoxy. But it is interesting to note in passing the reference to ἀνάγκη. Even if Thales used the term, as seems quite probable, in no technical sense, at least it suggests that he recognized no distinction between natural and supernatural events; and ἀνάγκη will soon become a leading idea for our observation. Water, gods, and necessity represent Thales' effective powers; and Aristotle might well have granted him an efficient cause in addition to a material cause.¹

For Anaximander the primary cosmogenetic substance is not limited, like the Water of Thales, to a single perceived substance, but is described, clearly in reaction against Thales, as τὸ ἄπειρον, ageless, unchanging, and divine, and containing within itself "the opposites" which are "separated out" of itself;² thus Anaximander accounts both for the emergence of what we call "things" and for an inexhaustible cause of the genesis of things. His "unlimited" is equivalent to the Chaos of the Orphics and of Hesiod,³ and it suggests the idea not only of a "primary substance" but of a *process* to account for genesis and change.⁴

Aristotle's treatment of Anaximander is not consistent. In the *Physics* he argues: (a) that belief in an "unlimited" rests not on sense-perception but on mental inferences and constructions;⁵ (b) that genesis without end does not require the existence of a σῶμα αἰσθητὸν which is unlimited,⁶ — that is, that Anaximander need not assume an unlimited material substance, since within a limited sum of things endless change may take place; (c) in fact, the existence of an infinite substance, whether conceived as the universal substance ($\tauὸ \; \ddot{\alpha}πειρον \; \sigmaῶμα$) or, "as some say, in addition to the elements" ($\tauὸ \; παρὰ \; \tauὰ \; στοιχεῖα$), not only is not revealed to any of our senses, but, if assumed, would prevent the existence of anything else, — e.g., of fire (or, as we might say, in the spirit of

¹ *Met.* A, 3, 983b7-984a4.

² *D12A1*; 9; 15.

³ *Theog.* 116; 123.

⁴ Cf. further Heidel, *Qual. Change*, pp. 344-348.

⁵ *Phys.* Γ, 3, 203b17-204b12 (= in part *D12A15*).

⁶ *Phys.* Γ, 8, 208a8 (= *D12A14*).

Parmenides, there cannot be motion or change in a solid continuum).¹ Nevertheless Aristotle holds (d) that Anaximander did believe in an ἄπειρον which is ὕλη,² and he admits (e) furthermore³ that if it exists it is fair to regard it as an ἀρχή, and therefore as self-moving and as "embracing and governing all things"; it is indeed, as he remarks, "the divinity itself, being immortal and indestructible, as Anaximander and most of the φυσιολόγοι declare it to be."⁴ In spite of all this, Aristotle studiously ignores Anaximander in his discussion, in the first book of the *Metaphysics*, of the early philosophers who were "materialists."⁵ One can hardly avoid asking why, for it is a significant omission.⁶ It is not, I think, because he does not sometimes, at least, regard Anaximander as "materialist," but rather because he recognizes in him something else besides which does not fit exactly into his own scheme. Indeed Aëtius complains that Anaximander is at fault in not specifying just what τὸ ἄπειρον is (whether air or water or earth or some other σώματα), and also in relying on ὕλη alone without any efficient cause (*τὸ ποιοῦν αἴτιον*), without which there can be no ἐνέργεια.⁷ In other words, Anaximander's ἄπειρον is not palpable to sense (as Aristotle might agree), and it provides no efficient cause (as Aristotle ought not to agree, if he remembered what he wrote in the *Physics*).⁸

So far we have restricted ourselves to the ἄπειρον, which is pure

¹ *Phys.* Γ, 3, 204b12–205A8. Cf. *Phys.* Α, 4, 187a20, possibly associating the ἄπειρον of Anaximander with the μῆγμα of Empedocles and Anaxagoras; cf. Cornford in Loeb ed. of *Physics*, I, p. 41.

² *Phys.* Γ, 7, 207b35 (= D12A14).

³ *Phys.* Γ, 4, 203b3–15 (= D12A15).

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ *Met.* Α, 3, 983b8: τὰς ἐν ὕλης εἰδει μόνας φήθησαν ἀρχὰς εἶναι πάντων.

⁶ Cf. A. E. Taylor, *Aristotle and his Predecessors* (Chicago, 1927), p. 33, n. 1: "Anaximander, whom Aristotle ignores as completely as he can throughout this sketch"; Cherniss, p. 220: "It is . . . significant for Aristotle's method that Anaximander is passed over in silence; evidently Aristotle did not feel sure that 'the infinite' was a perceptible material such as he is here maintaining was the principle of *all* the early philosophers, and lest the exception refute his thesis, he ignores Anaximander altogether."

⁷ D12A14.

⁸ See above on this page, n. 3.

causality, a god with power, but, so far, without purpose or moral implications. But Anaximander's scheme also represents finite beings as proceeding from it, and passing back into it, "according to necessity (*κατὰ τὸ χρεῶν*), for they make reparation and satisfaction (*διδόναι δίκην καὶ τίσιν*) to each other for their injustice (*ἀδικίας*) according to the appointed time."¹ In *τὸ χρεῶν* we find a regulative principle or force which is roughly equivalent to Fate; it is as universal, as impersonal, as anything can be. But in the conception of things "making reparation and satisfaction to each other for their injustice," — "rather poetical terms," as Simplicius aptly remarks in quoting the passage, — we note the transference to the physical world of ideas that we regard as human.² Here we find the beginning of the philosophical conception of Nature as upholding or as striving for a moral system; it consists in occasional retribution for "injustice," rather than in a continuously functioning power; yet the effect is comparable to the conservation of matter or of energy.³ The infringement of the simplicity of *τὸ ἄπειρον* may even be regarded as a principle of Evil, since it calls into being the egotistical, warring opposites, which tend to gain at each other's expense till they find a balance or are merged once more (like Orphic souls released from the *κύκλος γενέσεως*) in *τὸ ἄπειρον*; the latter thus now acquires a moral character as the Good (like the Being of Parmenides, except that his Being suffers no change).

¹ *D12B1*; cf. A9.

² The reverse process is to be found in Solon's "Prayer to the Muses," where (ll. 17-24) the poet declares that the vengeance of Zeus is as sure, though not so swift, as the clearing of clouds by a spring wind.

³ A. W. Benn, *The Greek Philosophers*² (London, n.d.), p. 6, finds here "the ultimate identity of natural with moral law. There is no trace of Oriental pessimism here, no slight on the desirability of existence in itself. Nor could Anaximander have meant that individual existence as such is an offence against the All-One, for then it could not have been expiated by another wrong. He meant that turn and turn about is a fair rule," etc. The point is well taken; but the "injustice" of which Anaximander speaks is not in being born, but in acting "selfishly." He is referring, of course, to fire and cold, etc. Cf. also Cornford, *Rel.-Phil.* pp. 7-12; 144-147; Scoot, p. 33, translating *κατὰ τὸ χρεῶν* "as is ordained," and seeing in it a final cause; Gundel, p. 7.

It is Anaximander, too, who has some vague notions of the evolution of animals, of the survival of those (enveloped in a prickly husk) that were fitted to their environment, and of lower and higher animals.¹ Here it is fair to see something in which Aristotle should have recognized formal causes, and even final causes, if it had suited his purpose to do so, and a world in which Fate furthers the Good but tolerates Evil. Thus early in the history of Greek philosophy has the Problem of Evil entered. It is only a passing thought, not to be developed till later. But there is sufficient evidence to show that Anaximander deserved a place in Aristotle's sketch of pre-Socratic philosophy, and that a relatively honorable one; can it be that Aristotle's omission betrays an uneasy conscience?²

Anaximenes agreed with his friend Anaximander, as Simplicius remarks, that the underlying *φύσις* is one and unlimited (*ἄπειρον*), but not that it is indeterminate (*ἀόριστον*); no, it is Air, *ἀήρ* or *πνεῦμα*, — for he used the terms indifferently, thus identifying the breath of life and atmospheric air, and linking Man and Nature.³ This reversion to a single determinate substance would have seemed to Anaximander unjust favoritism. But his Air is the supreme divinity, active, and creative of gods and of all other beings, by the correlated processes of rarefaction and condensation;⁴ here we may recognize a step, through different degrees of density, to the conception of purely quantitative determinations, as opposed to the qualitative change of Anaximander.⁵ Aëtius is doubtless correct in pointing out that Anaximenes provides a material, but not an efficient cause;⁶ we may add that the process of rarefaction and condensation describes a formal cause, but that

¹ *D12A30*.

² Cf. further H. Diels, "Anaximandros von Milet," *N. Jbb. f. d. kl. Alt.* (1923), pp. 65–75; Hommel, pp. 192 f.

³ *D13A1*; 5; 7; *B2*.

⁴ *D13A5*; 8.

⁵ Cf. Heidel, *Qual. Change*, pp. 348–350; Scoon, p. 28.

⁶ Gundel, pp. 8; 11; 12, hazards the suggestion that as Thales expressed the notion of necessity by *ἀνάγκη*, and Anaximander by *τὸ χρεῶν*, so Anaximenes may have used *εἰμαρμένη*, especially since these last two are the terms which Heraclitus and Parmenides tend to identify.

a final cause, and any ethical implication, is lacking in his system.

The Milesian conception of $\phi\beta\sigma\tau\alpha$ s as divine, though not personal, as self-moving, though regular, has not allowed the ideas of matter and power (or agent) to be separated; it is only when they have been separated that it is possible for Aristotle to criticize the Milesian philosophers for providing no efficient cause.¹ But of any final cause, or of grounds for interpreting the trend of the cosmos in terms of Good and Evil as well as of Power, we have found hardly a trace, save in Anaximander. The assumption has been that the description of what a thing *is* includes the description of its function or purpose.²

II

Xenophanes, greater as satirist and religious protestant than as constructive thinker, a rationalizer rather than a real scientist, is more important in the sequel than in himself, for he begins a new movement of enormous importance for our problem. His One God, *not* of mortal form, *not* toiling, *not* moving, *not* begotten, is, to begin with, the negation of popular mythology and even of the mystery gods, who *are* born; positively, he "sees all over, thinks all over, hears all over, and sways all things by the thought of his mind,"³ and is "throughout alike,"⁴ and "always alike,"⁵ and "spherical,"⁶ and "eternal."⁷ That is, he is an abstraction from the powers and divinities of the cosmologists and mythologists. But in dealing with concrete phenomena (matters of opinion), Xenophanes falls back on two substances, Earth and Water,⁸ so that Aristotle is perhaps justified both in hailing him as the first unitarian and in dismissing him somewhat haughtily as vague and

¹ *Met.* A, 3, 984a17-28. Cf. Hack, pp. 39-46; Scoon, pp. 29-34.

² I once asked an English friend, an archdeacon, what his functions were. "The functions of an archdeacon," he replied, with a twinkle, "are archidiaconal functions." By the same token one might say that the activity of $\phi\beta\sigma\tau\alpha$ s is physical activity; and until one has established an ulterior $\tau\epsilon\lambda\sigma$ one cannot talk of teleological causes, or of goodness.

³ *D21B23-26; 31.*

⁴ *D21A31.*

⁵ *D21A32.*

⁶ *D21A31; cf. 28.*

⁷ *D21A31.*

⁸ *D21B27; 29.*

naïf.¹ In fact, Xenophanes is not patient enough to be a scientist, proceeding from careful observations to a conclusion, but is a man carried away by a sudden moral and intellectual *aperçu*, which he buttresses and defends from all that would weaken it. His motive, too, is not scientific, but religious, and is a reaction against previous and contemporary religion, and against the "gods" of the Milesian philosophers; his own religion is to be pure and undefiled. In his zeal to rescue his supreme principle from immorality and the imperfections of the transitory world, he lifts it high above the flux and cuts it loose from such physical qualifications as his predecessors have imposed on their "gods." By attributing to his One God an absolute perfection and making it the object of what amounts to religious adoration,² he is compelled to describe it in chiefly negative terms and to reduce it to pure being; it is opposed to the changing and so far unreal world of phenomena, the subject-matter of popular science and religion, such as clouds and "gods," concerning which there can be only opinion.³ Xenophanes thus begins the antithesis, more obvious in Parmenides and Plato, between Reality and Appearance, which makes it hard to explain the relation between the One and the Many. Parmenides completes the severance, and denies the reality of Change and the Many; Plato and Aristotle build up their metaphysical schemes to bind them together, lest they be forever sundered; Xenophanes more light-heartedly evades the issue. His One God "sways all things by the thought of his mind,"⁴ and is "coherent with all things."⁵ He is pure causality; but what he causes, or how, we are not told; for natural phenomena can be explained only by guesswork. So far as our problem is concerned, the One God of Xenophanes appears in the rôle both of Fate and of Good, and Evil must be sought in the shadowy world of appearance; this,

¹ *Met.* A, 5, 986b22 (= D21A30).

² Cf. Hack, pp. 61-64; Burnet, *T.-P.* p. 35, misses the point when he denies that Xenophanes, whom he regards as a pantheist, "regarded this 'god' with any religious feeling."

³ D21B34-36.

⁴ D21B25, thus anticipating Anaxagoras.

⁵ D21A35.

in the sequel, will be of increasing importance. For, whether he realized it or not, the first unitarian was dangerously near to being also the father of dualism.

Dualism, of course, had already appeared in unphilosophic guise in the mystery religions, though it remained for Pythagoras and his followers to give it a scientific form. Much of their thought grew naturally from that of their predecessors. The Milesians, the Orphics, Pherecydes, the cults of Delian and Hyperborean Apollo, are enough to account for much that is generally regarded as characteristic of early Pythagoreanism — geometry, “the unlimited,” “air,” “purifications,” *παλιγγενεσία*, and bits of cosmological doctrine.¹ The real originality of the Pythagoreans consists in the manner in which they added to the idea of the “unlimited” the idea of the “limit,” and worked out their relations in the fields of mathematics and medicine and music. For Anaximander, the “unlimited” had been a god, and was endowed with something like a moral quality, as the god from which all things come and to which they all return. The Pythagoreans, true to the Greek instinct which viewed with suspicion the vague and irresponsible unlimited, and admired the well-defined forms of sculpture and Greek landscape,² made their principle of Evil out of *τὸ ἄπειρον*, or of darkness, or of empty space, and deified *τὸ πέρας*, sometimes conceived also as Fire. Because mathematics is the most precise example of definite proportion accessible to the mind, mathematics is invaded by this moral distinction; even numbers, since they are capable of bisection, are mobile and unreliable and evil; odd numbers, since they resist bisection, are reliable and good.³ The “One” is the divine parent of all other numbers, both odd and even, as the causal unity that underlies the many, much as *τὸ ἄπειρον* of

¹ Cf. Burnet, *T.-P.* pp. 39–44. It seems unnecessary here to enter into the question of the limits of earlier and later Pythagoreanism; we are here concerned chiefly with the former. I accept in the main the position of Burnet, *E. G. P.* pp. 93–112; 276–304; but for a different position, cf. also Scoon, pp. 44 f.; 134–150; 339–345. For a statement of the relationship between Pythagoreanism and Orphism, cf. W. K. C. Guthrie, *Orpheus and Greek Religion* (London, 1935), pp. 216–221.

² Cf. C. Lévéque, *Quid Phidiae Plato debuerit* (Paris, 1852), p. 60.

³ For an entertaining account of this subject, cf. Fuller, pp. 110–112.

Anaximander is parent of the "opposites";¹ conversely, "things," and even moral qualities such as justice and *καιρός*, the Pythagoreans "connected with numbers,"² as we might say that such things are symbolized by geometrical figures.

If it is true that "we must not attach too much importance" to these identifications,³ nevertheless we find serious Pythagorean doctrine in the view, which pervades musical and medical theory alike, that the limit imposes itself on the unlimited in a fixed proportion or mean: the result in music is tuning, or "harmony"; in medicine, health. In either case, the process may be described as a *κράσις*, or mingling, a "tempering" of opposed principles; it suggests not so much the "rarefaction and condensation" of Anaximenes (though this process includes quantitative degrees)⁴ as the avenging of "injustice" or encroachment which Anaximander had described as taking place.⁵ The musical scale and the physician's prescription keep a just mean between the extremes of the unlimited. Here, then, is a second sense in which the Pythagoreans find a Good: not only is the limit good, as opposed to the unlimited, but the resultant of the two is good, limit imposing itself on the unlimited, as form.⁶ This takes place both in the orderly cosmos, of which the Pythagoreans were the first to have any real notion, and to elaborate an astronomical system, and in human souls, which likewise represent a tuning or harmony. It will require another step for later Pythagoreans and for Plato to elaborate this theory, and to raise the question whether all living souls, or only the souls of just men, are tuned; and, again, whether the soul existed before it entered the body and will outlive it, as the Orphics and the earlier Pythagoreans held, or whether the soul is merely the attunement of the body.

¹ Cf. Hack, pp. 49-57.

² Arist. *Met.* M, 4, 1078b21: ὥν τοὺς λόγους εἰς τοὺς ἀριθμοὺς ἀνήπττον.

³ Burnet, *E. G. P.* p. 108. In his second edition, Burnet refers to them as "mere sports of the analogical fancy."

⁴ See above, p. 93.

⁵ See above, p. 92.

⁶ Aristotle mentions with disapproval, *Met.* A, 7, 1072b30 (= D58B11), a view held by "the Pythagoreans" and Speusippus, that perfect beauty and goodness do not exist in the beginning, as causes, but arise in the products of plants and animals, as results.

Despite their dualism, then, the early Pythagoreans adopted for practical purposes a view of the world that found in a well-formed union of limit and unlimited, of form and matter, of soul and body, the reality in which Good is to be sought; and form, justice, right proportion, the golden mean, will be henceforth the central and architectonic moral concept to be investigated throughout the Platonic and Aristotelian traditions. Even the atoms of Leucippus, whose qualities depend upon their forms and relations, owe something to the Pythagoreans, however little the atomistic philosophy is otherwise related to them. It remains to ask whether the Pythagoreans, who may be said to dispute with Anaximenes the claim of having invented the formal cause, had any conception of a final cause. The answer is probably in the negative, except so far as their One or Limit, conceived of as an active, cosmogenetic god, not merely efficient and formal, but containing in itself an orderly, unfolding process, could be thought of as working toward a goal — the cosmos, and the good man.¹ Adequate evidence fails us here. But we should not forget that Pythagoreanism, during its earlier phase, was a religion as well as a science; and that the doctrine, which it shared with the mystery religions, of the soul and its vicissitudes through purification and successive rebirths may be regarded as equivalent to a conception of a Fate that fixes the limits within which goodness may be achieved. To Necessity, either as Orphic goddess or as mechanical force, there is apparently no recourse.

III

In Heraclitus we meet another thinker whose whole philosophy is the elaboration of a single brilliant *aperçu*. Poet at heart, preacher in his manner, scientist in his sympathies if not in his activities, he makes his influence felt in such diverse fields as the Hippocratic writings and the Stoic literature. For ordinary men

¹ Aristotle complains, *Met.* A, 8, 990a8, that the Pythagoreans do not explain how motion can begin; but he also says, *Met.* N, 3, 1091a15, that in their cosmogony as soon as the One was composed "the nearest parts of the Unlimited were drawn in and limited by Limit."

who do not hearken to the “Word” (*λόγος*)¹ Heraclitus has only scorn,² and in particular for his predecessors in philosophy and poetry.³ The one thing needful to be known is that the fundamental reality is not substance, or a One and a Many, or two opposite principles, but process, growth, continuity. Rather than try to derive the Many from the One, movement from the stationary, or try to reconcile opposing principles, it is better to admit at the outset that conflict is the type of all reality. This fundamental process may be variously conceived: as flowing, as burning, as waxing and waning, as breathing, as the melting of day into night, as the tension of the taut bow or lyre. But there is identity in change; what burns is Fire, a living god like the *φύσις* of the Milesians.⁴ Conversely, there is change in identity: Fire consumes, and must be fed; it could not exist except at the expense of its fuel, which may be exhausted; measures must be kindled as measures go out, that the Fire may be ever-living.⁵ The soul lives, sleeps, or dies, according to its degree of dryness or of moisture. Hence Anaximander’s “separating out” of opposing principles is not a sufficient formula: the “rarefaction and condensation” of Anaximenes suggests alternation, or, as Heraclitus phrases it, an “exchange (*ἀμοιβή*) of all things for Fire, and of Fire for all things,”⁶ like the exchange of gold and wares. Again, the process may be described as “the Way up and the Way down.”⁷ These two Ways are said to be “the same,”⁸ which appears to be another

¹ Frag. B1: *λόγος*; B2: *δόγμα*, keeping the manuscript reading *δόγματος*, unnecessarily emended by editors to *λόγου*. Burnet holds, *E. G. P.* p. 133, n. 1, that we should not read Stoic or Christian doctrine into *λόγος*, which means “simply the discourse of Herakleitus himself.” Adam however makes a strong case, pp. 217–225, for identifying the *Logos* with God (or Fire). In particular, *γνώμη* (B19), “by which all things are steered through all things,” is the divine wisdom, *τὸ σοφόν*, which “is unwilling and willing to be called by the name of Zeus” (B65), much as in the Hymn of Cleanthes. O. Gigon, *Untersuchungen zu Heraclit* (Leipzig, 1935), ingeniously demonstrates, pp. 1–19, that the *λόγος* is both the discourse of Heraclitus and an eternal principle.

² B2–12; 16; 17.

³ B111–119.

⁴ B20; 24–26; 35; 36; 39; cf. 41; 43; 44; 45; 59.

⁵ B20.

⁶ B22.

⁷ B69.

⁸ B69; cf. 70.

way of saying that there is ultimately a conservation of energy, an equilibrium of forces, though they are not stationary, for Life and Death alternate.¹ "The Sun will not overstep his measures (*μέτρα*); if he does, the Erinyes, the handmaids of Justice (*δίκης ἐπικονυροι*), will find him out."² Natural law is thus affirmed on the analogy not only of business law (*ἀμοιβή*) but of the most ancient sanction of moral law. This law, then, is something at last which is timeless, something not carried along with the flux; if all else be relative, this is absolute, whether one call it justice, or *γνώμη*,³ or *τὸ σοφόν*,⁴ or "the thunderbolt that steers the course of all things,"⁵ or "the secret of Nature,"⁶ or "a secret tuning,"⁷ as Heraclitus variously named it, or *λόγος*, as did his Stoic followers. The strife that Anaximander called injustice is after all justice, and is a universal law. Fools may seek to live in a private world of their own imagining; but the wise "must hold fast to what is common to all (*τῷ ξυνῷ πάντων*) as a city holds fast to its law (*νόμῳ*) and even more strongly. For all human laws are fed by the one divine law (*ὑπὸ ἐνὸς τοῦ θείου*). It prevails as much as it will, and suffices for all things, with something to spare."⁸

So far everything in Heraclitus has conspired to support a view of the world in which things are mere moments in an orderly and inexorable process, and the debt of Cratylus and of Protagoras to Heraclitus is easy to understand. Only this process, a justice which is a law unto itself, has absolute worth; all else is relative, and persons and things and objectives have worth only as they are related to this process. The next step is to affirm explicitly the indifference of ordinary moral distinctions; Good and Evil are alike absorbed in what must be. From a partial point of view, to be sure, that of self-interest, Good and Evil certainly exist; and different interests find different goods. "The sea is the purest and the impurest water. Fish can drink it, and it is good for them; to

¹ B67.

² B29; cf. 20; and J. E. Harrison, *Prolegomena to the Study of Greek Religion* (Cambridge, Eng., 1903), pp. 216 f.

³ B19.

⁵ B28.

⁷ B47: *ἀρμονία*; cf. 10.

⁴ B65.

⁶ B10: *φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ*.

⁸ B91; cf. 92; 95.

men it is undrinkable and destructive.”¹ That sounds like unmitigated relativism. But from the point of view of the whole, these interests and value-judgments are invalid: “To God all things are fair and good and right, but men hold some things wrong and some right.”² Thus, just as the “Way Up” and the “Way Down” are the same,³ and “War is common to all and strife is justice,”⁴ so “Good and Evil are one.”⁵ Not that good and evil are interchangeable terms, as Aristotle perversely understood him to mean;⁶ not that, as Pope light-heartedly puts it, “Whatever is, is right.”⁷ What Heraclitus means, and what he would have said if the logical distinction could have been stated in his day, is that members of a pair of correlatives, such as good and evil, or sickness and health, or justice and injustice, have significance only in relation to their opposites.⁸ Single members of a pair are incomplete and so far insignificant; a complete point of view embraces both members and welcomes them both as “good.” If Heraclitus relegates good and evil, in the ordinary sense, to a position purely relative to the whole scheme of things, thus rating man and his interests very low, he attributes to natural law a “rightness” or “justice” of its own. Evil exists only in misguided men, or in temporary aberrations from Nature’s equilibrium.

There is here a foretaste of Stoic naturalism and Stoic ethics. To claim Heraclitus, moreover, as a forerunner of Spinoza, viewing all things *sub specie aeternitatis*, or even of Hegel, with his insistence on the dialectical nature of thought, may be permissible. But there is hardly a warrant for seeing in Heraclitus, except in a limited sense, a Greek Nietzsche who has passed “beyond good and evil” to a “transvaluation of all values,” despite the great

¹ B52.

² B61. By “God” we are to understand Fire, the process that absorbs the relativity and conflict of things. Cf. Burnet, *E. G. P.* pp. 166 f.

³ B69.

⁴ B62; cf. 44.

⁵ B57: ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακὸν ταῦτά.

⁶ *Phys.* A, 2, 185b20–26. Cf. further Cherniss, pp. 86 f.

⁷ “Essay on Man,” I, 294; cf. Dryden, *Oedipus*, III, 1: “Whatever is, is in its causes just.”

⁸ B104 (cf. 58); 60.

admiration of the German for the Greek.¹ One may find in Heraclitus and in Nietzsche alike the trenchant criticism of partial and arbitrary ethical codes of men of limited vision; and both thinkers have something of the intuitive, artist's attitude towards things, which is a form of optimism.² But Nietzsche's own code must be considered somewhat arbitrary, compared with the "common" of Heraclitus. It is Nietzsche, not Heraclitus, who might agree with Hamlet that "there is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so"; it is Heraclitus, not Nietzsche, who finds order and reason and goodness, under many different names, immanent in the strife and flow of things. In the last analysis, Heraclitus is no rebellious individualist, no "superman," and no "weeping philosopher."³

If the Stoics owe much to the naturalism of Heraclitus, they owe much also to his treatment of Fate. The motive forces for cosmogony are poetically described by him as *χρησμοσύνη* and *κόρος*,⁴ or again as *εἰμαρμένη*,⁵ which is for him apparently the same as *ἀνάγκη*, — *fatalis necessitas*, — or once more as *Logos*, or as Fire.⁶ Yet when it comes to human destiny, Heraclitus writes less as

¹ F. Nietzsche, *Early Greek Philosophy*, Eng. Trans. (London, 1911), pp. 97–114, and *passim*; cf. A. H. J. Knight, *Some Aspects of the Life and Work of Nietzsche, and particularly of his Connection with Greek Literature and Thought* (Cambridge, Eng., 1933), pp. 21; 100; 106–112; 145.

² Cf. Nietzsche, *op. cit.*, pp. 107–110.

³ On the essential optimism of Heraclitus, and its consequences in later times (including Stoicism and "consolation literature"), cf. W. Nestle, "Der Pessimismus und seine Überwindung bei den Griechen," *N. Jbb. f. d. kl. Alt.* XLVII (1921), p. 92; Hommel, pp. 192–194; Adam, pp. 235–237.

⁴ B24; cf. also D22B80: *χρεῶν* (Diels).

⁵ B63.

⁶ Aēt. 1, 7, 22 (in D22A8): 'H. τὸ περιοδικὸν πῦρ ἀλίσιον [εἴναι θεόν], εἰμαρμένην δὲ λόγον ἐκ τῆς ἐναντιορούμενας δημιουργὸν τῶν ὄντων. Aēt. 1, 27, 1 (in D22A8): 'H. πάντα καθ' εἰμαρμένην, τὴν δὲ αὐτὴν ὑπάρχειν καὶ ἀνάγκην. Cf. Aēt. 1, 28, 1 (in D22A8); D. L. 9, 7 (in D22A1); Gundel, pp. 9–11. The identification of Fate with necessity, and again with *Logos* or with Fire, seems to me to save Heraclitus from the criticism of Dr. Cyril Bailey, that here "'necessity' appears rather as an external agent called in, like a *deus ex machina*, or a 'maid of all work,' to explain what might otherwise be inexplicable," whereas "by the time of the Atomists it has become an internal force." *Proc. of the (British) Class. Assoc.* XXXII (1935), pp. 15 f.; cf. also Bailey, *Atomists*, pp. 49 f.

determinist than as humanist; "Man's character is his fate."¹ Adam reasonably interprets the saying as "an assertion of the divinity of the soul," through its unity with the *Logos*, and finds in it the warrant for the ethical doctrine of Heraclitus, — warning against *hybris*,² defence of the law,³ and the resignation of individuality before the universal in which alone good and evil are resolved.⁴

To the perennial problem of Identity and Difference, the One and the Many, Permanence and Change, Heraclitus had replied with a paradox: these opposites are one. And perhaps as much because of a temperamental disposition as for any other reason, he gave prominence in his system to Change. The paradox troubled Parmenides, who preferred to cut the opposites apart once more; and being by temperament⁵ inclined to prefer permanence to change, he built his system upon the conception of an unchanging unity, the product of pure thought. Since motion and "coming to be," the world of the flux, defied his logic, he outlawed it to another realm; between the two worlds he boldly recognized an impassable gap. Being (object of thought) and Becoming (object of opinion) were thus divorced; or, in other words, metaphysics and physics were distinguished.

The language and style of Parmenides' hexameter verse are in the tradition of Hesiod and the mystic myth-makers; his poem is an apocalypse, in which conventional religious abstractions play their part.⁶ After his prologue, Parmenides proceeds to

¹ B121: Ἡθος ἀνθρώπῳ δαιμων; cf. Bywater's *testimonia*, and Epicharmus, D23B17.

² B103.

³ B100.

⁴ Adam, p. 237.

⁵ On "a certain abstract monism, a certain emotional response to the character of oneness," and the difficulty of upholding it against the testimony of experience, particularly if the question arises of any "one purpose that every detail of the universe subserves," William James has some notable remarks in his *Pragmatism* (New York, 1928), pp. 129–132; 140–143. See also below, pp. 114 f.

⁶ D28B1, l. 3: δαιμονες (so Stein, Wilamowitz); l. 9: δώματα Νυκτός; l. 10: εἰς φάος. It is Δίκη πολύποντος (probably the Orphic goddess) who holds the keys of the doors of Night and Day (ll. 11–14). An unnamed θέα, identified

unfold the Way of Truth, and presently the Way of Opinion (a double way, as it proves, though one fork, the hypothesis that non-Being has a real existence, is a *cul-de-sac*).¹ In the Way of Truth, he refashions the one God of Xenophanes (his master, according to Aristotle²) into his One Being, eternal, immutable, identical, continuous, homogeneous, inviolable, a *plenum*, without origin and without offspring.³ Unlike the One God of Xenophanes, and unlike the Unlimited of Anaximander, the Being of Parmenides is sharply defined by an encompassing limit, and this is described in Pythagorean or Orphic language: "Justice ($\Delta\kappa\eta$) does not loose her fetters and let anything come into being ($\gamma\nu\nepsilon\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$) or pass away ($\delta\lambda\lambda\nu\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$), but holds it fast";⁴ it is immovable in the bonds of mighty chains, without beginning and without end;⁵ and it rests steadfast in the same place, "since hard Necessity ('Ανάγκη) keeps it in the bonds of the limit ($\pi\epsilon\rho\alpha\tau\oslash\epsilon\ \epsilon\nu\ \delta\epsilon\sigma\mu\bar{\iota}\sigma\omega\ \epsilon\chi\epsilon\iota$) that holds it fast on every side, so that it is not infinite."⁶ And again, "there is not, and never shall be, anything beside what is, since *Moira* has chained it so as to be whole and immovable."⁷ If we are to speak of causes in the philosophic system of Parmenides, we may properly call his 'Ανάγκη or *Μοῖρα* a formal, delimiting cause, and seek its pedigree in Pythagoreanism. Efficient and final causes are wanting; in fact, Parmenides rejects any efficient cause to call Being out of non-Being.⁸ Nor is there any tinge of ethics, of Good

by Coxon, p. 144, citing H. Fränkel, *Parmenidesstudien* (Berlin, 1930), pp. 158 f., with "Justice or Destiny," welcomes Parmenides (l. 22), since not *μοῖρα κακή* but *θέμις τε δίκη τε* have brought him on his way (ll. 26-28); he must (*χρεώ*, l. 28) learn all things, both the "heart of truth" and "the opinions of mortals in which there is no true belief at all" (ll. 29 f.).

¹ D28B2, ll. 5-8.

² Met. A, 5, 986b23; cf. D. L. 9, 21.

³ D28B2-8, l. 49.

⁴ D28B8, ll. 13-15.

⁵ Ibid. ll. 26 f.

⁶ Ibid. ll. 30-32.

⁷ Ibid. ll. 36-38.

⁸ Ibid. ll. 9 f.: $\tau\acute{e}\ \delta'\ \dot{\alpha}\nu\ \mu\nu\ \kappa\acute{a}\ \chi\rho\acute{e}\oslash\ \dot{\omega}\rho\sigma\epsilon\nu\ |\ \dot{\upsilon}\sigma\tau\epsilon\sigma\ \dot{\eta}\ \pi\rho\sigma\theta\epsilon\nu,\ \tau\dot{\omega}\ \mu\dot{\eta}\delta\epsilon\nu\dot{\delta}\ \dot{\alpha}\rho\xi\dot{\alpha}\mu\dot{\epsilon}\nu\dot{\nu}\nu;$ Aëtius, to be sure, remarks, 1, 25, 3 (=D28A32), Παρμενίδης καὶ Δημόκριτος πάντα κατ' ἀνάγκην τὴν αὐτὴν δὲ εἶναι εἰμαρρένην καὶ δίκην καὶ πρόνοιαν καὶ κοσμοποιόν. The inclusion of *πρόνοια* is as startling for Parmenides as for Democritus. But see below: for Parmenides, p. 105, n. 1; for Democritus, p. 125, n. 8. Cf. further Cherniss, 220 f.

or Evil, despite the faintly hieratic coloring of the style.¹ Yet perhaps we may detect, in *Δίκη* and *Μοῖρα*, if not an ethical conception, at least a value-judgment grounded in an aesthetic instinct for symmetry; they represent not so much retribution or destiny (implying a time sequence) as "due measure"; and in fact the "form" prescribed by this formal cause is that of a sphere, the perfectly symmetrical solid. Yet it is important to note that the sphere is merely a simile: Being "has a furthest limit, is complete on all sides *like* the mass of a rounded sphere."² What Parmenides is talking about, and thinking about, is not a hard, solid, material sphere, but thought itself, firm, closely knit, self-contained, and complete, so that "it is all one to me where I begin; for I shall come back again there."³ And if "it is the same thing that can be thought and that can be,"⁴ what better simile for the object of thought than that most perfect of images palpable both to senses and to reason, the sphere? So the Sphere, like the Fetters and Necessity, takes its place in the archaic landscape of Parmenides' universe of discourse.⁵ At the risk of being accused of anachronism, one may point out that here, as elsewhere, Parmenides is the ancestor of Leibniz; for him, as for Leibniz, this is the best of all possible worlds, because it is a rational world, and is the system in which the greatest quantum of perfection is realized that is possible among mutually compatible members.

So far the Way of Truth. But what of phenomena, the world of flux? This is the province of the Way of Opinion. The relation of the latter part of the poem to the earlier remains a subject for

¹ Gundel, p. 12, points out that Parmenides fuses Law and Divinity, Decree and Decree (cf. Aëtius, above, p. 104, n. 8), power and personality, and that he is nearer than Heraclitus to recognizing personality in the control of things. But Scoon remarks, p. 77, that though Parmenides is "guilty of the same confusion of thought, on the subject of natural regularity, as we found in Heraclitus," he represents "a further step in the transition from the old Milesian notion of natural Justice and Injustice to the later idea of mechanical regularity, which predominates in the Atomist system."

² D28B8, 1, 43: *εὐκύλον σφαῖρης ἐναλίγκουν δύκωι.* Cf. D28B1, l. 29: 'Αληθεῖης εὐκυκλέος.

³ D28A5.

⁵ Cf. further Coxon, pp. 139 f.

⁴ D28A3.

controversy. I need here only record my conviction that it is not¹ the former belief of Parmenides, derived chiefly from Pythagorean sources, which he now recants, but is rather the sort of plausible account, common to (philosophic) mortals² and particularly among Pythagoreans, which he puts forth as the best that he can give. It is "a concession to appearances," as Aristotle phrases it.³ There can be no real knowledge of the world of phenomena, for it is not rational and cannot be deduced from Being; in fact, the doctrine of Being renders motion, change, and becoming inconceivable. Yet the world of the flux has for Parmenides a specious half-reality, so that one may have of it, if not knowledge, at any rate opinion. The parallel with Plato, particularly in the *Timaeus*, is fairly close: the world of Ideas on the one hand, the world of concrete phenomena on the other hand; and, as Plato puts it, "What Being is to Becoming, Truth is to Belief."⁴ Hence Parmenides resorts, much as Plato does, to traditional opinions (partly Pythagorean) and the literary device of the myth (Orphic in origin). Again and again he declares that this doctrine is not true but is the best that he can offer with regard to such refractory material. He has marked, once and for all, the line between metaphysics and physics, and he has drawn the line well, even if he finds truth only in the realm of metaphysics. Modern physics, it may be noted, once so proud of its empirical methods, is tending to-day to creep over into metaphysics; but Parmenides would warn it that it has started from the wrong end, and furthermore that the line can never be passed with safety. For whereas Plato and Aristotle and Christian theology and Kant all recognize a distinction between the realm of Being (Thought, Ideas) and concrete phenomena, they all seek to minimize it and to bring the two worlds into relation with each other. Only Parmenides was consistent, or honest, or stubborn enough to insist that the gap re-

¹ As Burnet would have it, *E. G. P.* pp. 182-187.

² D28B1, l. 30: *βροτῶν δόξας*; cf. D28B6, l. 4; D28B8, ll. 39; 51; 61.

³ *Met.* A, 5, 986b32 (= D28A24): *ἀναγκαζόμενος δ' ἀκολουθεῖν τοῖς φαινόμενοις, κτλ.* Cf. Hippol. *Ref.* 1, 11 (= D28A23). On this question, cf. Cornford, *Rcl.-Phil.* pp. 218-224; Cornford, *Parm.* pp. 97-111; Coxon, pp. 134-144; Cherniss, pp. 220-222.

⁴ *Tim.* 29c. See also below, p. 109.

mains, and that in jumping it, in the latter part of his poem, he is doing something not quite legitimate. For though the Pythagoreans, beginning with premisses as abstract as his, had inconsistently evolved a *physis* and a cosmogony,¹ Parmenides held consistently that Being cannot be the *ἀρχή* of Becoming.² Nevertheless, Parmenides wrote a cosmogony after all, pointing out that he was making an absolutely fresh start, and that his picture is not a true one.³

Into the details of this cosmogony we need not go; it is enough to observe that it involves the error of mortals in naming two "forms," which are *two too many*.⁴ That is, the dualism of pairs of opposites, Light and Night,⁵ such as the Pythagoreans have used, is indeed the only condition on which change or motion is conceivable, but since the first philosophy of Parmenides has proved that change and motion are inconceivable, this dualism is *de trop*. Aristotle notes that Parmenides, despite his principle "being compelled to accord with phenomena, and assuming that Being is one in definition (*κατὰ τὸν λόγον*) but many in respect of sensation (*κατὰ τὴν αἰσθησιν*), posits in his turn two causes (*αἴτιας*) and two first principles (*ἀρχάς*), Hot and Cold, or in other words Fire and Earth. Of these he ranks Hot under Being and the other under Not-Being."⁶ And elsewhere Aristotle remarks that none of the pre-Socratics "who maintained that the universe is a unity achieved any conception of an efficient cause, except perhaps Par-

¹ Arist. *Met.* A, 8, 989b29; see also above, p. 97, n. 6; and cf. Cornford, *Parm.* pp. 104 f.

² Hack, pp. 88–90, seems to me to be mistaken in arguing that Parmenides regards his immutable Being as the cause of the changing universe. Yet just what the cause of it is, on Parmenides' showing, remains not clear. "He has left the appearances unexplained" (Cornford, *Parm.* p. 110). The presence of *'Ανάγκη* in both parts of the poem is not enough to prove that she creates both worlds; for the world of opinion is false. Perhaps it may be permitted to an early philosopher, as to a modern one, to have a few holes or weak spots in his system.

³ *D28B8*, l. 52: *κόσμον ἐμῶν ἐπέων ἀπατηλόν*; cf. ll. 53 f.; and *D28B1*, ll. 30–32.

⁴ *D28B8*, l. 53: *μορφάς*; cf. Cornford, *Parm.* pp. 108 f.

⁵ *D28B8*, ll. 55–59; *D28B9*, ll. 1–4.

⁶ *Met.* A, 5, 986b32–987a2.

menides, and he only so far as he admits, in a sense, not one but two causes.”¹ The world of changing phenomena can thus be derived by the mingling of these opposites or correlatives,² which are real not in the sense in which Being is real but only as related one to the other.³ It is tempting to suppose that Parmenides entertained among his opposites other pairs, such as the Pythagoreans included among their *συστοιχίαι*, and among them Good and Evil,⁴ or at least that for him, as for various oriental religions, Light and Night stood for Good and Evil, among other things, so that within the realm of Opinion, though not of Truth, the doctrine that this is the best (most rational) of all possible worlds⁵ would give place to a moral dualism. But the point must, I fear, be regarded as doubtful.⁶

The cosmogony continues in the prophetic manner of a myth with an account of the way in which on the illegitimate dualistic assumption things may be supposed to be arranged:⁷ the *φύσις* of the sky, and its contents, and their origin.⁸ Here at last is “physics,” growth and decay, with a vengeance, and incidentally support for the view that *φύσις* must include among its meanings that of growth. Although the thought is not that Being creates Becoming, there are certain analogies or echoes of the mystical language of the early part of the poem. “Thou shalt know the heavens that surround us, whence they arose, and how Necessity (*Ἀνάγκη*) took them and bound them to keep the limits of the

¹ *Met.* A, 3, 984b2–4. For the dualism of the Way of Opinion, as reported in later tradition under Aristotelian influence, cf. D. L. 9, 21 (= D28A1); Alex. in *Met.* A, 3, 984b3 (= D28A7); Hippol. *Ref.* 1, 11 (= D28A23), emphasizing the material and the efficient cause as being contained in it.

² D28B9.

³ D28B8, ll. 38–41.

⁴ Arist. *Met.* A, 5, 986a26.

⁵ See above, pp. 104 f.

⁶ We are told by Aristotle, *Met.* A, 4, 984b33–985a10 (= D31A39), that Empedocles was the first to introduce an efficient cause of Evil as well as of Good; and he implies that the Eros of Parmenides is the cause of Good only. See below, pp. 113 f.

⁷ D28B8, l. 60: *τὸν . . . διάκοσμον ἔουκότα τάντα.*

⁸ D28B10, l. 1: *αἰθερίαν τε φύσιν . . . καὶ ὀππόθεν ἐξεγένοντο . . . ἔργα . . . σελήνης | καὶ φύσιν . . . καὶ οὐρανόν . . . ἐνθεν . . . ἔφυ.* Cf. D28B19: *οὗτω τοι κατὰ δόξαν ἔφυ τάδε, κτλ.*

stars."¹ As in the Way of Truth the firm structure of reality was bound by Ἀνάγκη, or Δίκη, or Μοῖρα, so even in the physical world of Opinion, Necessity holds the universe together within bonds, an efficient cause of almost personal character. To correspond with the Sphere with which Being is compared in the Way of Truth, we have in the cosmogony not a solid sphere but a system of "rings" or "crowns";² one is reminded of the world in Plato's *Timaeus* created by the δημιουργός after the perfect pattern, and of time the copy of eternity;³ or, one might say, of a clock that keeps time with its interlocking wheels and cogs. And somehow at the centre is the δαιμων who "directs (κυβερνᾷ) the course of all things," and is the beginner of birth and generation, and who contrived Ἐρως first of all the gods."⁴ Again we are on familiar ground; here is Eros, the creative life-force of the Orphics and of Hesiod.⁵ Whether the δαιμων is simply Ἀνάγκη once more, or is Aphrodite, is a matter of inference.⁶ Aëtius, doubtless recording the views of Theophrastus, reports that "the central circle of the mixed crowns is the cause of movement and becoming to all the rest, being the goddess who directs their course," and adds that Parmenides calls her "Justice" and "Necessity" and the "Holder of Lots."⁷ The "Holder of Lots" who is also "Necessity" so strongly reminds one of the divinity in Plato's Myth of Er that one must suspect either influence or a common source, doubtless in Pythagorean literature.⁸ If Simplicius has any warrant for his statement that the goddess in Parmenides "sends souls at one time from the light to the unseen world, at another from the unseen world to the light,"⁹

¹ *D28B10*, ll. 5-7; cf. *D28B8*, l. 13: Δίκη; l. 31: κρατερή Ἀνάγκη; l. 38: Μοῖρα.

² *D28B12*; cf. Aët. 2, 7, 1 (= *D28A37*); Burnet, *E. G. P.* pp. 187-189.

³ *Tim.* 28a-29d; 37c-38b.

⁴ *D28A12*, ll. 3-6; *D28B13*.

⁵ Hes. *Theog.* 116-122; cf. Arist. *Met.* A, 3, 984b 23-33, referring to Hesiod and Parmenides as the originators of the idea of an efficient cause, though postponing to a more convenient occasion (which never comes) the question of priority.

⁶ Plutarch, with no special warrant, identifies her with Aphrodite (*D28B13*).

⁷ Aët. 2, 71 (= *D28A37*).

⁸ Burnet, *E. G. P.* pp. 189-192.

⁹ *D28B13*.

Parmenides, like Plato, has a plausible myth for the exits and entrances of human beings on the cosmic stage. With regard to the few remaining fragments, extending his principles to physiology and the theory of knowledge, it is enough to note that health and intelligence, like differentiated and changing being in general, are explained on a dualistic theory of a balance of opposites.¹

IV

The river of Greek philosophy has now a number of affluents, and with Empedocles it hurries its pace. From Xenophanes and Parmenides he derives his craving for a unity to be explained by the exercise of the speculative reason; from Heraclitus, his recognition of change and observed phenomena; from Heraclitus and more remotely from the Orphics and Pythagoreans the conception of an alternation or periodicity, by which opposites are given play, and therefore a theory of metempsychosis, of cosmogony, and of history, in all of which *'Ανάγκη* is operative. From the locked and frozen plenum of Parmenides he can find no release except by abandoning monism and thereby admitting change. Hence, in the *Περὶ Φύσεως*, the four "roots,"² which are imperishable, without birth or death;³ and, to account for their union in a "mixture"⁴ and their dissolution,⁵ the two forces, called "Love" (*Φιλία*) and "Strife" (*Νεῖκος*) respectively, which he describes as being also timeless.⁶ It is often said⁷ that Empedocles was the first to distinguish an efficient from a material cause; but we have found something like an efficient, or at least a living, cause more than once among his predecessors. Moreover it is commonly said⁸ that Love and Strife are regarded by Empedocles as being quite as

¹ *D28B16*; 17.

² *D31B6*: *βιτώματα*.

³ *D31B8*; 9; 11; 12; cf. *D31A44*.

⁴ *D31B8*: *μίξις*, cf. *D31B9*; *D31B23*, 1, 4; *D31B21*, 1, 14: *κρῆσις* (a word with Pythagorean associations); cf. *D31A44*.

⁵ *D31B9*, 1, 4: *ἀποκρίνθωσις*.

⁶ *D31B16*; 17.

⁷ Adam, pp. 245; 251.

⁸ E.g., by Burnet, *E. G. P.* pp. 267 f.

corporeal as his Roots; and it is true that he describes Strife as "of equal weight to each," and Love as "equal in length and breadth,"¹ so that Aristotle not unnaturally complains that "the Love of Empedocles is both an efficient cause, for it brings things together, and a material cause, for it is a part of the mixture."² The difficulty, however, is chiefly one of language; clearly Empedocles is trying to distinguish between living matter and a vital force that is coextensive with it, between object and subject, between passive and active. In "Love" he provides a force of attraction or cohesion, known to mortals as Joy and Aphrodite,³ though she unites unlike bodies; and she is also a cosmic force.⁴

The cosmic process of change, of growth and decay, in the system of Empedocles suggests the Strife, or the "Way Up" and the "Way Down," of Heraclitus; it may be described as an alternation of opposing forces,⁵ like the double process of breathing or of the heart's action, or, better, as a cycle. After the period in which all the four diverse elements are mingled by Love in the perfect Sphere, there is supposed to be a period of disintegration (as in such degeneration myths as that of the Ages in Hesiod), during which the power of Love is waning, and that of Strife is waxing; this is apparently our age.⁶ There follows the triumph of Strife, and the separation of the "roots" out of the mixture, so that like is reunited with like. Then as outlawed Love returns and drives out Strife, the mixture is made again, by a process of "reversed evolution,"⁷ till finally all the "roots" are reunited once more in the perfect Sphere.⁸

In addition to the material "roots" and the efficient forces of Love and Strife, Empedocles attempts, however vaguely, to provide an explanation of the way in which the world and its contents are

¹ *D31B17*, ll. 19 f.

² *Met.* Δ, 10, 1075b3; cf. *Simpl.* (in *D31A28*): σωματικὰ στοιχεῖα ποιεῖ τέτταρα . . . τὰς δὲ κυρίως ἀρχὰς, ὃντες ὡντεῖται ταῦτα . . . ὥστε καὶ οὗτοι εἶναι κατ' αὐτὸν τὰς ἀρχὰς.

³ *D31B17*, ll. 21–25.

⁴ *D31B20–22*.

⁵ *D31B20*; 21.

⁶ Burnet, *E. G. P.* p. 271.

⁷ Burnet, *T.-P.* p. 75.

⁸ *D31B17*; 26–29; 35; 36.

regulated, as a law or ratio governing the *μίξις*,¹ or as a "sacred and unutterable mind (*φρήν*) flashing through the whole world with swift thoughts."² Moreover Strife asserts his prerogatives "in the fulness of the alternate time set for them by the Broad Oath";³ and in the *καθαρμοῖ* the wanderings and transformations of the *δαιμῶν* who trusts in mad strife⁴ are ordained by "an oracle of Necessity, an ancient ordinance of the gods, eternal and sealed by broad oaths."⁵ It is during the ascendancy of Strife, then, that Necessity seems especially to operate. In the period when Love is in the ascendant once more, however, Empedocles admits an element of chance; *δαιμῶν* mingled with *δαιμῶν* and joined "as each might chance."⁶ More striking still is the statement, in the account of sensation, that "all things have the power of thought

¹ Arist. *De Part. An.* 1, 1, 642a17 (=D31A78): *λόγος τῆς μίξεως*. Cf. *Met.* A, 9, 993a15–24; here Aristotle says that Empedocles explained bone as existing by virtue of its *λόγος* (cf. the proportion in D31B96), but that he did not generalize the explanation as an account of the formal cause. This criticism is really unfair; granted that the statement of a final cause (what is good for a given thing) must include a definition of each given thing (its formal cause), Empedocles has at least provided a sample of such definition, as if a popular lecturer on chemistry were to content himself with illustrating chemical structure by the formula of a single compound. (Cf. further Cherniss, pp. 233 f.) For a more generalized statement, there is the *φρήν* of D31B134 (see above, ll. 1–3, and n. 2). Zeller nevertheless holds (II, pp. 143 f.) that Empedocles "had not arrived at the doctrine that all natural phenomena are regulated by law." Even if we limit ourselves to the fragments of Empedocles, however, it seems to me that the conception of law is clearly indicated; e.g., D31B30; 31; 134; 135.

² D31B134; cf. 135.

³ D31B30: *τελειομένου χρόνου | ὃς σφιν ἀμοιβαῖος πλατέος παρ' ἐλήλαται ὄρκου.*

⁴ Accepting the reading of D: *<νέκει θ'> ὃς κ(ε) κτλ.*

⁵ D31B115, ll. 1 f.: 'Ανάγκης χρῆμα, θεῶν ψήφισμα παλαιόν, | ἀλίον, πλατέεσσι κατεσφρηγισμένον ὄρκοις 'Ανάγκη here appears to be the Orphic goddess, though she is presently described as "intolerable" and loathed by *χάρις*, as *ἄμυνσον* (D31B116; cf. Plato, *Phaedrus*, 248b ff.: 'Αδράστεια). For Aristotle, *De Gen. et Corr.* B, 7, 334a26 (=D31A43), the *ἀνάγκη* of Empedocles is the cohesive force or *σύνθετος* comparable to the building of a wall from bricks, or to the growth of flesh. Aëtius wrongly identifies her with the Sphere (D31A32), and suggests that her essential character is that she employs the *ἀρχαῖ* and *στοιχεῖα* (D31A45); while Plutarch more plausibly identifies her in Empedocles with *Φιλία* and *Νεῦκος* (D31A45).

⁶ D31B59: *ὅπῃ συνέκυρσεν ἔκαστα;* cf. 53; 104.

by Fortune's will."¹ For the first time in Greek philosophy, *τύχη* has appeared upon the scene. The result of the first process may be described as the necessary evolution of differentiated species by the waning power of Love and the increasing action of Strife, and the survival, at least for a time, of the fit. In the period of "inverted evolution," moreover, some accidental, monstrous combinations of limbs and heads perished, while those that were mutually advantageous remained in union.² These accounts, taken together, not merely mark an advance on Anaximander's notion of man as a modification of lower forms by adaptation to environment, but even foreshadow certain elements in Darwin's conception of accidental variation, of struggle and survival.³ This can hardly be called a teleological view of evolution. In fact, Empedocles is criticized by Plato and Aristotle for this very reason: by Plato, because Empedocles explains everything by *φύσις* and *τύχη*, and *ἀνάγκη*, not by *τέχνη* or any *θεός*;⁴ by Aristotle, because the persistence of normal natural species (unlike such accidental monstrosities as the human-headed oxen of Empedocles), being the necessary result of sufficient causes, argues a purpose in Nature which Aristotle fails to find recognized by Empedocles.⁵ But Empedocles is at any rate capable of explaining the structure of the eye, with the pupil protected by membranes, as having been contrived by Love, just as a man encloses the flame of a lantern with horn plates to protect it against the winds of a stormy night;⁶ this might well be termed purpose in Nature.

It is only a short step from such a remark to complete moral dualism; and Aristotle in one passage interprets Empedocles as having really meant to explain the cosmic process in this sense. "Since it was apparent that Nature also contains the opposite of what is good, i.e., not only order and beauty but disorder and ugliness, and that there are more bad and common things

¹ *D31B103*: *ἴστητε τύχης*.

² Arist. *Phys.* B, 7, 198b29, and Simpl. *Phys.* 371, 33 (both in *D31B61*).

³ Cf. E. E. Sikes, *Anthropology of the Greeks* (London, 1914), pp. 49-55.

⁴ *Laws*, 10, 889b (= *D31A48*).

⁵ *Phys.* B, 8, 198b29 (= *D31B61*). Cf. Cherniss, pp. 250-260.

⁶ *D31B84*.

than there are good and beautiful, another thinker introduced Love and Strife as the respective causes of these things. For if one follows and gives heed to the statements of Empedocles with a view to his meaning, and not to his lisping expression in words, it will be found that Love is the cause of Good, and Strife of Evil. Thus it would perhaps be correct to say that Empedocles in a sense spoke of Evil and Good as first principles, and was the first to do so, that is, if the cause of all good things is the Good itself [and of evil things, Evil itself].”¹ Here order and *τὸ καλόν* are assumed to be principles which a powerful force maintains; it is too much to say that Aristotle admits that it seeks to maintain them. Furthermore, they are opposed by another force, productive of disorder and ugliness, which Aristotle significantly holds to be preponderant, so that for Aristotle the philosophy of Empedocles should have a pessimistic tinge. Elsewhere, however, Aristotle interprets the Love and Strife of Empedocles as equivocal forces, without moral character: “Empedocles does indeed use causes to a greater degree than [Anaxagoras], but not sufficiently; nor does he attain to consistency in the use of them. At any rate, he often treats Love as separating and Strife as combining; for when the Universe (*τὸ πᾶν*) is resolved into its elements by Strife, fire and each of the other elements are combined into unity (*εἰς ἕν*); and whenever they are all combined together again by Love into the One (*εἰς τὸ ἕν*) the parts of each are necessarily separated again.”² “He posits Strife as a kind of principle which is the cause of destruction; but none the less Strife would seem to produce everything except the One, for everything except God proceeds from it. . . . It follows on his theory that Strife is no more the cause of destruction than it is of Being.”³

This criticism raises a point of fundamental importance. Why is the union of the four roots in the Sphere under the influence of Love teleologically or morally better than the union of each sever-

¹ *Met.* A, 4, 984b32 (= D31A39). Cf. Plutarch's remark (*D31B18*): ‘Εμπεδοκλῆς δὲ τὴν μὲν ἀγαθουργὸν ἀρχὴν Φιλότητα καὶ Φιλίαν πολλάκις, *〈έτι〉 δ'* Αρμονίαν καλεῖ θεμερῶπιν.

² *Met.* A, 4, 985a21 (= D31A37).

³ *Met.* B, 4, 1000a26; B, 4, 1000b9. Cf. Burnet, *E. G. P.* pp. 232 f.

ally under the influence of Strife? Apart from an instinctive aesthetic preference for the peacefulness and perfection of the Sphere, and a monistic inheritance from Xenophanes and Parmenides and from the mystics,¹ there seems to be no reason. Or again, why is either of these extreme states to be preferred to the two half-way stages, one when our world of "things" and species is evolving from the Sphere, thanks to Strife and Necessity, the other of "reversed evolution"? The answer is simply that these "things" are perishable, and their differentiation and fitness for a temporary environment are of slight account for one who views things, as do Parmenides and Empedocles, *sub specie aeternitatis*. Empedocles is far removed from the point of view of the humanist whose moral standard of reference is man and his interests, and who regards man as the climax of the evolutionary series. He views our present world in the light of ancient degeneration myths as an impairment of primal perfection. And, finally, our world is for him a moment in the cycle of existence,² that cycle from which the mystics ever sought release. Not Empedocles, but Heraclitus and Anaximander, regard Strife as justice, and Good and Evil as one.³ Not Empedocles, but the Atomists, regard with indifference the variety of the disintegrated world, and the forces that build up or that destroy as equivocal. For Empedocles both Love and Strife are indispensable, for without both there cannot be change or "otherness." But Love creates the one Sphere, and Strife breaks it apart; hence though both are in a sense divine, one is a god and the other is something like a devil.⁴

¹ See above, p. 103, n. 5, on the instinct for monism, criticized by W. James.

² *D31B17*, l. 13.

³ For Anaximander, cf. Cornford, *Rel.-Phil.* p. 232: "In Anaximander's scheme the Reign of Justice came next after the primal state of fusion and before the existence of individual things. [See above, p. 92.] The motive of Empedocles' rearrangement is clear. To him Strife is an evil principle; it causes separation and, to the mystic, separation is evil, union is good. Hence the state of the world in which Strife triumphs is the lowest depth of evil, not, as it was for Anaximander, a Reign of Justice."

⁴ Scoon holds, p. 91, that the Sphere is identical with Love, and with the cosmic mind which is described in language similar to that used of the Sphere (*D31B27-31*; cf. 134), and is the supreme god of Empedocles. But the Sphere, though a god and though perfect, (1) is not immortal, and (2) cannot act, and

The theology of Empedocles, set forth chiefly in the *καθαρμοί*, is of no great originality, being chiefly a borrowing from the mystical religions. Nevertheless he is at some pains to connect it with his philosophy, by placing man in the continuous cycle of Being; he may fairly be described as a pantheistic Orphic.¹ So, for example, his horror of eating flesh is not based on any mere taboo, but on his vision of the unity of all Nature; flesh-eating is practically cannibalism, since animals, men, and gods are all united in one family through the *πνεῦμα* that penetrates the *κόσμος*.² In his picture of the Golden Age, over which not Ares nor Zeus nor Poseidon ruled, but Kypris (= "Love"), there was no blood-sacrifice;³ and "all things were tame and gentle to man, both beasts and birds, and friendly feelings were kindled everywhere."⁴ Empedocles himself is a god, though a fallen one, through that "oracle of Necessity" that condemns to exile from the abodes of the blessed for thrice ten thousand years such as have sinfully polluted their hands with blood or followed Strife and forsaken themselves.⁵

(3) is the product of Love's effect on the four "roots." The supreme god may more reasonably be sought in the *φρήν* of D31B134, however difficult it may be to connect this conception with the rest of Empedocles' philosophy. Hack, p. 96, identifies the supreme One God both with the *φρήν* and with the Sphere which "comes back to identity with itself at fixed periods under the agency of the divine power of Love" (p. 98). He well explains the temporary modification of the perfection as an attempt to mediate between Parmenides and Heraclitus; this works well enough for the Sphere, but not, it seems to me, for the *φρήν*. Cf. further Cherniss, p. 36, n. 135; pp. 50 f.; 230-234; 360.

¹ Adam would hardly assent to this description; cf. pp. 252 f. Cornford, *Rel.-Phil.* pp. 224-242, deals with the "consistency of Empedocles," showing that he "comes within an ace of succeeding" in reconciling "Orphic and Pythagorean doctrines of immortality . . . with Ionian physical science." He regards "his physical system as modelled on his religious beliefs and dictated by them," and therefore discusses first the *Purifications* and then the poem *About Nature*. The question of order seems to me at least debatable.

² D31B135; 136 (with Sext. Emp.); 137.

³ D31B128.

⁴ D31B129. Lovejoy and Boas, *Primitivism*, p. 32, refer the pacifism and vegetarianism to "chronological primitivism" (the view that (p. 1) "the most excellent condition of human life, or the best state of the world in general," fell in the past). They observe, p. 32, that "the supposition that men were once innocent of slaughter is connected with the Empedoclean cosmogony."

⁵ D31B115. See above, p. 112.

Through the cycle of Being he must pass wearily from one to another of the four elements, rejected by each in turn. The details of the apocalyptic landscape suggest Orphic parallels.¹ Yet there is hope for the soul of winning, after purifications and repeated metempsychosis, a return to blessedness and reunion with the gods.² The wise, however, as we are told in both of the poems, are blessed in this life;³ thus for religion, as for philosophy, the unity of all Being persists through diversity and change. It is only Empedocles' inherited conception of personal preëxistence and immortality, and the importance attached to the personality, that will not fit into his philosophic system, as he does not seem to realize.⁴ This is an important exception, for freedom of the will and moral choice based on human values are involved in it. Apart from this, Empedocles was drifting toward pantheism, not without tendencies toward mechanism.

Anaxagoras, like his Ionian predecessors, is at heart a physicist, concerned with the nature of being and of change. Unlike Empedocles, he has no distinct theology, no mysticism, no ethical system. As eager as Parmenides to find a unified, continuous reality, he is also as anxious as Heraclitus or Empedocles to account for variety and change, though without destroying the continuity. Thus whereas Empedocles has adopted a limited form of pluralism, with four "roots" absolutely distinct one from another, Anaxagoras boldly carries his pluralism so far as to assert that the "seeds" (*σπέρματα*) are infinitely divisible,⁵ and that "there is a portion (*μοῖρα*) of everything in everything,"⁶ though the proportions vary and cause things to be named for some preponderant part. Thus no thing is absolutely separate from its "other,"⁷

¹ D115; 120-123.

² D31B145; 146.

³ D31B132, from the *Purifications*; cf. 110, from the poem *On Nature*.

⁴ Even Cornford, *Rel.-Phil.* p. 229, speaks of each soul as "an atomic individual." Burnet, *E. G. P.* p. 250, remarks that "the cosmological system of Empedocles leaves no room for an immortal soul, which is presupposed by the *Purifications*."

⁵ D59B3.

⁶ D59B11; cf. 6; 12; and the "opposites" of Heraclitus.

⁷ D59B8; 12.

with one exception to be noted presently. Change is simply mingling or separation (*συμμίσγεσθαι*, *διακρίνεσθαι*).

Whereas Empedocles has had recourse to two opposing forces, Love and Strife, in alternate motion mingling or separating his "roots," Anaxagoras employs a single source, which he terms "Mind" (*Noûs*), of a rotary motion. Granted that there are two termini, union and dissolution, Empedocles uses what a modern traffic manager might call a "shuttle train" (with alternating engines), while Anaxagoras uses a "loop train." Even Empedocles, to be sure, thinks of the stages in his process as a cycle.¹ This *Noûs* is the one exception to the statement that "there is a portion of everything in everything"; for the statement continues, "except *Noûs*; and there are some things in which there is *Noûs* also,"² by which remark Anaxagoras apparently intends to account for the difference between inanimate and animate things. Anaxagoras takes some trouble to set apart *Noûs* from the rest of his universe, as the sole separable reality, and characterizes it as "infinite and self-ruled, and mixed with nothing, but alone, itself by itself," as "the thinnest of all things and the purest," and as having "all knowledge about everything and the greatest strength . . . and power over all things . . . that have life." Nevertheless many scholars find it hard to admit that he intended to make *Noûs* an immaterial force.³ Now it seems clear that neither Anaxagoras nor any other Greek had yet reached the conception of "immaterial, inextended consciousness"; but Anaxagoras does appear to be speaking of pure extension (like the Being of Parmenides), endowed (unlike the Being of Parmenides, but like the extended and thinking substance of Spinoza) with power to move. Thus "*Noûs* set in order (*διεκόσμησε*) all things that were to be, and all things that were and are not now, and the things that are, and the

¹ D31B35, l. 10: *κύκλος*.

² D59B11; cf. 12.

³ So Burnet, *E. G. P.* pp. 267-269; *T.-P.* p. 79. Not so Adam, pp. 257-261; nor Zeller, II, pp. 342-349, though he writes with admirable caution. Zeller-Nestle, *Grundriss der Gesch. der gr. Phil.*¹³ (Leipzig, 1928), p. 77, distinguishes any incipient "dualism" in Anaxagoras from such dualism as may fairly be ascribed to the Orphics, the Pythagoreans, and Empedocles (and Plato).

things that shall be";¹ in other words, it brought cosmos out of chaos. Like the stage on which a drama unfolds itself, it defines the action. Nor does it define the action merely in terms of space, but also throughout a time sequence,² so that the rôle of *Noûs* might be compared to the plot of a drama, manipulating its characters in time and space. This simile, if valid, would make of *Noûs* an efficient and a formal cause, and would even suggest a final cause as well. Did Anaxagoras mean in *Noûs* to provide a teleological explanation of all things?

Here we reach a critical point in our investigation. Perhaps it will help if we ask why Anaxagoras chose *Noûs*, rather than some other word, to express the source of motion. It is to be noted that he dispenses with several of the terms of his predecessors; he has no recourse to *δαιμονες* or *θεοι*, to *Μοῦρα* or to *εἰμαρμένη*,³ or, finally, to *ἀνάγκη* or *τύχη* (forces generally reckoned as hostile to man). It looks as if he were deliberately avoiding both the deism of the cosmogonists and the fatalistic or mechanistic explanations of Ionian philosophy. Yet he might, like Heraclitus and Empedocles, have used *λόγος*, to suggest the regularity or pattern of Nature; or he might, like Anaximenes and the Pythagoreans, have been satisfied with *ψυχή*, to suggest a living and life-giving force. Indeed, according to Aristotle,⁴ he did use *ψυχή*, as an alternative term to *Noûs*, for the moving principle. But he preferred, on the whole, to employ *Noûs*, which in ordinary Greek usage implied intelligence, either percipient or purposive. Thus he united the conception of a living substance that knows with that of a power which, to a greater or less extent, in the cosmos or in man, moves all things, like the Love and Strife of Empedocles, or like the unmoved Mover of Aristotle.⁵

Does the use of the term *Noûs* mean that Anaxagoras furthermore thought that the *κόσμος* of things was planned for a definite *τέλος*? And if so, was it for some remote end, like the *Διὸς βουλή*,

¹ *D59B12.*

² *Ibid.* ll. 5–10; cf. Arist. *Phys.* Γ, 4, 203a30: *πλὴν οὐχ ἄμα*.

³ *D59A66*; Gundel, p. 17. Cf. W. Theiler (p. 4), who finds no trace of teleology before Anaxagoras, and no certain evidence in him; it begins, he thinks, with Diogenes of Apollonia.

⁴ *De An.* A, 2, 404a25–405b3.

⁵ *Phys.* Θ, 5, 256b24 (= *D59A56*).

in which man's interests are seldom fully recognized, or was it for a definitely human purpose, in which man's good is the standard of reference? The latter alternative may be immediately dismissed. The pre-Socratics have so far tended to substitute for anthropomorphic divinities other divinities which are pure causality; it would be indeed strange if Anaxagoras were to be found suddenly readmitting an anthropomorphic and even anthropocentric explanation of all things; and that is not his meaning. *Noûs*, to be sure, suggests rationality, as contrasted with blind force, and is therefore an appropriate term to use of the cause of a world, so far as it is a cosmos that can be known. But it need not necessarily imply that the world was designed for the express good of any human individual, or of the human race. The world of Anaxagoras, in brief, is constructed on intelligible principles. Nevertheless it is not pure intelligence; "mind set in order all things," but did not create them. Like a physical or chemical formula, it does not create "things," but describes their constitution and behavior; furthermore, it is supposed by Anaxagoras also to move things; and if he meant also to suggest that it moved them for some purpose, the word *Noûs* could be understood as conveying that idea as well. But that he did mean this, cannot be proved from the fragments or from the *testimonia*. And here, I think, is the reason for the disappointment of the Socrates of the *Phaedo*, and of Aristotle.

The striking point to be noted in the criticisms of both Plato and Aristotle is the discrepancy between their admiration for Anaxagoras for having introduced the conception of *Noûs* as causality and their disillusionment when they discovered that he did not use his conception in support of the teleological conception of Nature which they themselves held. His was a "dusty answer" to their eager hopes. In the *Phaedo*¹ Socrates is represented as having been interested, in his youth, in περὶ φύσεως ἱστορία, in learning τὰς αἰτίας ἐκάστου, διὰ τὶ γίγνεται ἐκαστον καὶ διὰ τὶ ἀπόλλυται καὶ διὰ τὶ ἔστι, and as having become so confused by the conflicting physical explanations of the day that he hailed with delight² the report that Anaxagoras was saying that νοῦς ἔστιν ὁ διακοσμῶν τε

¹ 96a.

² 97b.

καὶ πάντων αἴτιος, which he supposed would mean that *νόος* ordered each and every thing for the best (*ὅπῃ ἀν βέλτιστα ἔχη*), so that the investigation into causality would resolve itself into an inquiry into the Good, which would be the *αἰτία* and *ἀνάγκη*¹ that account for the several natural phenomena. The disappointment which young Socrates is represented as having experienced is that he found, after all, that Anaxagoras “made no use of *νόος*, nor ascribed to it any causality in the ordering of things, but rather used airs and aethers and waters and many other absurdities,”² as if one were to account for the fact that the aged Socrates is refusing to escape from prison by a theory of bones and muscles, rather than by reference to his idea of what is good and just,³ thus mistaking for a real cause what is merely a *sine qua non*.⁴

Aristotle also praises Anaxagoras only to condemn. “It is unnatural to suppose,” he writes, “that fire or earth should cause existing things to be or become well and beautifully disposed . . . nor would it be reasonable to ascribe so important a matter to accident and chance. Hence when someone said that it is the presence of Mind which is the cause of order and all arrangement in Nature, just as in animals, he seemed like a sober man by contrast with the random talk of his predecessors.”⁵ Here, however, the agreement ends. For whereas Plato denies that Anaxagoras made any use of Mind, Aristotle accuses him of “availing himself of Mind as a *deus ex machina* for the production of order, and when he is at a loss to explain some necessary result (*διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἔστι*) then he drags in Mind; but in all other cases he makes anything rather than Mind the cause of what happens.”⁶ When we turn to the scanty fragments of Anaxagoras, we are forced to admit that, so far as they go, they bear out the criticism of Plato better than that of Aristotle, but that neither critic is fair. Plato

¹ 97e.

² 98b.

³ 98e-99a.

⁴ 99a: *ἄνευ τοῦ τοιαῦτα ἔχειν . . . οὐκ ἀν οἶδε τὸ η ποιεῖν, κτλ.* This is the first of the five meanings of “necessary” set forth by Aristotle; cf. *Met. Δ*, 5, 1015a20: *οὐ ἄνευ οὐκ, κτλ.*

⁵ *Met. A*, 3, 984b15 (= D59A58).

⁶ *Met. A*, 4, 985a18 (= D59A45). Simplicius, *Phys.* 327, 26 (= D59A45), and Clement, *Str.* 2, 14 (= D59A57), echo the charge that *Νόος* is not actually used.

is refuted by the statement of Anaxagoras that Νοῦς initiated the περιχώρησις and that it orders all things;¹ on the other hand no support can be found in the fragments for Aristotle's assertion that Anaxagoras arbitrarily appeals to Νοῦς when he is baffled for an explanation in matters of detail. As a matter of fact, he never in the extant fragments uses the word *airia*. What he does (and this is the real reason for the animus of both his critics) is to begin the ordering of things with Νοῦς, which, if anything, is his *deus ex machina*, and then to continue his account of details with mechanical explanations, developed largely from Anaximenes, in which air in various forms appears frequently.² But he never for a moment supposes that he is explaining the details teleologically.

One of his explanations is significant. He has argued that animal life differs from vegetable life in degree (bodily structure), but not in kind (all having the same Νοῦς);³ how then can he account for man's superior wisdom? Not by any better intelligence, but because he has hands. Aristotle, who records the remark, curiously but not unexpectedly inverts the explanation: Nature has given man hands because he is the most intelligent creature.⁴

It should be clear now that the unfair criticism of Anaxagoras by Plato and Aristotle is due to the fact that he appeared to them in the light of a "lost leader," one who seemed to point onward to such a final cause, such an optimistic outlook, as they themselves entertained, but who left them in the lurch.⁵ Whereas what he meant to say, in effect, is this: "I believe that a single living God⁶

¹ D59B12; Plato admits this elsewhere, *Cratyl.* 413c (= D59A55).

² Cf. Burnet, *E. G. P.* pp. 269-272.

³ D59B11; 12.

⁴ *De Part. Animal.* 10, 687a7 (= D59A102). Cf. Cherniss, p. 260, n. 170.

⁵ C. Göring, *Über den Begriff der Ursache in der griech. Phil.* (Leipzig, 1879), pp. 6-9, finds the chief difference between Anaxagoras and the earlier (mechanistic) treatment of Nature in his optimistic point of view; since design and beauty cannot be derived from ἀνάγκη, he invoked Νοῦς, but without having any real conception of causality and without developing a real teleology. If he had not asked, with insufficient materials, about the διότι as well as the ὅτι, which Aristotle generally admits to be the prior question (cf. *Met.* A, 1, 981a29; b13; *E. N.* A, 4, 7, 1095b6-8), he would have escaped Aristotle's criticism. I agree, though I find more traces of optimism and of inquiry into the διότι in the predecessors of Anaxagoras than Göring does. ⁶ D59A48.

(who is Mind and Air and Aether) is the source of all power and motion and variety in the visible universe, and inspires all living things; lifeless things are something of a problem for me, and seem somehow to resist the power of Mind, but I am not ready to admit that they are absolutely unknowable. Now, having recited my creed, I will proceed to details, and deal with them as rationally as I can." Such men are dangerous; and that Anaxagoras should have been charged with impiety and forced to leave Athens is, everything considered, not surprising. Plato, even in his old age, refers, without naming them, to some philosophers who explain all things by Nature or chance, not by mind, or God, or art,¹ and to early astronomers who attributed mind to the universe, but who mistook the true order of things and therefore made the soul younger than the body and assigned causes to bodies, thus producing atheism and perplexity.² If Empedocles is the model for the first of these portraits, clearly it is Anaxagoras whom the second depicts; his science is attacked in the name of religion.

A brief glance at the pre-Socratic successors of Anaxagoras must suffice. Both Diogenes of Apollonia and Archelaus betray his influence, no less in the attempt to develop the conception of *Noûs* as a unifying force throughout the natural world than in the use of Air. Diogenes is indebted ultimately to Anaximenes for his conception of Air as the single divine substance of which all things are differentiations (*έτεροι οὐσθαῖ*) for mutual "good or harm" (*ἀφέλησις . . . βλάβη*);³ but from Anaxagoras he draws his identification of Air with Intelligence,⁴ which is the God⁵ which "steers all things and has power over all things, which reaches everywhere, and dispenses everything, and is in everything," though in different modes (*τρόποι*); it is "an eternal and undying body" (*σῶμα*).⁶ Finally, however slight may be our evidence with regard to the teleological character of the *Noûs* of Anaxagoras, Diogenes says explicitly that it is only by reason of *Nόησις* that things "keep their

¹ *Laws*, 889b (= D31A48).

² *Laws*, 967b.

³ D64B2. Cf. Heidel, *Qual. Change*, pp. 377-379.

⁴ D64B3; 4; 5: *νόησις*.

⁵ D64B5, reading, with Usener, *θεός*.

⁶ D64B7.

measures, — of winter and summer, of day and night, of rains and winds and fair weather.”¹ And he adds the significant remark, “And anyone who cares to reflect will find that everything else is disposed in the best possible manner ($\omega\delta\ \alpha\nu\nu\sigma\tau\delta\nu\ k\alpha\ll\iota\sigma\tau\alpha$).” Thus Diogenes proclaimed what young Socrates, according to the *Phaedo*, had longed to find proclaimed by Anaxagoras, and deserves in all probability to be called the first teleologist among Greek philosophers.² Anaxagoras was exiled from Athens and censured by Plato; Diogenes enjoys the distinction of having been parodied by Aristophanes³ and imitated both by the “Hippocratean” treatise *Περὶ Φυσῶν*⁴ and by Euripides.⁵

Of Archelaus of Athens, pupil of Anaxagoras and possibly quondam teacher of Socrates, it will suffice to note that he kept the *Noūs* of his master and attributed it to animals as well as to men, but that in a desperate attempt to get *Noūs* effectually at work in the world he “held that there was a certain mixture immanent even in *Noūs*,” as well as in matter;⁶ in other respects he recurs to more primitive Ionian physics.

V

The Atomists, though not strictly pre-Socratic, must be briefly considered here, since their work is uninfluenced by the sophistic movements except in the ethical teaching of Democritus. They return to the concept of Fate or Necessity; but so far as they attempt a theory of Good and Evil they stand revealed as humanists building a world of human values independent of their mechanistic system. The only surviving fragment of Leucippus (from a work significantly entitled *Περὶ Νοῦ*) runs as follows: “Naught happens at random ($\mu\acute{a}\tau\eta\nu$), but all things from a ground and of necessity ($\acute{e}k\ \lambda\acute{o}γou\ \tau\epsilon\ kai\ \dot{\nu}\pi'\ \acute{a}n\acute{a}γk\eta\varsigma$).”⁷ But whereas Parmenides has deified $\acute{a}n\acute{a}γk\eta$ and $\epsilon\imath\mu\alpha\rho\mu\acute{e}\nu\eta$, Leucippus and Democritus re-

¹ *D64B2*.

² Cf. Theiler, pp. 6–36.

³ *Clouds*, 225–236; 828 (= *D64C1*).

⁴ Chap. 3 (= *D64C2*).

⁵ *Troades*, 884–889 (= *D64C2*). ⁶ *D60A4*.

⁷ *D67B2*. Aëtius, quoting the remark, comments: $\Delta\acute{e}\nuk\iota\pi\pos\ p\acute{a}\nu\tau\alpha\ k\at\acute{a}'\ \acute{a}n\acute{a}γk\eta\varsigma\ t\iota\varsigma\ \delta'\ a\acute{u}t\iota\varsigma\ \epsilon\imath\mu\alpha\rho\mu\acute{e}\nu\eta\varsigma$.

ject such a special, external deity, and find their necessity in the nature¹ of the living, moving atoms, innumerable miniature fragments, as it were, of Parmenidean Being vibrating or whirling in a non-Parmenidean Void. Thus the whole cosmos is bound in a causal nexus, somehow rational, and dispenses both with Chance² and, with one slight exception to be noted presently,³ with Purpose. Aristotle, to be sure, attributes to the Atomists an account of animals and plants not ἀπὸ τύχης, but using φύσιν ἢ νοῦν ἢ τι τοιεῦτον ἔτερον, but implies that they inconsistently assign astronomical movements, including the cosmic whirl (*δινη*) to τὸ αὐτόματον.⁴ This “cosmic whirl,” however, which Diogenes Laertius says⁵ that Democritus identifies with “necessity,” is automatic only in the sense that it is not directed by a final cause.⁶ Presently, dealing with Empedocles and Democritus, Aristotle remarks that on their premisses it does not rain in order to increase the grain, but by a law of necessity which makes cold water descend; the growth of the grain is an accident, or an incidental result (*συμβέβηκε*).⁷ So, he continues, in the human body different types of teeth, for example, have different functions, but these functions are supposed by the Atomists (and Empedocles) to be accidental — that is, not intended. Thus whereas Aristotle himself would, quite differently, interpret these phenomena as the fulfilment of a purpose of Nature,⁸

¹ Arist. *De Caelo*, I, 2, 300b8 (= D67A16): κατὰ φύσιν αὐτῶν κίνησις.

² It was not Democritus, but Epicurus, who in order to save the freedom of the will in man introduced the conception of the spontaneous swerve (*παρέγκλισις*) of the atoms, an exception to the otherwise universal law of necessity; this exception could be regarded by others as *τύχη*, e.g., by Plutarch, *De Sollert. Anim.* 7, 964c, in H. Usener, *Epicurea* (Leipzig, 1887), p. 351, l. 11. Cf. Bailey, pp. 316–327; 433–437. Yet it is Democritus whom Dante describes as the one “che il mondo a caso pone,” *Inf.* 4, 136.

³ See below, n. 8.

⁴ *Phys.* B, 4, 196a24 (= D68A69; cf. 68). Cf. Gundel, pp. 14–16.

⁵ 9, 45 (in D68A1).

⁶ Cf. Bailey, pp. 138–146.

⁷ *Phys.* B, 8, 198b18. Cf. further Cherniss, pp. 249–251.

⁸ Even Democritus occasionally resorts to purpose, e.g., as to the structure of the ear (cf. Zeller, II, p. 256), thus proving less consistent than Empedocles with his conception of chance and the survival of the fit; cf. Fuller, pp. 239–242. Can this be what Aëtius had in mind in the phrase cited above, p. 104, n. 8?

the Atomists are left with non-accidental, necessary events, which incidentally, rather than accidentally, have supervening values for a limited, human interest or point of view. So Good and Evil enter where Nature leaves off, and all without any random or arbitrary interference of any divine or supernatural power. Necessity itself is hardly more than the absence of any interference with the motion of the atoms;¹ all things are natural. We feel ourselves once more in the full current of Ionian physics, and recall the utterances of Thales ("all things are full of gods"²), and of Heraclitus beside his fire ("here too are gods"³), and the Hippocratean sayings: "The so-called 'sacred disease' is not more divine than others, but has a natural cause"; and "they are all divine and all human."⁴

The atomistic system could not fail to come under Aristotle's general censure of systems that do not recognize a final cause; indeed he can find in it nothing more than a material cause,⁵ since he pays scant heed to the variety of the atoms, and utterly ignores their living character.⁶ He complains that the Atomists "say that motion is eternal; but what it is and why it is they do not say, nor do they explain why it is in one direction more than another."⁷ But the Atomists doubtless supposed that they had supplied all the explanation that is necessary in assuming the "natural"⁸ motion of the atoms. Yet the *Noûs* of Leucippus and the *Noûs* of Democritus (composed of atoms spherical in form) represent no important advance on Parmenides or Anaxagoras save as they express the perpetual unfolding of the causative process.

To turn, among the fragments of the encyclopedic works of Democritus, from the physical theory to his theory of conduct is to meet with something of a surprise; for the two seem quite

¹ Cf. Scoon, p. 228. Perhaps this is the simple solution of the perplexity of Diogenes Laertius, who says that Leucippus accounts for waxing and waning κατά τινα ἀνάγκην, and adds ην δποία ἐστιν <οὐ> διασταθεῖ (D67A1).

² See above, p. 89, n. 3.

³ *Ibid.* n. 4.

⁴ Περὶ Ἱερῆς Νόσου, 5; 21.

⁵ *Met.* A, 4, 985b4 (= D67A6).

⁶ Cf. Hack, pp. 128-134.

⁷ *Met.* A, 6, 1071b (= D67A18). Cf. Bailey, pp. 84-86.

⁸ See above, p. 125, n. 1.

independent.¹ His ethical system is a refined eudaemonism, inculcating not the pursuit of happiness through external goods, but peace of mind or "cheerfulness" (*εὐθυμίη*).² An extraordinary number of gnomic maxims are preserved, mostly traditional in character, sometimes epigrammatic, and all of unexceptionable respectability. For our present purpose the interesting point to note is that Democritus takes for granted the freedom of the will³ and man's responsibility in the achievement of Good or Evil; fate, gods, and chance play a very minor rôle.⁴ Intelligence is the great power that enables men to choose good rather than evil, or to convert evil into good.⁵ Such humanism has roots in the tradition of Greek poetry and of proverbial wisdom, and in sophistic criticism, rather than in physical speculation.

VI

In spite of the partly negative result of this inquiry into the rôles of Fate, Good, and Evil in the pre-Socratic philosophers, certain definite conclusions may be drawn. In general, the criticism of Plato and Aristotle is supported in so far as it denies that the predecessors of Socrates conceived of a final cause, yet these critics fail more than once to recognize the importance of certain other ideas, especially with regard to the living, divine causality which is implicit in each of the pre-Socratic systems.⁶ Such are the living, cosmogenetic god of Thales, an efficient cause, and Anaximander's conception of process and natural law, with moral implications in the survival of the fit, which Aristotle slighted. Anaximenes provides both a material and a formal cause, though without ethical implications. The One God of Xenophanes is both Fate and Good; Evil is only in the world of appearance. The Pythagoreans and the mystics find Good in Limit or Proportion, with important applications not only in medicine and music but in ethics. Their religion defines the limits within which Good may

¹ Scoon's attempt to connect them, pp. 225–227, is to me unconvincing; better is Bailey's account, pp. 186–214.

² Cf. D68A166.

³ D68B37; 62; 173.

⁵ D68B58; 66; 76; 173.

⁴ D68B119; 172; 173; 175.

⁶ Cf. Hack, pp. 144–154.

be realized; they discard external Fate as an all-sufficient cause. Heraclitus includes both Good and Evil, as correlatives, within a natural system which presents an analogy with primitive moral law; human good and evil, however, are related to a specifically human attitude and activity, as with the Atomists and the Stoics. The (monistic) Way of Truth of Parmenides defines a formal, but not an efficient, cause; Being is controlled by Justice, which is identified with Fate; his (dualistic) Way of Opinion deals with a mingling of opposites under the control of a divine power ($\delta\alpha\mu\omega\nu$) who is Fate (or Justice, or Necessity). Empedocles reckons with controlled forces which though apparently equivocal are ultimately productive of Good and of Evil respectively; his religion is closely bound to his philosophy. The *Noûs* of Anaxagoras is formal and efficient, but not final, as Plato and Aristotle point out; they criticize him the more severely because he superficially seems to promise more than his predecessors, yet has no better grounds for the optimism which he shares with Plato and Aristotle. Diogenes of Apollonia, however, is a full-fledged teleologist, a fact which Aristotle chooses to ignore. The Atomists are determinists within the limits of their physical philosophy; but Good and Evil are the province of a quite distinct and humanistic inquiry.

More important, however, than any of the specific theories of the pre-Socratic philosophers is the fact that they unconsciously established the limits of the ethics of naturalism; this, too, Plato and Aristotle hardly sufficiently realized. For even those philosophers who had most conspicuously emphasized the conception of a divine, cosmogenetic principle had failed to show that the supreme power in the world,—God, or *Physis*, or Fate,—has either the purpose or, except incidentally, the effect of causing Good or Evil. This is not surprising, for neither was their science based upon a sufficient empirical foundation nor had the analysis of human values gone further in their day than the naïf though often beautiful conceptions of the poetic tradition from Homer to Theognis. What was needed next was, in the first place, the empirical pursuit of science, and, secondly, that criticism of human values on which a theory of Good and Evil must rest. And there remained the further question of man's relation to his environment.

The sophistic movement was chiefly, though not exclusively, humanistic, and considered this question only casually. The scientific interests of Plato and Aristotle and the Stoics were given a teleological coloring by the Socratic interpretation of Nature as anthropocentric, the work of a benevolent God. This is the outcome not of pre-Socratic speculation on *physis* but of a fusion of early Greek religion, chiefly mystical, with the *a priori* reasoning of such philosophers as Xenophanes and Parmenides and the Pythagoreans.

It may be worth while to observe in conclusion that the problem of Good and Evil cannot be solved on purely *a priori*, metaphysical grounds, for it involves the recognition of standards of reference and of the interest of individuals. In order to say that the power in the universe is good, we must be in a position to say either that it is making the whole universe better (which manifestly can never be proved), or else that it is making better some part of the universe which we are entitled to regard as an adequate measuring rod. Practically we adopt as our measuring rod the interests of mankind, or of certain persons, and ask whether the power in the universe advances them; and since the answer is bound to be only partly in the affirmative we recognize Evil as well as Good. The problem of Evil thus has to be dismissed by metaphysics, and belongs ultimately not to ethics (for the moral struggle is based on the premiss that there *is* Evil to be overcome) but to religion, where the relation of the individual to the goodness that is experienced in the universe is the fundamental question. And since it involves also the frequent discrepancy between men's apparent deserts and their fortunes, there is matter, tragical or ironical, for the dramatist to explore. The treatment of Fate, Good, and Evil by the later philosophers and by Greek Tragedy I reserve for further investigation.

THE ARGUMENTA OF THE SO-CALLED LACTANTIUS

BY BROOKS OTIS

ALL students of the manuscripts of Ovid's *Metamorphoses* are familiar with the *Argumenta* or *Narrationes* of the so-called Lactantius Placidus. They are in effect prose summaries or digests of the narrative and appear in seven extant manuscripts¹ of the poem. It is the purpose of this paper to describe their relationship to the general problems of the textual criticism of the *Metamorphoses*. The importance of such a study is evident from a perusal of Magnus' preface² to his great edition, for it is clear from this that his text — which is in the main the received text of the poem — is based mainly on the manuscripts containing these *Argumenta*. Furthermore the very fact that they *do* contain the *Argumenta* is taken by Magnus as one of the strongest proofs of their excellence — that is of their belonging to a special family (O) which is descended from a carefully 'revised' fifth-century codex. Thus a study both of the content and of the text of the *Argumenta* is an almost indispensable precursor to a scientific textual criticism of Ovid's poem.

¹ These manuscripts are:

M (*Marcianus 225*) saec. xi–xii; N (*Neapolitanus IV, F, 3*) saec. xi; U (*Urbinas 341, Vaticanus*) saec. xi–xii; β (*Mus. Brit. Add. 11967*) saec. x–xi; π (*Parisinus, B. N. lat. 12246*) saec. ix; ε (*Harleianus 2610*) saec. x; κ (*Frag. Hauniense: Ny Kgl. Sml. Nr. 56*) saec. xi. The sigla C and V are here used for two manuscripts unknown to Magnus but reported by Giselinus (see p. 133, n. 1).

The V used in this article must not be confused with Magnus' V (his *siglum* for the Ed. Veneta, 1486). M, N, β, π, ε, κ are described in the preface (pp. xiii ff.) of H. Magnus' edition, *P. Ovidi Nasonis Metamorphoseon libri XV, etc.* (Berlin, 1914). U was first described by D. A. Slater, *Towards a Text of the Metamorphosis of Ovid* (Oxford, 1927). Slater also gives in his *Prolegomena* a fuller description of ε; he is aware of the fact (ignored by Magnus) that ε contains portions of the *Argumenta*. π is most fully described by Chatelain, *Cinquatenaire de l'École des hautes Études* (1921), pp. 289 ff. For κ and its agreement with the lost Spirensis see Slater's *Prolegomena* and E. H. Alton, *Class. Rev. XLIII* (1929), p. 85. For a convenient description of the manuscripts see also Lafaye, *Ovide: les Métamorphoses* (Collection des Universités de France), Tome I (Paris, 1928). There are two full recensions of the text of the *Argumenta* — by Magnus and Slater — in the works just mentioned.

² Magnus, *Praefatio*, pp. vi–vii.

I

The name *Lactantius* appears in the early editions¹ and in one fifteenth-century manuscript² (*Laurentianus XC* 99). None of the manuscripts of the *Metamorphoses* which include the *Argumenta* make any mention of Lactantius or of any author. Other early editions and late manuscripts attribute the summaries to 'Donatus' or 'Fulgentius.'³ As will be shown later, there are several verbatim parallels between these *Argumenta* and the 'Lactantian' commentary on Statius' *Thebais*. There are also parallels (not so clear) with Servius Danielis, who may of course represent Donatus. But there is no reason for supposing that these parallels indicate anything more than the *raison d'être* of some learned Renaissance conjecture. We cannot tell, for example, who this Lactantius or Luctatius was.⁴ We only know that he first appears on the Ovidian scene in the fifteenth century — a suspicious sign.

¹ E.g., Ed. (III) Veneta, 1486; Ed. Aldina 1502.

² The *Argumenta* in this codex have the following *titulus*: Celii Firmiani Lactantii / in fabulas P. Ovidii Nasonis / comentum incipit. Bandini, *Bib. Laurentianae Catalogus*, III, p. 681, thus describes the manuscript: 'Codex chartaceus Ms. in VIII, saec. XV, optime servatus sed parum castigate perscriptus.' This codex contains 276 pages for the most part filled with a work of Iohannes Boccaccius de Certaldo (*De Montibus, Silvis, Nemoribusque, etc.*). The pages of the codex left over from this work contain the *Argumenta* without the Ovidian text.

³ The *Argumenta* are attributed to Donatus in two editions — the Cologne Edition, 1534, and that of Vadianus, Vienne, 1513 — and in one manuscript (*Laurentianus Plut. LIII Cod. XV*). The *Argumenta* are printed on the first few leaves; the rest of the codex is written by hand. The *Argumenta* have the following title: 'Donati grammatici peritissimi fabularum breviatio Ovidii Nasonis elegans et succincta et prima de chao in quattuor Elementa divisa.'

The *Argumenta* are attributed to Fulgentius by the manuscript Burneius 311 (Mus. Brit.) written in 1462. See Slater, *Prolegomena*, p. 38.

⁴ This was Magnus' supposition in regard to the name Lactantius (p. 627): "Haec [i.e., Laurentiani XC 99 tituli verba] videntur fluxisse e commentario in Stat. *Theb.* VI: 'Sed de his rebus (sc. meteorologicis) prout ingenio meo committere potui, ex libris ineffabilis doctrinæ Persei praceptoris seorsum libellum composui Caelius Firmianus Lactantius Placidus.' Apparet igitur Italum quandam sibi persuasisse eundem hominem scripsisse et commentarium Statianum et Narrationes fabularum Ovidianarum." Cf. also Wessner in Pauly-Wissowa, *R. E.* XII (1924), col. 361. There does not seem to be any connection with the *Glossarium Placidi* (see *Glossaria Latina*, IV, Paris, 1930).

The real problem is to determine precisely what these *Argumenta* are. Are they simply one of the usual 'epitomes' or, on the contrary, the remnants of an ancient commentary? The fact that they appear as summaries in our oldest extant manuscripts¹ and do not appear *en bloc*

¹ Our manuscripts contain the *Argumenta* in the following manner and proportion:

A: manuscripts which have the *Argumenta* in the text: M: complete as far as end of Book XIV; U: complete to Book XIV, fable vii; β: contains fables i–vi of Book III, fable xii of Book IV, and following fables as far as Book V, fable v; κ: contains text from Book IX, fable vii, to Book X, fable xii; π: contains fables iii–vi of Book I.

B: manuscripts which have the *Argumenta* in the margin: N: complete as far as end of Book XIV; ε: begins with the words *ex terra*, Book I, fable i, and continues through the first ten fables. It also contains fable xiii.

N has, as Magnus, p. 628, says, '*Argumenta adscripta a prima manu . . . in margine, lineis aut rubris aut viridibus cincta (item initiales rubro pictae sunt.)*' Thus — even though N's *Argumenta* are marginal — they are none the less an indubitable part of the original scribe's work. The case of ε, however, is different. The *Argumenta* are rather carelessly written at odd spots in the margin; they were obviously added after the Ovidian text itself had been transcribed. They are written furthermore in a hand which Slater considers different from but almost contemporary with the main hand of the text. It is noteworthy that the *Argumenta* cover only a small portion even of this fragmentary manuscript.

Aside from these manuscripts two others (C and V) are now lost, but described and cited by Victor Giselinus in his edition of the *Metamorphoses* and *Argumenta* (Books I–III) dated 1566. Giselinus thus describes these manuscripts: 'C: liber Cornelii Walteri antiquissimus qui haec argumenta in marginibus adscripta habet sed adeo fere extrita vix ut legi queant.' 'V: alter eiusdem Corn. Walteri liber in quo haec argumenta versibus auctoris eadem serie eodemque calamo interserta sunt. Priore quidem aetate inferior, scriptus tamen ut videtur ante annos CCCC.' Giselinus cites these manuscripts (by the letters C and V) in the margin of his text and in special *Annotaciones* at the end of his edition. Muncker, however (*Myth. Lat.*, Amsterdam, 1681, II, *Praefatio*, p. 9), informs us that Giselinus used these manuscripts only for the first three books of the *Argumenta*, and it is indeed at the beginning of Book IV that citations of C and V stop. We know too that Giselinus did not use C and V for the *Metamorphoses* themselves but followed the Aldine text; cf. Fabricius, *Bibliotheca Latina* (Leipzig, 1773), I, p. 448. In his extant citations of C and V, however, Giselinus is very cautious — indicating lacunae, difference of ink and hands. I have not been able to find out anything about Cornelius Walter or his manuscripts. Unquestionably (like ε and Ed. Col.) V belongs to the German family (Z²) of Ovidian manuscripts. Perhaps a complete representative of this important tradition may some day be discovered in Germany.

and isolated from the text until the fifteenth century would seem to indicate that they cannot be placed in the category of the usual epitome. Like the summaries in the commentary on Lucan,¹ they are 'legends' obviously intended for the reader's convenience. But were they — like the Lucanian summaries — a part of a general commentary on the poem? This theory² was first advanced by Heinsius and has been held by modern scholars. A 'commentary,' however, may be either an essentially independent composition (e.g., Servius and Macrobius) or a series of *scholia* written in the margin of a text. These *scholia* may be frequent or infrequent. One can perhaps best account for the actual evidence in this case by the latter supposition: at some time before the 'Dark Age' some learned man equipped a manuscript of the *Metamorphoses* with 'legends' and 'footnotes.' We cannot, however, develop this hypothesis until we consider the precise nature of our *Argumenta*. A study of them reveals three rather interesting peculiarities:

A. In the main they seem to follow Ovid, but they also not infrequently supplement and contradict Ovid.

B. As has been already observed, they seem to cite verbatim passages from the commentary on Statius' *Thebais*, from the *Scholia Danielis*, Hyginus (*Fabulae*), and the *Mythographi Vaticani*.

C. They contain — in addition to the summary proper — occasional scholiastic material.

A: Their diversions from Ovid are so significant that Leuschke,³ for example, has doubted that our summarizer even saw the text of the poet. This is, however, difficult to believe if we consider that in

¹ Summaries appear in the manuscripts of Lucan: Parisinus, B. N. lat. 7502 and Montepessulanus, H. N. 113 (in the library of the Medical School of Montpellier).

² Heinsius, quoted in the preface of Muncker's *Mythographi Latini*, p. 6, says: 'Scriptor ille qui Argumenta Metamorphoseon Nasonianarum concinnavit, visus mihi semper est vixisse post belli Gothicici tempora; quo factum est ut bibliothecae pleraque libris spoliarentur, atque ingens penuria suboriretur auctorum veterum. Certe sublata iam tunc videntur, si quae in Met. hasce exstiterant, ut exstitisse non dubito, commentaria.' This 'commentary hypothesis' was upheld in the nineteenth century by Richard Foerster, *Der Raub und die Rückkehr der Persephone* (Stuttgart, 1874), pp. 289 ff., by Franz, "De Callistus fabula," *Leipziger Studien*, XII, pp. 263 ff., and by Magnus himself.

³ Alfred Leuschke, *De Metamorphoseon in Scholiis Vergilianis Fabulis* (Marburg, 1895).

the main there is constant agreement between Ovid and our 'Lactantius' even in matters of verbal detail.¹

Yet it is none the less true that the divergences and additions are striking:²

1: p. 636, l. 8:³ Iuno Argum quem ob custodiam occiderat in volumen pavonem transformavit et receptum in suam tutelam pennis insignibus quibus amissa lumina indicaret ornavit.' Ovid, however, has only (*Met.* 1, 722-3): 'Excipit hos volucrisque suae Saturnia pennis / Conlocat et gemmis caudam stellantibus implet.'

2: p. 645, ll. 16-17: 'in delphinos et aves se mutavere.' There is no mention of birds in Ovid (cf. *Met.* 3, 680 ff.).

3: p. 655, ll. 11 ff.: 'Venus . . . Ditem . . . inpulit in amorem.' Ovid, however, makes the boy *Amor* do the impelling.

4: p. 656, l. 12: 'docuitque eam mali punici granum gustasse.' Cf. *Met.* 5, 537: 'tamen septem grana Persephonen dixit edisse.'

5: p. 646, l. 22: 'Tiresias, Everi filius . . . edixisset.' Ovid (*Met.* 4, 4) has only: 'sacerdos . . . iusserat.'

6: p. 647, l. 6: 'urbis Babyloniae.' Not in Ovid.

7: p. 650, l. 19: 'Cum Harmonia, Mortis et Veneris filia, coniuge sua.' Ovid has only *coniugem*.

8: p. 638, ll. 7-8: 'Sorores Phaethontis, Phaethusa, Lampetie, Phoebe.' For *Phoebe* Ovid (*Met.* 2, 350) has only *tertiam*.

9: p. 639, l. 16: 'Cum pecus Admeti, Pheretis filii, pasceret.' *Pheres* is not mentioned by Ovid.

10: p. 643, ll. 5-6: 'Echion, Idaeus, Chromius, Pelorus, Hyperenor.' Ovid (*Met.* 3, 126) mentions Echion only.

11: p. 662, l. 2: 'Saturnus praeterea versus in equum, ut Philyram, Oceani filiam comprimeret, ex qua Chirona centaurum videtur procreasse.' Cf. *Met.* 6, 126: 'ut Saturnus equo geminum Chirona crearit.'

12: p. 664, ll. 4-5: 'Tantalus epulis Iovis cum interesset et cum vellet experiri an futura prospiceret.' All this is not Ovidian; cf. *Met.* 6, 402-411.

¹ Cf. Section II, *readings* 2, 9, 10, etc.

² This is not an exhaustive list. The particularly striking evidence of *Fabula V* is considered not here but in note 3, page 140.

³ References here and hereafter are to Magnus' text of the *Argumenta* included in his edition of the *Metamorphoses*.

13: p. 668, l. 13: 'Medeam fugientem docet Othrym montem Thessaliae petisse, in quem diluvio Deucalionis Cerambus nympharum auxilio pennis delatus est.' Ovid (7, 353) has only: 'Othrym et eventu veteris loca nota Cerambi.'

14: p. 669, ll. 3-4: 'Eurypyli urbem . . . in qua Coae matronae in cornutas transfiguratae sunt propter effectum quod Veneri formam suam anteposuerunt.' Cf. *Met.* 7, 363: 'Eurypylique urbem qua Coae cornua matres / Gesserunt tum cum discederet Herculis agmen.'

15: p. 681, ll. 19 ff.: 'Callirhoe, Acheloi amnis filia, Alcmaeonis coniunx qui materno sanguine adspersus in Acarniam se contulerat ut expiaretur coniugium iniit. ex eo duos filios edidit. qui cum per falliciam a Phegeo cuius ante filiam habuerat, esset occisus, petit a Iove liberis suis, ut ultores patris essent, annos adiceret. ergo ut id consequi possent dei voluntate ex pueritia in adulescentes factum est ut cederent.' Cf. *Met.* 9, 413 ff.:

'Tum demum magno petet hos Acheloia supplex
Ab Iove Callirhoe natis infantibus annos;
Neve necem sinat esse diu victoris inultam,
Iuppiter his motus privignae dona nurusque
Praecipiet facietque viros inpubibus annis.'

16: p. 716, ll. 16 ff.: 'Tumulum secundum Trozenam urbem in aream redactum eruptione spiritus, qui terrae increverat.' Cf. *Met.* 15, 297-298: ' . . . quondam planissima campi / area, nunc tumulus.'

It is evident from the most superficial perusal of these passages that 'Lactantius' went considerably beyond Ovid in composing his summaries. A study of passages ostensibly taken from other authors throws at least some light on what his extra-Ovidian sources were.

B: Aside from the citations of the 'Lactantian' commentary on Statius' *Thebais*, Lange¹ has pointed out even more important 'citations' of Hyginus; Slater has even 'secluded' such passages of the *Argumenta* as interpolations. Again Baehrens² has indicated several

¹ C. Lange, *De Nexus inter Opera mythologica Hygini* (Bonn, 1865).

² W. A. Baehrens, *Studia Serviana*: Werken uitgegeven van wege de Rijks-Universiteit te Gent Nr. 1: Faculteit der Wysbegeerte en Letteren, Nieuwe Reeks Nr. 1, 1917.

parallels with Servius Danielis, while Keseling¹ indicates others with the Vatican Mythographers. These parallels are not, however, absolutely verbatim at all points. Foerster, for instance, has pointed out an absolute divergence in subject matter from Hyginus in the very passage where the so-called citation is in the main exact.² The same can be said of the parallels with the Commentator on Statius.³ As for the passages in the Vatican Mythographers, they can doubtless be dismissed as citations *of*, not *by*, our summarizer.⁴ The probability is, therefore, that he simply used whatever ready-made material he found at hand. Like other commentators (e.g., the commentator on the *Thebais*), he 'pillaged' all the bits of summarizing he could find in other available works. Probably he pillaged Hyginus in this manner. Very likely, as has been suggested, the Virgilian commentaries — perhaps Donatus⁵ — were a common source for all such plunderers. This task, however, need not have been performed absolutely mechanically; a 'mosaic' of this sort would at least require careful fitting. All the pieces nevertheless did not jibe. Thus he unconsciously includes 'bits' of summary which give a version (of a story) that contradicts the version of Ovid. Other bits add details that are not Ovidian.

C: So far, however, no direct evidence of a 'commentary' has appeared. All the facts heretofore adduced can be explained by the assumption of the 'pillaging summarizer.' Yet, as we have stated, there is an altogether different kind of material in these summaries — positive scholia that are not integral parts of a summary at all:

¹ F. Keseling, *De Mythographi Vaticani secundi Fontibus* (Halle, 1908).

² Foerster, *op. cit.*, pp. 289 ff., has clearly shown that 'Lactantius' diverges from Hyginus even in the very passages where otherwise a verbatim correspondence is obvious.

³ Cf. *Com. in Thebaidem*, 5, 347 with Magnus, p. 655, lines 11 ff.

⁴ Wessner (*op. cit.*) believes the Vatican Mythographers have excerpted the *Argumenta*. Keseling (*op. cit.*, pp. 100 ff., n. 3) comes to the opposite conclusion, i.e., that both go back to a common source.

⁵ Baehrens (*op. cit.*, n. 2) comes to this conclusion: 'Haesitans quippe abbreviator quo modo longas narrationes poeticas in breves redigeret paraphrases auxilium petebat e paraphrases in Servianis, quod quidem attinet ad formam, valde cognatis. Apparet igitur eum qui *Argumenta* confecit adisse Servii atque Serv. Dan. fontem communem sc. Donatum.'

I. The mention of the names Hesiod, Varro, Euripides:

- a: p. 631, l. 16: 'ut Hesiodus indicat volumine.'
- b: p. 632, l. 3: 'ut idem Hesiodus ostendit.'
- c: p. 633, ll. 4-5: 'auctoritate Varronis.'
- d: p. 638, ll. 9-10: 'ut Hesiodus et Euripides indicant.'
- e: p. 638, l. 17: 'Phanocles in Cupidinibus auctor.'
- f: p. 639, ll. 6 ff.: 'ut auctor Hesiodus indicat.'
- g: p. 692, l. 4: 'sic enim cum Hesiodo consentit Ovidius.'

II. Brief explanatory phrases:

- a: p. 638, ll. 12-13: 'Eridani quem quidam Padum vocant.'
- b: p. 643, l. 21: 'quae Nysam montem Indiae perfrequentarent.'
- c: p. 647, l. 6: 'urbis Babyloniae.'
- d: p. 648, l. 13: 'heliotropium diceretur.'
- e: p. 649, l. 3: 'qui dupli figura Hermaphroditus vocatur.'
- f: p. 649, l. 21: 'in volucres conversae sint, quae vespertilioines vocantur.'
- g: p. 668, l. 15: 'et in montem Parnassum, qui est altissimus.'
- h: p. 671, l. 9: 'in venenum esse conversam quod (Graeci aconas nominant) aconiton a cane nomen accepit.'
- i: p. 672, l. 8: 'formicae enim graece myrmices appellantur.'
- j: p. 675, ll. 8-9: 'quam Graeci haliaeeton dicunt.'
- k: p. 685, ll. 9-10: 'alii ferunt fuisse eius filium [Athis], alii pastorem.'
- l: p. 691, l. 3: 'Tmolum, montem Lydiae.'
- m: p. 693, ll. 9-10: '[Achilles] 'vir fortissimus Graecorum.'

III. Actual scholia of an interpretative character:

- a: p. 661 passim: 'duo sensus isti in unum versum continentur.'
 'hi duo sensus in unum versum veniunt.'
 'hi tres sensus in tribus versibus: aliter cadere non possunt.'
 'hi sensus continentur in tribus versibus.'
- b: p. 662, l. 7: 'plura vero opera Arachnes poeta rettulit fuisse quam Minervae, ut hanc scientia artis, quae potentior est, illam labore contendisse demonstraret.'
- c: (See Section II, *Reading 27*).
- d: (See Section II, *Reading 36*).
- e: (See Section II, *Reading 21*).

It is evident that at least some of these scholia cannot be explained as parts of a summary. Brief comments such as those exhibited in Paragraph II above do not perhaps call for any particular explanation. Even a summarizer can find a little scope for his erudition. The passages listed under Paragraph III, however, do not fall in the same category. They seem essentially alien to the purpose and style of the *Argumenta* as a whole, and a study of the manuscripts at once reveals that this is indeed the case.¹

The inference drawn from these instances can probably be extended to all the strictly scholiastic passages of the *Argumenta*. They are, in other words, marginal scholia which have crept into the text (of the *Argumenta*). As will become clear when we consider the manuscripts in detail, this process of 'contamination' or interpolation must go back to a fairly early date. Since it appears in what we shall prove to be two distinct families of the manuscripts, it must at least have appeared in their common ancestor, which cannot possibly be later than the ninth century. The probability therefore is that the common archetype of all the manuscripts contained both *Argumenta* and a number of scholia. Both were very likely written in the margin;² the successive copyists would therefore be apt to confuse the two whenever possible. This it seems to me is clearly indicated by the '*A Graecis . . . ignes*' passage (Section II, reading 36).

It is obvious then that the *Argumenta* in their present form are a very miscellaneous compilation. In so far as they merely exhibit 'ready-made phrases' from what is probably one or more of the Virgilian commentaries they do not form an exception to the general run of mythological summarizing. Students of Hyginus, the *Mythographi Vaticani*, Servius, and the *Scholia Danielis* have long been on the hunt for 'sources,' and the confusion of conclusions may well be in itself a proof of the essentially eclectic method of the different excerpting summarizers. Of such attempts there can be no end. More important is the evi-

¹ See Section II, *Readings* 26, 37, and 34. See also Magnus, p. 650, ll. 3 ff.: 'Ad Erinyas ultrices impiorum descendit petiitque ab eis ut Athamanta cum coniuge Ino, adversarios numinis sui, ulciserentur.' After *sui* U alone adds: 'Iuno et Melicertes di maris qui alio nomine Leucothoe et Palamen nuncupantur.' This is an obvious scholium whose absence from a majority of the manuscripts is a proof of the process of accretion by which such scholia have crept into the text.

² For this see particularly Section II, *Readings* 26 and 27.

dence that the *Argumenta* were once part of a considerable body of scholastic material¹ — that is to say that the ‘commentary hypothesis’ is quite correct in the sense that the ensemble (summaries, text, and scholia) constituted a rather elaborately annotated edition. It is obvious that even the archetype of our present manuscripts must have been itself a garbled copy of this annotated edition — a copy which had already omitted a large part of the original scholia. Magnus² supposes that certain passages in Probus and Vibius Sequester are excerpted from the scholia of this edition, but none of the references cited can be considered absolutely convincing.³

We have then an elaborate edition as the source of all our manuscripts of the *Argumenta*. It remains to enquire what the significance of this may be for the text of the *Metamorphoses*.

II

We can then assume that these *Argumenta* along with a few scholia existed in some fifth- or sixth-century codex. That can at least be considered reasonably established — whatever hypothesis we may care to hold about a prior ‘commentary.’

Magnus supposes that such a codex was the direct ancestor of his two main manuscripts N and M as well as of those fragments that also have the *Argumenta*. This ancestral codex (which he calls O) represented, he thinks, a fifth- or sixth-century ‘recension.’ This ‘recen-

¹ Cf. Foerster (*op. cit.*, p. 290, n. 9): ‘. . . ein Commentar zu Ovids Metamorphosen, ähnlich dem zu Vergil, Lucan, Statius, mit argumenta fabularum. Aus diesem Commentar sind die erhaltenen narrationes ein Rest, ähnlich wie die erhaltenen Scholl. zu den genannten Dichtern.’ He then cites, as proof, some of the passages mentioned on p. 138.

² *Praefatio*, pp. vi–vii.

³ Cf. the *testimonia* in Magnus’ edition to *Met.* 11, 736 (Probus), 11, 751 (Servius), 15, 281 (Vibius Sequester), 8, 630 (Commentary on Lucan), and 11, 86 (Vibius Sequester). The most convincing *testimonium* (or rather reference) is that of Probus: ‘itaque in altera sequitur Ovidius Nicandrum, in altera Theodorum.’ This is certainly much in the vein of the commentator we know (e.g., p. 692, l. 4: ‘sic enim cum Hesiodo consentit Ovidius’). More important, however, is the mention of Nicander. Foerster, *op. cit.*, pp. 289 ff., has pointed out how in the Persephone story (*Book V, fable v*) ‘Lactantius’ seems to show a knowledge of Nicander — Ovid’s probable source — which may be at first hand. For example, Ovid (5, 446 ff.) mentions only an ‘anus’ and a ‘puer.’ Lactantius supplies the names *Misme* and *Stelles*.

sion' is considered a product of the same 'commentator' whom we have just been examining. Magnus, however, declines to consider O as the archetype of all the manuscripts. He supposes Ovid to have been too popular to have been preserved in a single text even in the dark ages before the Carolingian renascence. Along with the copies of O, 'popular' manuscripts derived from other sources have come down to us. These lack the *Argumenta* (the supposed product of the 'recension') and have the fifteenth book (lost by O). Thus Magnus builds up a case for what is in effect, despite his theory, a one-manuscript text. M is assumed to be the 'best' representative of the 'revised' O. It is therefore generally followed. When, however, it disagrees with the other O manuscript (N), the non-O or 'X' manuscripts are consulted. Of the fragments α is supposed to have highest authority; the other O fragments (i.e., fragments which contain the *Argumenta*) are used to supplement M and N — generally in cases of disagreement. Thus it can be seen that Magnus really turns back from Riese (who preferred N) to Merkel, whose text, as is well known, is based almost entirely on M.

This general hypothesis — on which all existing standard texts are based — has been vigorously attacked by Professor E. K. Rand and several of his pupils. It is my purpose here to examine Magnus' hypothesis solely in the light of the *Argumenta* themselves. If one takes the existing manuscripts of the *Metamorphoses* that contain the *Argumenta*, one can construct a *stemma* based only on readings of the *Argumenta* and therefore quite independent of Ovidian readings. Such a *stemma* can reveal interesting things.

It is evident, first of all, from the list of such manuscripts already given that Magnus neglected the fact that ϵ contains (even if in the margin) the *Argumenta*. It cannot, therefore, be classed as an X manuscript. Secondly, we have now another manuscript (U) which is also a Lactantian and, therefore, an O manuscript. Furthermore we have in the edition of the *Metamorphoses* by Victor Giselinus careful transcriptions of Lactantian passages in two other lost Ovidian manuscripts (V and C). Again Slater has made it very clear that the fragment κ is really a portion of a lost manuscript S (Spirensis), of which we possess readings transcribed by Heinsius. All this considerably extends our textual material.

The relationship of the manuscripts can be seen most clearly by considering a few crucial readings:

1. p. 633, l. 7: 'Nam cupiditate habendi avaritia cum perfidia exorta est.' *Perfidia M N U, editors; fidia (with per written above in a Tironian note) π; invidia ε, Giselinus, Ed. Col.*

Here it is evident that *per* was originally dropped in the exemplar of both ε and π. The corrector of π supplied it; the scribe of ε (a German), however, probably corrected *fidia* into *invidia*. This at once supplies a basis for separating ε, Giselinus and Ed. Col. from M N U and for assigning an intermediate position to π.

2. p. 633, ll. 10–11: 'Quartum saeculum ferreum a rigore dictum est.' *So Magnus after the emendation of Raenerius; a rigore duratum est M; frigore N U; ferri minaea frigore duratum est π; ferri nimio rigore duratum est ε, Gis., Ed. Col.*

Without correction, the M reading is obviously absurd. The *frigore* reading (N and U) is little better. The reading of ε, Gis., Ed. Col., is however very good and corresponds to the Ovidian original: 'De duro est ultima ferro' (*Met.* 1, 127). The *mina* of π seems to be an obvious metathesis and corruption of *nimio*. The *frigore* reading doubtless reflects the previous *f* in *ferri*; such auditory errors are common. This reading then bears out the grouping suggested above, and — furthermore — casts some doubt on the value of the M N U group.


3. p. 633, l. 16: 'Ver quod fuerat ante unum semper ad serenam tranquillitatem continuum.' *Thus M N U; serena tranquillitate (— am — em second hand) π; continuam ε C V.*

Chatelain suggests *ac serena tranquillitate continuum*, which certainly supplies a much better sense than the accepted reading. If the original error was *ad* for *ac*, the later corrections of π and ε C V are easily accounted for. π here, as above, seems to represent a distinctly earlier stage in the manuscript tradition than M N U but to belong, nevertheless, with M N U as opposed to ε.

4. p. 634, l. 10: 'Cui Lycaon tamquam mortali praeparans mortem.' *Thus M, editors; numquam N U; quasi π ε (si in π is written above the line, probably by the corrector).*

This is an extremely instructive reading. The only rational way of accounting for the divergence of the manuscripts is to assume

that *quasi* is correct, that the letters *si*, as in π , were omitted, that this finally led the progenitor of M N U into the error *numquam* (which written *ñquam* could easily arise from *Lycaonquamortali*), and that last of all the scribe of M corrected this into *tamquam*. This reading therefore not only confirms our previous surmises, but definitely shows the scribe of M to be an *emendator*. The common error *numquam* is a good ground for grouping N U together. Thus:¹



5. p. 633, ll. 12–13: ‘Namque ab odiosa vita et insanientis avaritiae grassationibus ad parricidia usque perventum est.’ *Thus MN, editors; ab odiis et U; ab odiosis viciis Ed. Col.; ab odioso vicio ε; vitio Gis.; ab (d erased) odiosa vitia (changed apparently by the original scribe into odiosis vitiis) π.*

Here the trouble seems to have arisen from an original error of *ad* for *ab* (due doubtless to the influence of the following *ad parricidia*). Thus — as in π or more probably in π 's exemplar — an original *odiosa vitio* would be changed to *odiosa vitia* in order to conform to the preposition *ad*. This was later corrected either by *odiosis vitiis* or by *odiosa vita* or simply (as in U) by *odiis*. Here, as above, π gives the key to the later history of the reading. Our grouping is therefore once more confirmed. U, however, would seem to be not too closely linked with N.²

¹ For a fuller explanation of this stemma see Section III of this article.

² It is of course possible that an original *odiosa vita* could have been (due to same 'error of *ad* for *ab*) emended to read *odiosa vitia*, but *vitiis* or *vitio*, a much better parallel with *grassationibus*, seems more likely to be the Lactantian reading.

The reading *odioso vitio* or at least *odiosis vitiis* seems here distinctly preferable to *odiosa vita* on the ground of sense alone.

6. p. 633, l. 2: 'Tunc meditata [sunt] domorum tutiora secreta.' *Meditata M N U, editors; aedificata ε π, Ed. Col., Heinsius, Micyllus.*

If our conclusions so far are correct, the consensus $\epsilon \pi$ must be preferred to the consensus M N U. Cf. 4 above. *Aedificata*, however, may well be a gloss on *meditata*. If so, it must go quite far back in the manuscript tradition.

7. p. 632, l. 20: 'sine vicissitudine temporum continua veris gratia fruebantur.' *Temporum ε M N; corporum U π.*

Corporum must be an error, perhaps arising from auditory influence of the following *co* in *continua*. Doubtless it was corrected in π 's exemplar but so ambiguously that π and later U did not notice. At any rate this confirms our surmise (cf. *reading* 5 above) that U must be separated from N — that is to say must be related only collaterally with N.

8. p. 634, l. 15: 'nec contentus fuit Iuppiter ceteros homines unius Lycaonis terrere suppicio.' *Thus ε π U, editors; non . . . omnes . . . huius M N.*

Here even Magnus and Slater reject the reading of M N. This at least is a good indication of the close connection of M N. Cf. 7 above.

9. p. 633, l. 1: 'Tunc primum et aestus ardentior caeli et gravida frigora incubuere mortalibus.' *ardentior M ε π, Gis., Ed. Col.; ardentis N U.*

Cf. *Met.* 1, 119–120: 'Tum primum siccis aer fervoribus ustus / Canduit et ventis glacies adstricta pependit.' *Ardentior* thus seems more Ovidian; as is evident, it also has the better manuscript authority. Hence *ardentis* seems an error of N U. Cf. 4 above (*numquam N U; tamquam M; quasi π ε*).

10. p. 633, ll. 2–3; 'antea enim aut in antris habitabant aut incolebant frutecta silvarum. Semina etiam tum primum sulcis coepere committere.' *frutecta M, editors; tecta N U π ε; etiam . . . tum ε π M, Gis.; enim . . . tunc N U.*

Enim is hardly preferable to *etiam* here. For the agreement of N U compare *Readings* 9 and 4. The reading *frutecta* of M seems suggested by the corresponding lines in Ovid (*Met.* 1, 122–123):

'domus antra fuerunt / et densi frutices et vinctae cortice virgae.' But the authority of the manuscripts is overwhelmingly against it. It would seem to be a not unlearned emendation of M. Cf. *tamquam* (*Reading 4*).

11. p. 633, ll. 16-17: 'ver . . . in partem anni quartam et angustissimum coierit tempus.' in parte anni quarta ε π, *Gis.* (quartam π); cogeret ε π *N U*; coierit *M*.

The whole question here is whether *tempus* is accusative (that is, object of the transitive *cogeret*) or not. Such a usage of *cogo* is common; e.g., *Caes. B. G.* 2, 5: 'copias in unum locum cogere.' Hence M would seem to have deliberately emended here — its scribe apparently believing that *tempus* was in apposition with *ver*. Cf. the *Reading* just above.

12. p. 633, ll. 9-10: 'et in venis quidem non sola frumenta quaesita sunt sed metalla inventa crepuerunt.' *Thus editors*; sola *M first hand* (solum *second hand*); sola . . . et *N U π*; in venis quidem (cī' in the manuscript possibly *eius*) ubi . . . et ε.

The *non solum* and *sed* are thus peculiar to M. The reading of ε has much to recommend it. Metals were found as a consequence of agricultural excavations. The Ovidian lines (*Met.* 1, 137-138: 'nec tantum segetes alimentaque debita dives / poscebatur humus, sed itum est in viscera terrae.') suggest the *non solum . . . sed*, but they were probably the source of an emendation of M rather than of the original Lactantian version. The manuscripts would at least indicate this. Thus the whole passage seems to be adequately explicable only on the assumption that ε's reading is the right one and that *ubi* dropped out in the π M N U family of manuscripts. The scribe of M — using the Ovidian text — emended the text with *non* and *sed*; later another scribe changed *sola* to *solum*.

13. p. 634, l. 1: 'quorum magnitudini par exarsit audacia.' par ex (a erased by second hand) rsit *M*; par expaīsit *N*; par exparsit *U π*; par fuit ε *V*.

Here the error *exparsit* (plainly caused by the preceding *par*) has corrupted all the manuscripts. The *par fuit* of ε *V* seems to be a correction of *par sit* after the omission of the second *par* and the seemingly superfluous *ex*. This reading would therefore seem to indicate a *common error* in all our manuscripts and thus consti-

tutes pretty good *prima facie* evidence for a common archetype. It is also very good evidence for the ε V family. Cf. 4.

14. p. 632, ll. 21 ff.: 'secundum' M alone, accepted by Magnus, bracketed by Slater.

It is obviously superfluous and must therefore be considered another emendation by the scribe of M. Cf. 12 above.

15. p. 632, l. 7: 'separata erat terra a caeteris elementis.' caeteris N ε, editors; cunctis M; π ε are lacking here.

Another lone M reading. Cf. 14 above.

16. p. 633, ll. 11–12: 'Quod [saeculum ferreum] in tantam rabiem furoris erupit ut omnia scelera cupiditatis excelleret.' excelleret M, editors; excederet N U ε, Gis., Ed. Col.; excederet first hand, excideret second hand π.

There can be no doubt that *excederet* has a perfectly good sense here; cf. Suet. *Caes.* IV: 'eloquentia aut exaequavit praestantissimorum gloriam aut excessit.' Hence *excelleret* must be considered another emendation of M.

17. p. 636, l. 4: 'Iuppiter vero ne si negasset proderet puellam.' negasset M; negaret N ε; ne signa rei U.

U's reading *ne signa rei* is unquestionably a mechanical error for *ne si negaret*. Thus M's *negasset* must be considered as a rather artful emendation by a not ungrammatical scribe.

18. p. 635, ll. 19–20: 'Iove . . . qui amoris precibus desiderium explevit.' Thus M; admotis precibus ε, Slater; amotis speciebus N; admotis preciebus U.


The M N U group seem to have been corrupted. Here *admotis precibus* on grounds of sense is far preferable. An original dittography *admotis sprecibus* was later variously corrected by M and N. *Speciebus* would be suggested by the *specie* in line 19. The *amoris* of M can only be a deliberate emendation.

19. p. 636, l. 3: 'in Peloponensi regno.' Thus Muncker, Magnus; in Peloponneso Slater, Gis.; in pelopnesso (the letters on may have been present; there is here an hiatus in the manuscript) ε; in pelop(ensi erased by second hand) regno M; in peloponenso N U.

Unquestionably *Peloponneso* is the right reading. The M N group exhibit the common error *Peloponenso* which M corrected into *Peloponensi regno*.

20. p. 636, ll. 2-3: 'petit eam ab Iove: velut munus sibi daret vaccam quia speciosissima erat ceteris armentis.' *Thus M*; dari baccam N U; a Iove sibi munus dari eo quod speciosior esset ε, *Slater (with erat)*.

In the version accepted by Magnus *daret* can only be interpreted (in the light of all the evidence given above) as an emendation of M. If, however, we read with N U *dari* the *vaccam* becomes very awkward. Furthermore we must notice the rather ungrammatical *speciosissima ceteris armentis*. Hence Slater's adoption of ε's reading here seems thoroughly justifiable although it does not seem absolutely necessary to change *esset* to *erat*. Doubtless the M N U error arose in the admission of the superfluous *vaccam* (perhaps originally a gloss), which required the *velut* and the change in word-order. M concluded this process of correction by supplying *daret*. The *speciosissima* doubtless came from the *speciosissima* above (p. 635, l. 12). This whole passage is very instructive in pointing the manuscript groupings:



Note the *baccam* error common to N U.

21. p. 636, l. 1: 'in vaccam est transfigurata. cuius fallaciam Iuno cum, etc.' *Thus M ε; in vaccam mutata est. Isidis deae nomen accepit. Iuno cum, etc. N U.*

I have already referred to this passage (see above, p. 138). All the manuscripts have the words *Isidis deae nomen accepit linigeraque est appellata* (see below) at the end of Book I (p. 636, l. 21). *Isis* is not mentioned by name in the text except in 9, 773. This passage (*Isidis . . . accepit*) must therefore be taken as a scholium which was later added to the *Argumenta* at the end of the first book. The exemplar of N U, however, added it here as well. It must therefore represent an earlier codex when the exact place of

the scholia in the Lactantian text was still uncertain. At any rate this is a decisive reading for N U (cf. *baccam* above).

22. p. 635, ll. 8–9: ‘Hunc Pythonem Apollo sagittis interemit et ne eius aboleret nomen, instituit ludos.’ *Thus M N U; ne eius aboleret nomen vetustas ε V.*

Cf. *Met.* 1, 445: ‘neve operis famam posset delere *vetustas* / instituit sacros celebri certamine ludos.’ Thus the source of *vetustas* is easy to see. The reading of M U N is hard to defend, since it would make Apollo the subject of *aboleret*, a sense that is hardly wanted here. Giselinus felt the difficulty and suggested that Lactantius had either originally written *aboleretur* or had used *aboleret* in an inchoative sense. He hesitated to adopt the reading supported only by his *Walterianus* (V). Since, however, we can now supplement it with ε, whose independent value we have already demonstrated, we can surely accept its reading with impunity.

23. p. 636, l. 8: ‘Iuno Argum quem ob custodiam occiderat.’ *So M; quia N U; quia in custodia occisus est ε; quia in custodienda Io occiderat Slater.*

No readings with *occiderat* make sense; Juno cannot be the cause of Argus’ death. We must accept the reading of ε and regard M’s *quem* as a clumsy emendation. Slater’s correction is awkward and unnecessary.

24. p. 634, ll. 5–6: ‘De gigantium sanguine nati quam sacrilega mente versati sint, Lycaonis testatur exemplum.’ *So N, (versati sunt) M, (sint inilicaonis) U, (natum for nati, with a lacuna after mente) π. De . . . natus Lycaon qua sacrilega mente versatus sit ipsius testatur exemplum V ε; De . . . natum qua sacrilega mente vesatis in Lycaonis C.*

Here it would seem that an original error (dittography of *in*) has been the cause of the variation of the manuscripts. There can be little doubt but that the reading of N is correct; cf. *Met.* 1, 160 ff.: ‘sed et illa propago / contemptrix superum saevaeque avidissima caedis / et violenta fuit; scires e sanguine natos’ (then follows the story of Lycaon). C here probably reproduces the original error which was corrected in one way by M N, in another by V ε. The reading is important for the connection of V and ε. We have al-

ready observed this connection in 22 and 24. Cf. also (p. 633, l. 6): durius *M N U π*; deterius *V ε*. Cf. again (p. 632, l. 10): cetera *M N U*; ceteris *ε V*.

25. p. 634, l. 8: 'in se accedit iratum.' *So all the manuscripts except ε* (ascendit) *and V* (provocavit).

Here *V* seems to have corrected the obvious error of *ε*.

26. p. 634, l. 13: 'in lupi saevi eum formam convertit.' *So M*; in lupi eum formam *N U*; in lupi feram formam *π*; in lupi formam (eum *om.*) *C*; in lupi formam eum *ε*; lupi saevi in formam *V*.

This is a difficult reading to interpret. The *feram* of *π* may well be due to the influence of the *f* in the following *formam*. Thus *eum* might have been converted into *feum*, later to *feram*. Then the omitted *eum* would have been supplied again later. Originally, at any rate, the *eum* was omitted; this has undoubtedly been the cause of the variations in language and word order here. Thus, as in 24, *π* and *C* seem to go back to an early manuscript. More instructive is the difference between *ε* and *V*. *V*, at any rate, is not a copy of *ε*. Cf. *Reading 25*.¹

27. p. 632, ll. 1–5: 'Ex terra cum omnia generata sunt variarumque rerum mater reperiatur tum humanum genus quod cuncta vinceret, Prometheus Iapeti filius, ut idem Hesiodus ostendit ex humo finxit, cui Minerva spiritum infudit. Saecula enim dicta auctoritate Varronis vertuntur, quoniam aureum in deterius argenteum et post in aeneum ac postea, quod opprobrium antedictis est, in ferreum cessit.' *Thus MN and (with saecula . . . cessit omitted) CV; U is lacking here; ε has eique for cui and omits saecula . . . cessit. C, V, and M, however, repeat 'ex terra . . . infudit' opposite Met. 1, 33–34, with the following differences: omniumque rerum mater . . . cum humanum genus cuncta vincat . . . immisit (for infudit) M; (ex terra omitted) cum omnium quae onerosae sunt rerum mater . . . eique Minerva C. We have no record of changes in V.*

This passage has already been mentioned above. The words *ex terra . . . infudit* must originally have stood opposite *Met. 1, 33–34*. They are probably simply one of many similar passages which were originally written in the margin opposite the Ovidian verses

¹ [Read in lupi feram formam eum convertit. The omission of *feram* or *eum* is easy, and *saevi* is a gloss of Z. E. K. R.]

they summarized or elucidated. This one, however, still persisted in the margin after it had been included in the *Argumenta*. It is noteworthy that N and ε, which both preserve the *Argumenta* in the margin, both omit this second version. The difference in the text of the two versions (i.e., the two versions of M or of C) is probably due to the fact that the marginal version (of both M and C) goes back through several transcriptions to the original archetype, for representatives of both manuscript groups M C and V contain the double version. What distinguishes M N from C V ε is the presence in M N of the scholium *saecula . . . cessit*. The obvious conclusion then is that this scholium, originally standing in the margin, was added by the exemplar of M N and not added by the exemplar of ε V.

28. p. 636, l. 7: 'et a casu eius Argiphontes est cognominatus.' So M N U ε; a casietus C; a caeso eo V.

This *Reading* reinforces what I have already said about the relation of V and ε. The error of C is very interesting. It very likely goes back to majuscules. C — if we can rely at all on the evidence of Giselinus — may be one of the oldest Ovidian manuscripts of which we have record.

29. p. 636, ll. 8–9: 'in volucrem pavonem transformavit et receptum in suam tutelam pennis insignibus quibus amissa lumina indicaret, ornavit.' missa M (corr. second hand) N U; decoravit U C; exornavit ε V; transformatum V; quibus *and* indicaret omitted by V; quibus amissa lumina indicaret omitted by C; quibus om. ε.

Perhaps the phrase *quibus — indicaret* was written as a gloss on *pennis* in *Met.* 1, 722 (*excipit hos volucrisque suaे Saturnia pennis / collocat, etc.*), but more probably the omissions in C V ε can be accounted for by the similar endings of *insignibus*, *quibus*, and *indicaret, ornavit*. This is a good instance of agreement (in omission) between ε and V. Notice also the common error of M N U, *missa*.

30. p. 636, l. 18: 'cuius cantu Argus in somnos compulsus est.' So M C; in fugam compulsus est U; in fugam conversus est N; in somnum compulsus est V.

Fugam is here a common error of N U; N, however, has ingeniously corrected *compulsus* by *conversus*. This is an important indication of the character of N.

31. p. 637, l. 21: '[Phaethon] diu expetitum currum accepit et a praeministris Horis iunctum concendit.' So M; diu expetitam veniam V N U Slater; vix petitam veniam C.

The reading of C is here important. In a continuous script *diuex* could easily lead to *diu vix* (cf. 28 above). *Veniam* is unquestionably correct here. M's *currum* is, however, to be defended in the light of the whole passage. If we read *veniam*, *iunctum* is left without a noun with which to agree. The obvious emendation is to supply *currum*, not in lieu of *veniam* (as did the scribe of M), but between *et* and *a*, and therefore read *veniam accepit et currum, etc.*

32. p. 638, l. 1: 'Monitis itaque instructus patris per iter ignotum cum equis obniti nequisset, equi ignoto agitatore conterriti mundi pronam partem petierunt. quamobrem cum cuncta mortalium ardore subito profligantium incenderentur a Ioveque opem implorantes peterent ne orbis terrarum conflagraret, Phaethon fulmine ictus et e curru praecipitatus est.' So M; (implorantibus ferrent) N U; Monitis itaque patris cum iter ignotum instrui nequisset et equi ignoto agitatore conterriti mundi pronam partem appeterent ac cultra mortalium subito ardore profligantium incenderentur a Ioveque opem sibi ferri implorarent ne orbis terrarum conflagraret, Phaethon fulmine ictus est e curru praecipitatus C; Monitis itaque patris per iter ignotum ire cum nequisset equi ignoto agitatore conterriti mundi pronam partem petierunt quamobrem culta mortalium subito ardore incensa sunt. A Iove autem rogantes ut opem implorantibus ferret ne orbis terrarum conflagraret, Phaethon fulmine et e curru praecipitatus est V.

This is a very difficult passage. The *cuncta* of M N U seems much inferior to *culta*. Giselinus says of V's reading here: 'In quibus verbis (i.e., V codicis) multum, ut mihi videtur, perversis, retentum tamen est *culta* pro quo vulg. *cuncta multa*.' *Cuncta* is possibly just a correction of the erroneous *culta* (C). I am inclined to accept the version of C changing *culta* for *cultra*, *profligantia* for *profligantium*, *qui a Iove* for *a Ioveque*, and *ictus et* for *ictus est*, with of course a final *est* after *praecipitatus*. The passage was doubtless not very elegantly written at best.

33. p. 638, l. 14: 'pari calamitate est concussus. plus enim iusto de-

flendo propinqui interitum deorum voluntate in volucrem cycnum abiit.' So M; concussus plus enim deflendo N U; concussus deflendo C; concussus plus deflens V; est *om.* N U.

Here so far as we know M alone has *est* before *concussus*. *Iusto* seems to be a sheer emendation of M.

34. 638, l. 17: 'Phanocles in Cupidinibus auctor.'

C alone omits. This is, of course, an obvious scholium. Cf. *Reading 36* below.

35. 638, ll. 15–16: 'qui perosus caelestis ignes, paludes ac flumina est secutus.' Caelesti signo (vel caelestem ignem *written above by second hand*) M; caelesti signo N U; caeleste signum V; caelestia C. Cf. Met. 2, 379: 'Stagna petit patulosque lacus ignemque perosus.' Thus *ignes* seems the right reading. The error *signo* could arise very easily from the preceding *s* of *caelestis*. The *caelesti signo* is an error of N U. The reading *caelestia* of C can only be regarded as an emendation.

36. p. 638, ll. 17 ff.: 'Iuppiter cum . . . ursam eam transfiguravit' (p. 639, l. 4).

After *transfiguravit* M N U have the passage: 'quae a Iove cum Arcade filio, quem erat enixa, inter sidera conlocatur. A Graecis autem Helice, a nostris Septemtrio nuncupatur et a Tethy et Oceano ob Iunonis iram inter cetera sidera liquore non tinguuntur, ut auctor Hesiodus indicat, ut alii: "sed lucet in astris Callisto renovatque suos sine fluctibus ignes." M N U have also opposite Met. 2, 504: 'Calisto supradicta cum filio Arcade in sideribus a Iove translati.'

C omits this whole passage (Iuppiter cum . . . ignes) altogether. V has it as far as *transfiguravit* with *A Graecis autem Helice; a nostris Septemtrio vocatur* immediately following. Both V and C have, however, opposite Met. 2, 504 (C in another hand): 'Calisto supradictam cum filio Arcade Iupiter inter sidera collocavit; et a Tethy et Oceano ob Iunonis iram praeter cetera sidera liquore non tinguuntur ut auctor Hesiodus indicat.'

The same thing is true here as above in 27. All this passage after *transfiguravit* (*quae a Iove . . . ignes*) was originally a scholium that stood in the margin opposite v. 504. The *quae* doubtless was first used in *joining* the passage to the Lactantian fable. Originally the

scholium began with *Calisto supradicta* and continued to *ignes*. It was then taken from the margin and added bodily to the Lactantian text in M N U's predecessor. A remnant, however, still remained in the original place (opposite v. 504). In V and C, however, the scholium was left in its place; it was not therefore as well preserved as if it had been bodily inserted in the *Argumenta*. It would be interesting to determine the reason why the whole fable (V-VI) is omitted by C. The only plausible explanation is that the *Argumenta* were taken from the margin of an elaborately annotated edition wherein scholia and occasional summaries of the story were very much mixed together. A copyist who wished only to take the bare summaries — assembling them into more compact units — might sin both in commission (M N U) and omission (C).

37. p. 639, ll. 14-15: 'quem pater exciso utero matris, cum ea rogo esset inposita, abstulit' *abstulit om. N U*; *matris om. N*; *quem pater excidit de utero matris et cum ea rogo esset inposita V.*

The absence of *abstulit* in N U V is suspicious. Furthermore *exciso utero* is hardly what we want here. As I have remarked elsewhere (see p. 162, note 2): 'Vix enim *excido* eundem atque *caedo* sensum habere potest. Filium excidit, uterum cecidit Iuppiter. Et certe rem eleganter exprimit: progeniem suam pater excidit etiam tum cum mater rogo esset imposta.' If we suppose that *excidit de utero* was the original reading here, it will be easy to see how *dit* drops out by haplography and how consequently *exci* is changed to *exciso*. Later the scribe of M added *abstulit*.

38. p. 641, ll. 11-12: 'Invidiae novissime imperavit . . . eam sorori Hersae exacerbavit.' *So M*; *sororis herses exacer(b vel v)atam N*; *eam sororis Herses exacerbare fortunio V.*

Magnus indicates that there is a lacuna here; Slater thinks the text corrupt. But the reading of V will solve all our troubles. *Fortunio* dropped out and *exacerbare* was variously changed.

39. p. 641, ll. 18-19: 'filiam . . . insidentem suo tergo per mare in insulam Cretam detulit.' *suo tergo M*; *sibi tergo N V, Ed. Col.*; *sibi a tergo U*; *per mare om. V C.*

Both *suo tergo* and *sibi a tergo* seem to be corrections of *sibi tergo*, yet this does not really need correction. This kind of dative

can be defended. At any rate *suo tergo* must be rejected. U's *a tergo* might well be accepted as the most satisfactory reading.

40. p. 643, ll. 6-7: 'Cadmo socii condendae urbis additi sunt.' So M N; Slater adds *hi* before Cadmo; C actually does have *hi* before Cadmo; V omits the passage altogether.

The emendation of Slater is confirmed by C, a manuscript of which Slater was ignorant. The omission of the line by V is, however, significant. It is probable that this is another marginal scholium.

41. p. 643, ll. 9-10: 'eundem locum petens ad refrigerandum se et canes quos exercuerat, feras persecutus in conspectum deae incidit.' feras persecutus M β V; per aspera sequens N U; V adds after persecutus: 'apud se habuit sicque in conspectum, etc.'

Giselinus rightly explains this reading of V: 'et canes sc. refrigerandos quod non intelligens V de suo adiecit *persequens*, etc.' (he obviously means the words following *persequens*, i.e., *apud se*, etc.). This passage is interesting on account of the error of N U *per aspera*, which is an obvious mechanical change of *feras persecutus*. The confusion of *f* and *p* seems to go back to majuscules, but this is by no means a necessary conclusion. Any scribe confronted with *fer asper* could have corrected to *per aspera*. What is significant here is the sharp division between M β and N U. The N U group has by now been definitely established (see above 20, 21). The agreement of M β cannot of course be deduced from this one reading, which is an agreement on a right reading and *not* an error. However, this agreement is apparent in a number of common errors, some of which might well be cited here:

p. 649, l. 14: Minides β M; Minides U; Minyides N; Minyeides editors.

l. 15: produnt β M; produntur N U correctly.

p. 650, l. 17: Agenoris filius β M; Agenoridae (es U²) N correctly.

p. 651, l. 6: per Africam iter faciente β M; iter f. p. Africam N U.

l. 8: Athlas β M; Atlans N U correctly.

p. 654, l. 8: Corinthus β M; Corithus N U; Corythus editors.

42. p. 642, ll. 12-13: 'Agenor . . . fratres eius ad requirendam sorem dimisit ita ut nisi eam reperissent ad se ne reverterentur, imperaret.' imperat C N U β; imperante V; imperarat M.

Here it is obvious that all the manuscripts are in error. Possibly the archetype (Z) had *imperat* with *re* written above *at* (of *imperat*). Then Z² (V) read *re* as *ne*. M, however, seems to have made some effort to emend the text. What is significant here is the disagreement of M and β. M and not the common exemplar of Mβ emends. The majority of distinctive β errors are not accepted by the learned scribe of M (and some not by N U). Thus:

p. 654, l. 5: *fritus β N U; Erytus M correctly.* (Here M seems to have corrected an old error coming down from majuscules.)

p. 650, l. 2: *ad erenias β N U; ad Erinyas M correctly.*

p. 651, l. 13: *Gorgone i β; Gorgone ei M N U.*

p. 649, l. 22: *Ino berialtrix β; Ino Liberi altrix M N U correctly.*

p. 651, l. 15: *inter β; iter M N U correctly.*

p. 651, l. 17: *processiset β; procis esset M N U correctly.*

43. p. 650, l. 5: ‘in sinum eius ac coniugis angues et virus . . . iniecit.’
ac virus *N U β; et virus M.*

et virus seems an independent correction of M.

44. p. 651, l. 4: ‘intercepto Phorcydum lumine quae invicem custodias Gorgonum agebant.’ *agebant M; alebant β; habebant N U.*

Perhaps the common error of Z³ (M N U β) is here *alebant*. Possibly *agebant* became *aiebant* (then *alebant*) due to a degutturalized g. N U (Z⁵) and M correct variously. This, as 42, 43, 44 above, proves that the emending tendency of M is not shared by its relative, β.

45. p. 651, l. 5: ‘adspectum caput Medusae rettulit.’ *So M; aspectum N U β; absectum Ed. Col.*

Slater suggests *apsectum*. At any rate it is hard to accept *adspectum*. Not only the sense but the manuscripts are against it. *Aspectum* seems to be an error for *apsectum* or *absectum*. Hence *aspectum* (N U β) is here the reading of Z³ and *adspectum* is simply another emendation of M.

46. p. 651, l. 7: ‘utero autem eiusdem Medusae equus Pegasus cum pennis exiit.’ *So β N U edd.; huius Medusae M. Cf. 44, 45 above.*

47. p. 653, l. 19: ‘Phineus . . . cui Andromeda ante desponsata furerat.’ *disposita M; disponsa U; despnsata β N.*

Here all the manuscripts (β M N U) have been troubled by a

common error, *i* for *e* in *desponsata*. This accounts for the correction of M. This is a very clear case where M emends.

48. p. 682, ll. 1–2: ‘coniugium iniit ex duabus filios edidit.’ *So M U*; ex quo duos filios *N*; ex eo duos filios *Ed. Col.*; coniugio inibit duos filios *κ(S)*.

What is noteworthy here, is the peculiarity of *κ*'s reading. It seems to represent a tradition quite separate from M N U.

49. p. 682, l. 7: ‘hic ex Maeandri filia Byblis et Caunus.’ *So M N*; filia et apolline *κ(S) U*.

This does not necessarily imply a close relationship between *κ* and U. Cf. *Readings* 47, 48, 7. U, as we have seen before, has definite earmarks of Z¹ (close to π) to a greater extent than any other manuscript of the Z³ (β M N U) group.

50. p. 682, ll. 7 ff.: ‘Byblis cum fratrem corporali amore potius quam pio patroique more diligenter nec vesania cupiditatem consiperet atque per litteras . . . amorem . . . indicavisset, furiāl vesania ipse instinctus patria profugit.’ Vesania (*before* cupiditatem) *M U*; vesanam *N*; vesana crepiditate *κ(S)*; cupiditate *M N U*.

Slater rightly supplies *vesanam cupiditatem*. The *vesania* of *vesania cupiditatem* (in M U) is doubtless an error, partly due to the influence of *vesania* below. The original error doubtless is due to a dropping of the accusative ending *m* from *cupiditatem*. This would be an easy loss, as the accusative was probably only indicated by a horizontal line over the *e*. Then *vesanam* would change to *vesana*. Here (as in 49 above) *κ* seems to represent a tradition quite distinct from Z³ (M N U).¹

51. p. 682, l. 12: ‘ibique adsiduo maerore et fletu fatigata cum concidisset.’ Maerore *M U*; errore *κ(S) N*.


Cf. *Met.* 9, 638 ff. There can be little doubt that *errore* is an appropriate word here, where the wanderings of Byblis are described. *Maerore* seems a rather useless synonym. *Maerore* (which appears in both M and U) must be the original reading of Z³. N's *errore* is probably (as in 50, — *vesanam*) an example of contamination.

¹ Rand suggests *vesana cupiditate tamen* (*tamen* originally abbreviated \bar{tm}) with the sense: ‘for all her madness, she did not see him but sent a letter instead.’ The original error, in this case, would be *vesanam* for *vesana* (accusative *cupiditatem* by assimilation).

tion with another manuscript tradition — that of κ . Cf. also 49, where κ seems at least to reveal a trace of tradition distinct from Z^3 .

52. p. 683, l. 8: 'Ianthen ex Theleste genitam despondit.' So *M*; ex teliste genitam filio despondit κ ; ex telixie genitam fide respondit *N*; ex teliste genitam fide spondet *U*; ei despondet *Slater*; genitam despondit filio *Ed. Col.*

Cf. *Met.* 9, 715: 'Cum pater, Iphi, tibi flavam despondet Ianthen.' Slater's emendation supplies the clue to the readings of the manuscripts. For *ei despondet* (in continuous majuscules) would be written *EIDESPONDET*, which could, by the common error of *e* for *f*, become *fide spondet* or *fi despondet* corrected into *filio despondit*, etc. This is a reading, therefore, that can be considered an almost certain indication that κ has an archetype in common with *M N U*. However, the *filio* of κ would seem yet another indication that κ is not a Z^3 manuscript. Noteworthy is the agreement of *U* and κ . The original of both probably read: 'ex teliste genitam fide spondet'; κ then read *filio despondit*, and *U* *fide spondet*. This *N* and *M* variously corrected. *U* would thus seem to represent here the original reading of Z^1 . κ 's *filio* however is, as we see, present in the Cologne Edition (already proved to be — in spite of many changes — based on a Z^2 manuscript). The relationship of manuscripts in this reading can therefore be represented as follows:



53. p. 684, ll. 18–19: 'revocata ergo ad inferos, Orphea, ut ad lucem

confugerat, sic dementia stupuisse, etc.' So *M*; ab inferis (*lacuna after inferis*) in (*uncertain*) lucem conspiceret κ ; ad inferos Orfea ut lucem confugerit *U*; amissa ergo euridice secundo Orpheus in lucem conspexit *N*; revocata igitur ab inferis Eurydice, Orpheus ut lucem contigit *Ed. Col.*

It is obvious that this is a very difficult passage either to emend or to genealogize. There are two main differences between the version of κ and that of *M U*:

1: κ has *ab inferis*; *M U ad inferos*.

2: κ has *conspiceret* (*N conspexit*); *M U confugerat* or *it*. Thus κ seems plainly to represent another manuscript family which — as we also here have the common reading of *Ed. Col. ab inferis* — is probably *Z²*. *N*, as in 50 and 51, seems here to agree with κ against *Z³* (*M U*) and possibly *Z¹* itself. *N* may either — like *U* — represent here *Z¹* or — which is more likely — it may be contaminated with a manuscript like κ (that is, a *Z²* manuscript).

54. p. 686, ll. 6–7: 'quo eliso post obitum eius cruar in florem eius nomine inscriptum accessit.' So *M*; p.o. nomine cruar eius in florem inscriptum *N U*; ae ae cessit *U*; secessit *N*; p.o. nomine cruar eius in florem inscriptum e e cessit $\kappa(S)$; quo eliso post obitum cruar eius in florem inscriptum hya literis dolorem testantibus cessit *Ed. Col.*

Slater, I think, rightly here excludes *eius nomine* and reads *in florem inscriptum ae ae cessit*. Both *U* and κ represent the original reading of *Z*; *N* and *M* have variously emended by *accessit* and *secessit*. Cf. *Readings* 49, 52. The version of *Ed. Col.* (doubtless the reading of *Z²* with the exception of the obviously interpolated *literis . . . testantibus*) confirms this conclusion.

55. p. 687, l. 7: 'conperit voto se esse damnatum coniugii.' damnatum $\kappa(S)$; natum *N U*; donatum *M*.

κ is unquestionably right; *natum* is an error of *Z³*, badly corrected by *M*. Cf. 52, 53.


III

These *Readings* point to the following conclusions:

i. The manuscripts C V $\pi \epsilon \beta$ M N U have a common archetype. Cf. *Reading* 13 where all the manuscripts have traces of the common

error *par exparsit* for *par exarsit*. More important, however, is the evidence of 27 and 36, both of which readings point to a common marginal origin of at least portions of the *Argumenta*. Another probable common error can be seen in 29 where originally *ad* seems to have replaced *ac*. So far as κ is concerned, there can be little reason for supposing that it does not stem from this same archetype. Unfortunately we cannot compare its readings with any of the ϵ V tradition; the evidence of the Cologne Edition is at best doubtful. Still its agreement with U and N (reading 52) is enough to prove its paternity.

2. The relationship of these manuscripts can be represented as follows:



This stemma can be considered as certainly established with the possible exception of the placing of C, π , κ , and U.

(a) π obviously belongs to the Z^1 family. (Cf. *Readings* 1, 2, 3, 4, and particularly 13.) But it is also obvious that it represents a tradition prior to that of Z^3 (M N U). Cf. *Readings* 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 24. This is all that can be said of it with certainty.

(b) C is in all probability a Z^1 manuscript. Cf. *Readings* 24, 28, 29, 33, 40. Yet C, like π , is very obviously prior to the Z^3 tradition. Cf. *Readings* 27, 29, and particularly 32, 36, 40. Yet we have but one *Reading* (24) where we can compare it with π . On the evidence, C and π cannot be shown to be closely related, but they at any rate belong to the early history of the Z^1 family. Thus their indicated position in the stemma must be regarded as only a rough approximation.

(c) We can compare κ only with M N U and Ed. Col. It is evident

that κ agrees with N or U as against M (49, 50, 52, 53, 54). There is also some evidence of agreement with Ed. Col. as against M N U (52, 53, 54). We know, however, that Z⁵ (N U) is much closer to the archetype than the emending M. Thus the agreement with Ed. Col. is a more significant indication of κ 's position. But this evidence (as discussed above) is very tenuous. On the whole κ would seem to be a Z² manuscript, but the question is still entirely open. For N's conflation with κ see *Reading* 53.

(d) There are certainly striking common errors which lead to the grouping of N U (cf. *Readings* 2, 4, 9, 10, 20, and especially 21). There are places, however, where U seems to represent Z¹ or even the archetype (when correctly indicated by Z²) in striking disagreement with M N. Cf. *Readings* 5, 8, 18, 24. *Reading* 7 (corporum U π ; temporum ϵ M N) is a case where U agrees with π in manifest error. This alone would suffice to indicate that U is a much better representative of Z¹ than any other Z³ manuscript. The most likely explanation is that U is a much more literal transcript of the lost Z⁵ than N (just as β is a much more literal transcript of the lost Z⁷). N presumably (as the condition of the manuscript itself would indicate) is the work of not unscholarly scribes, who very likely had access to a manuscript very much akin to M — which however they used only occasionally. U, on the contrary, was copied rather quickly and carelessly (by comparison). In general, however, the agreement of N and U is paramount. They are both Beneventan manuscripts of the Bari type, copied presumably in the same monastery.

3. The common archetype of all these manuscripts was probably a copy of a fifth or sixth century majuscule codex (cf. *Readings* 4, 28, 31) written in continuous script. It is also fairly clear (cf. *Readings* 26, 42, 52) that this was written in rustic capitals. It contained the *Argumenta* written in the margin; they were probably not yet completely condensed into the present compact *fabulae*. They were essentially written as convenient legends for the reader. Along with them in the margin were numerous scholia perhaps themselves going back to a fuller edition or 'commentary.' Our archetype, in copying this codex, omitted the vast majority of the scholia but did copy the summaries and often erroneously included scholia with these. In several places, whether intentionally or unintentionally, actual scholia were tran-

scribed in their former place in the margin. It was perhaps the scribe of our archetype who first separated the *Argumenta* into *fabulae* with titles.

IV

All this, however, is but a prelude to the real question: are these conclusions about the relationship of the manuscripts as valid for Ovid as for Lactantius? There can be little doubt that they are. The *Argumenta* in V, M, U, β , κ , π are an integral part of the original handwriting. In N they are written in the margin but the hand is without doubt the same as the hand that wrote the *Metamorphoses* themselves. Everything points to the conclusion that the scribe's decision to write them in the margin was due to his own choice. As for ϵ , we have already pointed out that the circumstances are slightly different. Yet the evidence hardly allows us to infer that the *Argumenta* were copied from a manuscript different from that of the manuscript used for Ovid. (For C see note 1, p. 133, above.)

All these Lactantian manuscripts are, in Magnus' phraseology 'O' manuscripts. They by definition do not fall in the 'X' category (which includes the manuscripts τ , v , μ , F, l, h, e, p, etc.). Magnus, as we have seen, made ϵ an X manuscript, since he did not observe that it contained at least a few of the *Argumenta*. He does not, however, seem to have based this decision on anything except this oversight. For this whole X group — *monstrum horrendum informe ingens cui lumen ademptum* — is, by definition, supposed to lack either an archetype or a definable articulation.

But is it true that all these X manuscripts belong to a separate category? We have already mentioned Magnus' hypothesis of a fifth-century recension from whence sprang O and Lactantius, and we have seen that these O manuscripts do unquestionably go back to a single manuscript equipped with marginal scholia and summaries. Still, it is perfectly reasonable to assume that their absence from other manuscripts—even in the attenuated Lactantian form—does not carry any additional implications. There are, however, common lacunae in ϵ , M, N, and U which *do* reveal a distinct unity among these manuscripts as compared with those of the X group (e.g., F, where the lacunae are supplied). Still, that would only differentiate X from O (if it did

that) and would not in itself remove the possibility that both X and O stem from a common parent. This is in fact essentially the position taken by E. K. Rand¹ and W. F. Smith.² A full discussion of their work would be impossible here. I can only express my conviction that the case for a common archetype of both X and O manuscripts is difficult to establish, and that it has, in fact, not yet been effectively established.³

In the meantime this Lactantian stemma, so far as it goes, can be of use to Ovidian scholars. Essentially it agrees with the conclusions reached by Rand and Smith. These conclusions were based on a direct study of Ovid (not of Lactantius) and mark an important advance on the work of Merkel, Riese, Magnus, Ehwald, and Slater. This Lactantian stemma therefore must be taken as an independent corroboration or 'control' of their work. It is at least to be hoped that it can help to establish certain long-needed principles for the textual criticism of the *Metamorphoses*:

1. M, the pride of Merkel, Magnus, and Lafaye, is not the most excellent but the most doctored Ovidian text.
2. Since ε (along with τ) represents an entirely different family of manuscripts from that of Z¹ (M N U π β) and is apparently as trustworthy a representative of the archetype, it must be given as much weight as the whole *consensus* of Z¹ manuscripts.

¹ See E. K. Rand, "The New Edition of Ovid's *Metamorphoses*," *Classical Philology*, XI (1916), pp. 46–60.

² W. F. Smith, *De Ovidii Metamorphoseon aliquot Codicibus recensendis*, 1925. This thesis is on file in the Harvard College Library. There is a summary of it in the *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, XXXVI (1925), pp. 183–184. Smith's thesis is in the main a development of Rand's work on the manuscripts. My own thesis, *De Lactantii qui dicitur Narrationibus Ovidianis*, 1935 (on file in the Harvard College Library and summarized in *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, XLVI (1935), pp. 209–211), of which this paper is a partial translation, is largely based on similar principles.

³ See the thesis of R. T. Bruère *De Ovidii Metamorphoseon aliquot Codicibus recensendis*, which is on file in the Harvard College Library (for a summary of it see end of this volume). Bruère, in my opinion, has now made out an effective case for the general derivation of the 'X' manuscripts. They—along with κ—ultimately derive from Z² and form a special branch of Z², that is to say Z⁴. Probably this Z⁴ is conflated not only with N but with U or Z⁵. This, however, is hardly to be proved on a basis of the *Argumenta* alone.

3. The consensus N U (except when in obvious error) is to be preferred to M alone and to be considered at least equal to the consensus M β .

4. Where π exists, it is to be consulted as an equal with ϵ . The other manuscripts are to be considered only secondarily.

5. U (at least so far as the first hand goes) is on the whole to be preferred to N.

GREEK THEORIES OF SLAVERY FROM HOMER TO ARISTOTLE

ROBERT SCHLAIFER

I. THE EVIDENCE

THE first theories of any political and social institution are to be found long after it has been first established, when its validity and justice are first attacked and then defended. To this rule slavery is no exception. Before the attacks begin, there is no conscious theorizing; there is only a state of mind, a habit of thought, in regard to slaves, which can be learned from incidental remarks and from the treatment accorded the slave; both of these can be well observed in the Homeric poems, where the relations of the master and his slave are more clearly depicted than by any other classical Greek author except Euripides. Somewhat later than the heroic period the general attitude toward the servile members of society crystallized in the form of law; the extant parts of the laws of two states, Athens and Gortyna, afford excellent evidence for our problem. In the great period of Greek literature innumerable references in all sorts of writers illuminate this popular, unconscious attitude.

The beginning of conscious theory is to be found in the teachings of the Sophists, of whose writings and doctrines only the merest scraps remain, and with whom Plato does not choose to debate this question. There is, consequently, no systematic statement of the problem until the *Politics* of Aristotle, with which this account will be concluded.

II. INTRODUCTORY: HELLENIC NATIONALISM

The Greek theories of slavery after the heroic period can be understood only in the light of two contributing factors: the rise of a pan-Hellenic nationalism and the growth of disdain for menial occupations. Neither of these has left the slightest trace in Homer,

who, as Thucydides¹ was the first to notice, has no common name for Greeks or for barbarians. The foundations of this nationalism were laid in the eighth century, when, with the rise of the great national festivals, all of non-Greek blood were excluded. The formation of political and religious leagues, the meeting of pilgrims from all parts of Greece at the great oracles — these and similar gatherings caused the Greeks to realize that they were one in blood, spirit, and heritage. It was during the eighth century that there arose the use of 'Hellenes' as a common appellation for all Greeks and 'barbarians' as a category in which all others were included. The feeling of distinction between these two must have been greatly strengthened through continual observation of the barbarian by the many colonists of the seventh century.

Not until the Persian wars, however, is there any evidence that this feeling of national unity involved a belief in national superiority. This struggle, in which almost all the Greeks participated as a nation and which resulted in the complete defeat of almost all the known foreign peoples, headed by a king hitherto believed invincible, caused a great surge of national pride. This was the sentiment which the poet Aeschylus expressed in his *Persae* (472) and which he chose to place on his tombstone;² this was the sentiment which held Greece together for seventeen years more in a pan-Hellenic league. And then, as the glory of Salamis and Plataea receded into the past and as clashes with the Great King became less frequent, a new factor, consciousness of superiority in the arts and sciences, kept national pride alive. Their very language was felt by the Greeks to be superior³ — Aristophanes⁴ uses βάρβαρος to mean 'incapable of speech.' After the shameful dealings by both sides with the Great King at the close of the Peloponnesian war, after the national humiliation of the peace of Antalcidas, this cultural superiority was — and was sometimes admitted to be⁵ — all that remained on which to support Greek pride and

¹ I, 3, 3.

² Anon. *Vit. Aesch.*; Plut. *De Exil.* 13 (*Mor.* 604f); Athen. 14, 23, 627cd.

³ Dion. Hal. *Rhet.* 11, 4; K. J. F. Roth, *Bemerk. üb. d. Sinn . . . d. Wortes Barbar* (Nürnberg, 1814), pp. 8-9.

⁴ Av. 199.

⁵ Isoc. 15, 293-294.

conceit. *Báρβαρος*, when used adjectively, now assumed the more comprehensive significance of 'gauche';¹ Hellenism was recognized to be a thing of the spirit rather than of blood.² But not for a century, until the time of Eratosthenes,³ were the full implications of this admission realized; in the fifth and fourth centuries the general view was that a Greek *ipso facto* possessed this superior culture and that a non-Greek was incapable of receiving it.

Besides this realization of their superior *Kultur*, there was another factor in the composition of the Greek attitude toward the barbarian — the ready submission of the latter to absolute monarchy, a state which the Greek habitually termed *δουλεία*. This accusation against the barbarian, first uttered by Aeschylus in his *Persae*,⁴ was repeated by Herodotus;⁵ its general acceptance is shown by the fact that although Euripides himself refuses to admit its justice,⁶ yet he puts it in the mouths of two of his characters.⁷

From these two beliefs, that in a superior *Kultur* and that in the actual slavery of the barbarian in his political state, two conclusions naturally followed: first, that barbarians were by nature fitted only for slavery and hence that it was not only the privilege but even the duty of Greeks to enslave them;⁸ second, that a Greek was by nature designed for freedom. Neither of these conclusions is found in Herodotus, but both were a matter of common belief by the end of the fifth century. In the fourth century two new phenomena appear in connection with them: the frequent preaching that these beliefs should be realized in a great national crusade against the enemy,⁹ and the attempt to state in technical

¹ E.g. in [Dem.] 26, 17.

² Isoc. 4, 50. Cf. the use of *δύσθωντοι* instead of *συγγενῆς* in [Plat.] *Menex.* 241e.

³ Strab. I, 4, 9, p. 66.

⁴ 241–242.

⁵ 7, 135, 3; cf. 6, 44, 1.

⁶ Cf. Th. Gomperz, *Griechische Denker*⁴ (Berlin & Leipzig, 1922–31), II, p. 15.

⁷ *Hel.* 276; *Iph. Aul.* 1400–1401.

⁸ Isoc. 4, 131–132; 181–182; cf. 34–37.

⁹ 'Nonnulli' ap. Isoc. 5, 120; Gorg. frg. 1; Isoc. *Eph.* 9, 19 (to Archidamus); 3, 5 (to Philip); *Or.* 4, 182; cf. 158; Dem. 14, 32. These dreams of a crusade were attributed to the great leaders of an earlier time, e.g. to Cimon by Theopompus ap. Plut. *Cim.* 18, 5; see J. Kärst, *Gesch. d. Hellenismus*² (Leipzig, 1917–26), I, pp. 151,

philosophical language the difference between the Greek and the barbarian *φύσις*. The explanation was simply the assertion that the barbarian failed to possess, or possessed in undue proportion, some essential part of the soul. By Plato the Orientals were supposed to be lacking in *τὸ θυμοειδές* and to have an excess of *τὸ φιλοχρήματον*; in addition they, together with all barbarians, lacked *τὸ φιλομαθές*, a possession of the Greeks alone.¹ Aristotle apparently thought that the deficiency of the Orientals in courage and of the Northerners in intelligence was due to climatic causes.² To both Plato and Aristotle the barbarian lacked the governing element of the soul, Plato's *θεῖον ἄρχον*, Aristotle's *τὸ βουλευτικόν*.³ Such a conclusion suited admirably the various reports and travellers' tales brought back from the East and accorded still better with the nature of the barbarian slave as it could be observed at home. It is true that some, whose names are much less highly regarded than these two, held a more intelligent view of the origin of the slave-like nature of the barbarian, namely, that it was caused by long subjection to slave-like domination. Thus, as Isocrates says,⁴ *οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε τοὺς οὕτω τρεφομένους καὶ πολιτευομένους οὕτε τῆς ἀλλης ἀρετῆς μετέχειν οὔτ’ ἐν ταῖς μάχαις τρόπαιον ιστάναι τῶν πολεμίων*. But regardless of the cause, subjection to tyranny, the equivalent of slavery, was considered the mark of the barbarian:

*ἴω τυραννὶ βαρβάρων ἀνδρῶν φίλη.*⁵

By the time of Aristotle, however, there had arisen a large body of contrary opinion, which maintained that the popular prejudice

514–515. The general acceptance in the early fourth century of the justice and desirability of such a crusade is shown by the fact that Isocrates' *Panegyric* is an argument concerning its leadership only: see sec. 66.

¹ Plat. *Rep.* 435e–436a.

² H. Newman, *The Politics of Arist.* (Oxford, 1887–1902), III, pp. 363–364.

³ Plat. *Rep.* 590cd; Arist. *Pol.* 60a12. In both these passages the element is denied not to barbarians as such, but to slaves. Since, however, as will be shown, both Plato and Aristotle held that all barbarians are *φύσει δοῦλοι*, the statement made in the text is legitimate.

⁴ Isoc. *Or.* 4, 150; cf. the whole passage 150–151; also 5, 124.

⁵ Tragici incert. frg. 359 Nauck.²

against the barbarian was entirely unjustified. In the seventh and sixth centuries the tyrannies and the Orphic cults had begun to lay the foundations for cosmopolitanism:¹ the former had pursued a policy of foreign, including non-Greek, alliances; members of the tyrannic families had sometimes taken foreign names; and they had not restricted the immigration of barbarians. The Orphic cults were open to all men, not to Greeks alone, and Orpheus himself was supposed to have been a Thracian. But with the fall of the tyrannies in the sixth century and the decline of the Orphic cults in the fifth, there was little to check the intensification of nationalism after the Persian wars.²

It was inevitable, however, that with the spread of the 'enlightenment' a school should arise to deny the categorical division of mankind into Greeks and barbarians. Hellenism, as has been shown, was gradually becoming a thing of the spirit and therefore tended to break the bounds of nationality and race. The chief attention of philosophy was to virtue, knowledge, and similar ethical qualities, and sooner or later it was bound to be recognized that many barbarians possessed these virtues to a great degree. The first signs of the new cosmopolitanism are found in Euripides, who reflects so many of the ideas of the 'enlightenment.' Although for dramatic reasons he often lets his characters express the opposite view,³ it is clear that his own sentiments are shown in the fragment:⁴

τὸν ἐσθλὸν ἄνδρα, κἄν ἐκὰς ναιῇ χθονός,
κἄν μήποτ' ὄσσοις εἰστῶ, κρίνω φίλον.

Democritus had already said:⁵ ἀνδρὶ σοφῷ πᾶσα γῆ βατή· ψυχῆς γὰρ ἀγαθῆς πατρὶς ὁ ξύμπας κόσμος, and the fact that Lysias⁶ rages against

¹ Gomperz, I, p. 113.

² There may be a slight trace of cosmopolitan spirit in Pind. *Nem.* 6, 1-2; it is to be remembered that Pindar was a citizen of a Medizing state.

³ E.g. the famous words of Jason to Medea (*Eur. Med.* 533-544), words which almost any Greek might have used, and yet which are obviously intended to arouse disgust in the audience.

⁴ Frg. 902 N². Cf. frgg. 777 and 1047.

⁵ Frg. 247 ed. H. Diels, in *Die Frag. d. Vorsokrat.*⁵ (Berlin, 1934-), II, p. 194.

⁶ 31, 6.

ὅσοι δὲ φύσει μὲν πολῖται εἰσι, γνώμῃ δὲ χρῶνται ὡς πᾶσα γῆ πατρὶς αὐτοῖς ἔστιν ἐν ἦ ἀν τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἔχωσιν, shows that the argument, although adopted perhaps for base reasons, was quite widespread. Hippias' assertion¹ that in matters of law and custom universality was the only true criterion of goodness amounted to a flat denial that any nation could be peculiarly excellent. In rejecting² the validity of distinctions of birth, Lycophron must certainly have drawn the obvious inference that there was no distinction between Greek and barbarian. Finally, the Sophist Antiphon states categorically:³ φύσει πάντα πάντες ὅμοιως πεφύκαμεν καὶ βάρβαροι καὶ Ἕλληνες εἶναι . . . οὕτε βάρβαρος ἀφώρισται ἡμῶν οὐδεὶς οὔτε Ἕλλην. Even Plato, in his *Statesman*, reversed the position he had earlier taken in the *Republic* and adopted Antiphon's theory: it is as ridiculous, he says, to divide mankind into Greeks and non-Greeks as into Phrygians and non-Phrygians.⁴ Although he returned in the *Laws* to his old view, he remained open-minded enough to admit that certain barbarian regulations were preferable to those of his favorite states, Sparta and Crete.⁵

The Cynics, denying the significance of everything not contained in the individual himself, refused, of course, all value or importance to the state: μόνην τε ὄρθὴν πολιτείαν εἶναι τὴν ἐν κόσμῳ.⁶ But, it must be remembered, 'der leitende Gedanke dieses cynischen Kosmopolitismus ist weit weniger die Zusammengehörigkeit und Verbindung aller Menschen, als die Befreiung des Einzelnen von den Banden des Staatslebens und den Schranken der Nationalität.'⁷ And yet, while Aristotle was engaged in writing his *Politics*, in which he upheld the old nationalistic spirit, Alexander was disregarding his advice to act toward the Greeks as a leader, toward the barbarians as a master, and was establishing in fact a world

¹ Gomperz, I, p. 336; E. Zeller, *Die Philosophie d. Griechen in ihrer geschichtl. Entwick.* (Leipzig, 1919–23), I, ii^b, p. 1397, n. 2.

² Stob. ed. Wachsmuth et Hense (Berlin, 1884–1912) 4, 29, 24.

³ Antiph. Soph. ed. L. Gernet (with Antiph. Or.) (Paris, 1923), 1, frg. 5 = Pap. Oxy. XI, no. 1364, vv. 275–292 (p. 100).

⁴ *Polit.* 262c–e. Cf. Gomperz, II, p. 448.

⁵ Legg. 674a.

⁶ Diog. Cyn. ap. Diog. Laer. 6, 72.

⁷ Zeller, II, ii^b, pp. 325–326.

state.¹ Thus at the end of the period under discussion the situation was rapidly becoming that which obtained at the beginning. A feeling of the distinction between Greek and barbarian, arising gradually between the eighth and sixth centuries, had developed in the fifth and fourth into a belief in Hellenic superiority, only to find almost immediately opponents among the Sophists and later among the Cynics, whose ideal was in fact partially realized in the empire of Alexander.

III. INTRODUCTORY: BANAUSIC OCCUPATIONS

The idea that certain occupations were menial and beneath the dignity of a freeman is not found in the earliest Greek literature, but its rise and its prevalence at any given time are unfortunately difficult to determine. The attempt, however, must be made, for this idea is the chief cause of the Greek attitude toward slaves which resulted in the most commonly held of all the later theories, that of the natural slave. In Homer and Hesiod there appears no prejudice against any honest means of gaining a livelihood; it is a common observation that the wives and daughters of Homer's Zeus-reared kings spend their days in the humblest of household tasks. According to Hesiod only those mortals who devote themselves to useful toil will receive the favor of the gods,² and in some states this attitude persisted well into the sixth century. Solon, who, himself a merchant,³ became the highest magistrate and law-giver extraordinary in the crisis of the Athenian state, in his poems describes the artisans as sons of Athena and Hephaestus.⁴ It was only at a relatively late date that the feast of the *χαλκεῖα* ceased to be a festival of the whole people and became exclusively for artisans.⁵ Until the tyrannies, in fact, there was almost no slave

¹ Plut. *De Alex. Fort.* 1, 6 (*Mor.* 329b).

² *Op. et D.* 298–309. Cf. *Hym. Hom.* 20, where Hephaestus and Athena are said to have raised mankind from barbarism by teaching them the arts.

³ Plut. *Sol.* 2, 1.

⁴ Sol. ed. E. Diehl, *Anthol. Lyr. Graeca* (Leipzig, 1925), frg. 1, 49–50. Cf. Plat. *Legg.* 920d.

⁵ Suid. s.v. *χαλκεῖα*. These remarks on the situation in Athens are derived from P. N. Ure, *The Origin of Tyranny* (Cambridge, 1922), p. 16.

labor at all in those states which had not been conquered during the dark ages.¹

The change in attitude, then, began only with the disruption of the old order brought about by the conquest of much of Greece by the Dorians, who when they had settled in a new land forced the subject population to tend to the supply of the necessities of life and devoted themselves exclusively to military occupations.² It was, of course, inevitable that once labor had become reserved to an inferior class, whether slave or serf, it should soon come to be regarded as degrading in itself. This contempt naturally extended to the tillers of the soil as well as to artisans and tradespeople, while on the other hand in states where there was no ruling and exploiting class there is until the fifth century no evidence for a prejudice against any form of labor.

At no time did the tiller of the land in any state of the latter type fall from high esteem in the popular mind. The attitude in Athens is well shown by Euripides' line:³

αὐτουργός — οἵπερ καὶ μόνοι σώζουσι γῆν,

and Aristophanes' respect for the small farmer is well known. The basis of this high opinion is easy to understand: farming not only rendered the body fit for service as a hoplite but also required intelligence and initiative, not merely the brute force which the slave or day laborer contributed. The average Greek — not the member of the *Demos* alone but also the politically moderate of the higher classes — probably believed that these *αὐτουργοί* were the only possible basis for a well-governed democracy.

An oligarchically minded person, however, who believed that the system of Sparta was at least very near to the ideal, would naturally disagree with this view and would wish to establish in his state also an exploiting class, whose only difference from the Laconian was to be devotion to the more philosophical life of politics, rather than the life of war. Xenophon, who was as aristocratic

¹ B. Büchsenschütz, *Besitz u. Erwerb im griech. Alterthume* (Halle, 1869), pp. 321, 341, 193 (cited by Ure, *op. cit.*, p. 22, n. 6).

² Newman, *Pol. of Arist.*, I, pp. 99–100.

³ *Or.* 920.

as Plato or Aristotle but less intellectual and therefore could not have imagined spending all his time at politics and philosophizing, occupies the middle ground between the common view and that of the two great philosophers. In one passage¹ he speaks of agriculture in terms of the highest praise. His ideal, however, is really that of the gentleman farmer who supervises his estate but works in the field only occasionally, for pleasure and exercise. Ischomachus' estate certainly required slaves, but Xenophon would probably have allowed the *aὐτοργός* to be a citizen, although perhaps without all the privileges of the upper class.

Plato classes the peasant with the manual laborer. In his *Republic* all the productive classes are to be members of the third estate, which, while free in name, is really slave. Although it is true that these people are not to be enslaved — indeed, the taking of their liberty by the governors is the first sign of the decline of his ideal state² — yet the fact that they are to have no share in the government of the city shows that Plato is really extending the usual notion of the worthlessness of *βάναυσοι* for political purposes to include the peasants also. In the *Laws*,³ too, agriculture as well as industry and commerce is strictly forbidden to the citizen. Aristotle⁴ follows Plato exactly in this: the cultivators of the soil, *εἰ δὲ κατ’ εὐχήν*, should be slaves; if this ideal cannot be realized, then serfs should be used, but never freemen.

These views concerning peasants were, as has been shown, rare in the more enlightened states of Greece. For the banalistic occupations, however, all but the *βάναυσοι* themselves had only contempt from the early fifth century on.⁵ Several factors contribute to produce this attitude, none of which can actually be illustrated by citations, but which may nevertheless be assumed with some confidence. First was the growth of the hoplite system, which

¹ Xen. *Oec.* 6, 9; cf. 4, 4; 5, 1-17; 6, 10.

² *Rep.* 547bc.

³ 806de.

⁴ *Pol.* 30a25 ff.

⁵ E. Meyer, *Die Sklaverei im Altertum*, in vol. I² of *Kleine Schriften* (Halle, 1924), p. 200, disputes this, but his conclusion is really only another form of statement for the same fact. Cf. Dem. 18, 258; Ar. *Ach.* 478-479; *Thes.* 387; *Ran.* 840. Many artisans preferred mercenary service abroad to continuing at their occupations — Agesilaus' army was composed chiefly of this class: Plut. *Ages.* 26; Polyae. 2, 1, 7.

received its test in the closing years of the sixth and the beginning of the fifth centuries.¹ Second, the plunder of the Persian wars made many more citizens financially independent, thus increasing the numbers of the class which could look down upon the petty workers and shop-keepers.² Last of all, many prisoners of the wars were enslaved and the increased wealth made it possible to purchase still others, so that as slaves became widely employed the idea spread that the tasks at which they were put were unfit for a freeman.

The first of these causes, the importance of the hoplite army, was the only one which was recognized by the Greeks, and when they came to justify their scorn of the *βάναυσος*, this formed an important part of their argument. For if one was forced to sit all day, sometimes even in front of a fire, one's body soon became incapable of strenuous service in heavy armor. When the body became weakened, the soul too lost its vigor and courage³ and soon was lost to every virtue.⁴ The result would be that in case of an invasion the *τεχνῖται* would, if they had their choice, flee before the enemy.⁵ It may be, but it is unlikely, that Socrates, who was a stone-mason in his youth, drew the obvious distinction between harmful trades and crafts and those, such as brick-laying, which were as beneficial as farming.⁶ A further objection raised against the banausic oc-

¹ Newman, *Pol. of Arist.*, I, p. 100.

² W. Drumann, *Die Arbeiter u. Communisten in Griechenland u. Rom* (Königsberg, 1860), p. 46 (cited by Ure, *Orig. of Tyr.*, p. 19).

³ Plat. *Rep.* 495de; Xen. *Oec.* 4, 2; *Mem.* 4, 2, 22; Arist. *Pol.* 37b8 ff.

⁴ Plat. *Rep.* 590c; 495d; Arist. *Pol.* 28b39 ff.

⁵ Xen. *Oec.* 6, 6-7.

⁶ From Xen. *Mem.* 1, 2, 56-57, Gomperz (II, p. 63) and Zeller (II i⁵, p. 170) conclude that Socrates, more radical than Plato, believed that any honest means of earning a living was honorable. Socrates, however, had said (Xen. *Oec.* 4, 2-3) *αἱ γε βαναυσικαὶ καλούμεναι . . . καταλυμαίνονται . . . τὰ σώματα . . . τῶν δὲ σωμάτων θηλυρομένων καὶ αἱ ψυχαὶ πολὺ ἀρρωστότεραι γίγνονται*. When he says, then, in the passage under consideration (Xen. *Mem.* 1, 2, 57) *τοὺς μὲν ἀγαθὸν τι ποιοῦντας ἐργάζεσθαι . . . καὶ ἐργάτας [ἀγαθοὺς] εἶναι*, and *τὸ μὲν ἐργάτην εἶναι ωφέλιμόν τε ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι*, he can scarcely mean by *ἀγαθὸν* *τι* any occupation with the effects on body and soul of *αἱ βαναυσικαὶ καλούμεναι* (*sc. τέχναι*). It may be, therefore, that he is here distinguishing a certain class of trades as non-banausic. It is to be observed, however, that Plato and Xenophon, as well as Eurip-

cupations was the fact that they left the citizen insufficient leisure for intercourse with his friends or, more important, for attending to the business of the city.¹ In any case, it simply would not be fitting (*πρέπον*) for the citizen to have to bother with the necessities of life.² For still another reason, according to Plato, and in spite of the fact that it was intrinsically useful and good, trade was not to be practiced by the citizen: it causes or encourages men to pursue their appetites beyond the measure of reason.³

With the growing importance of industry there was, to be sure, a tendency for the artisan and commercial class to rise somewhat in the estimation of their fellow-citizens, but one must not overestimate this rise. In Corinth, where probably — although this is disputed⁴ — Periander had, in order to encourage free labor, forbidden the purchase of slaves,⁵ artisans were least scorned.⁶ But it is to be noted that Herodotus says ἥκιστα δὲ Κορίνθιοι ὄνονται τοὺς χειροτέχνας — he does not say οἱ δὲ Κορίνθιοι οὐκ ὄνονται . . . , and if there was disdain in Corinth, there must have been contempt elsewhere. Only an extreme democracy gave the βάνανσοι a share in the government,⁷ and even here it was only the more successful βάνανσοι. The Thetes at Athens were never made eligible to the higher offices, although they were enfranchised and admitted to the courts in the sixth century. Their service in the navy, an important but never a respected branch of the Greek military service, connected them still more closely with slaves.⁸ For no matter how

ides, make no such distinction, but class all crafts and trades together: Plat. *Rep.* 495d; Xen. *Oec.* 4, 2; Eur. frg. 635 N². Cf. Newman, *Pol. of Arist.*, I, p. 103. Cf. Soc. ap. Xen. *Mem.* 3, 7, 5–6. It is perhaps more probable that Socrates' real view is that of Dem. 57, 45: πολλὰ δουλικὰ καὶ ταπεινὰ πράγματα τοὺς ἐλευθέρους ἡ πενία βιάζεται ποιεῖν.

¹ Xen. *Oec.* 4, 3; Plat. *Legg.* 846de; 807c; Arist. *Pol.* 37b14; 29a1.

² Newman, *Pol. of Arist.*, I, p. 117.

³ *Legg.* 918b–919b.

⁴ G. Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte* (Gotha, 1893–1904), I², p. 646.

⁵ Heraclid. 5, 2 in Müller, *F H G*, II, p. 213; Nicol. Dam. frg. 59 Müller, *F H G*, II, p. 393. This and the above reference are from Ure, *Orig. of Tyr.*, p. 192.

⁶ Hdt. 2, 167.

⁷ Arist. *Pol.* 77b1 ff.

⁸ Cf. Plat. *Legg.* 706b–d.

much pride the moderately well-to-do citizen might take in the navy as a whole, his attitude toward the individual sailor was much the same as the attitude in most modern countries toward common privates or seamen. Thus a theory of the equal merit and value of all occupations never reached an articulate expression in Greece. Even the Sophists, of whom there seemed always to be at least one to uphold any conceivable theory, are not recorded as having proclaimed this equality, although Prodicus showed more sympathy for the despised classes than was common.¹ The prejudice against workers, which had arisen first in the states ruled by exploiting aristocracies, where it extended to all forms of manual labor, had in the other states of Greece, although restricted to banalistic occupations, spread so rapidly during the fifth century that by 400 B.C. it was and remained universal.

IV. THE LEGAL THEORY

'Das Institut der Sklaverei beruht darauf, dass es zwischen verschiedenen Stämmen ein ursprüngliches rechtliches Verhältnis nicht gibt noch geben kann. . . . Wo [religiöse] Voraussetzungen fehlen, ist der Kriegszustand das natürliche Verhältnis zwischen zwei Stämmen; mit dem Stammfeinde, den man in seine Gewalt bekommt, sei es im Kriege, sei es durch Raub oder List, kann man daher machen, was man will. . . . Auch der Stammgenosse kann in dies Verhältnis durch einen Rechtsakt hinabgestossen werden, etwa wegen Schulden oder wegen eines Verbrechens, so gut wie der Stamm ihm das Leben nehmen kann: dadurch wird er aus der Stammgemeinschaft ausgestossen und den Stammfremden gleichgestellt.'² That a foreigner could always be enslaved is too well known to require illustration;³ it remains to examine the causes of enslavement of citizens and the legal status of all slaves.

¹ Prodicus in Mullach, *F P G*, II, p. 139a (cited by Ure, *Orig. of Tyr.*, p. 19).

² Meyer, *Sklaverei*, p. 177.

³ The only apparent exception is Lycurgus' law of ca. 333, which provided μηδενὶ ἔξειναι Ἀθηναίων μηδὲ τῶν οἰκούντων Ἀθήνησιν ἐλεύθερον σῶμα πρίασθαι ἐπὶ δουλείᾳ ἐκ τῶν ἀλισκομένων ἄνευ τῆς τοῦ προτέρου δεσπότου γνώμης: [Plut.] *Vit. X Orat. 7* *Lycurg.* 12 (*Mor.* 841f). It seems certain, however, that the interpretation of M. H. E. Meier, *De vit. Lycurg.*, etc. (Halis, 1847), p. 40, is correct, viz. that this law ap-

In both Athens and Gortyna, the only states of which we have knowledge, great precautions were taken lest a citizen should be illegally enslaved, but in this as in other laws relating to slaves Gortyna is more advanced. Although the seizing and selling of a freeman was in Athens an offense punishable by death,¹ still there was no provision by which the wrongly enslaved person might institute proceedings in his own behalf, and there were no means for preventing the owner of the slave from making away with him before the trial. In Gortyna, on the contrary, enslavement did not automatically involve loss of all civil rights, a principle of which we shall see further illustrations. Here, in case suit was brought on behalf of a slave claiming his enslavement had been illegal, the owner was compelled under penalty of a five-stater fine to produce him at the trial.²

The causes for which a freeman might legally be enslaved varied in the different states of Greece. The chief of these, of course, was debt. In most states the mere fact that a debt was unpaid was itself sufficient reason for enslavement;³ in Athens before Solon's time, however, enslavement followed only if the debtor's body had been pledged as security.⁴ There is, of course, no difference between the latter type of enslavement and simple self-sale, which was fairly common in early times in Athens and elsewhere,⁵ especially

plies only to the fugitives of one state. But even if the other interpretation (e.g. Tarn, *C A H*, VI, p. 443), that it was a general law forbidding enslavement of Greeks, is correct, still it is only an extension of the meaning of *Stammgenosse* from 'fellow-citizen' to 'fellow-Hellene': cf. above, pp. 166 ff.

¹ Dem. 4, 47; Lycurg. ed. B. et S. frg. 61; Arist. *Resp. Ath.* 52, 1.

² *Code of Gortyna* 1, 1 ff.; 10, 25 ff.; E. Zitelmann, *Das Recht von Gortyn, Rh. Mus.* XL (1885), Anhang, p. 79.

³ Diod. Sic. 1, 79, 5; Isoc. 14, 48. Apparently the Athenian oligarchs of 403 passed a regulation to that effect: Lys. 12, 98.

⁴ Plut. *Sol.* 13, 2; *De vitand. Aer. al.* 4, 1 (*Mor.* 828f); Arist. *Resp. Ath.* 2, 2.

⁵ The sale could be for a limited time, indeterminate, or permanent. The cases most closely resembling forfeiture for debt are those where the cause of the sale was poverty, e.g. Hes. *Op. et D.* 600-603; Hdt. 8, 137, 1-2. A case of self-sale for another motive is Eur. *Alc.* 1-2 and Schol. Cf. Darembert et Saglio, *Dictionnaire des antiquités*, etc., IV, p. 1261a; H. Wallon, *Histoire de l'esclavage dans l'antiquité*² (Paris, 1879), I, p. 70.

since Greek mortgages took the form of sales with option of repurchase. The same principle is involved in the sale of children by their father;¹ namely, that a man's soul and body, and those of all persons under his parental authority, were his to do with as he pleased. But since society can for the general interest restrict the rights of the individual, Solon prohibited both the use of the body as security² and the sale of oneself or one's children into slavery.³ An apparent exception in Athens is the fact that a ransomed prisoner remained the slave of his redeemer until the ransom was repaid. But this was not really a case of enslavement by a fellow-citizen: it was the purchase of a slave made by the foreigner with the stipulation that the prisoner had the option of redeeming himself at the price which the ransomer had paid for him.⁴

In Gortyna the absence of any provision for enslavement for debt leads one to believe that it was not permitted. Here again the case of the ransomed prisoner seems, but is not, an exception: it was a loan to the prisoner of the money to ransom himself; apparently a fee or interest could be charged on this loan, and if the loan and interest were not paid, the ransomed person was delivered over to the ransomer for detention but was not made a slave.⁵

The enslavement of a metic or freedman for non-compliance with certain regulations⁶ is based on the general theory of the right to enslave all foreigners and is not a case of penal enslavement, for such a penalty is out of all proportion to the crime involved, e.g.,

¹ Plut. *Sol.* 13, 3.

² Plut. *Sol.* 15, 3; *De vitand. Aer. al.* 4, 1 (*Mor.* 828f).

³ Plut. *Sol.* 13, 3. An exception was made in the case of an unmarried girl who had been detected in relations with a man: *ib.* 23, 2, but this is really criminal rather than civil legislation.

⁴ Dem. 53, 11. This stipulation of the right to purchase oneself at a fixed price is akin to the right of a slave to demand resale if mistreated: Poll. 7, 13 (who quotes Ar. frg. 567 K. (I, p. 536) and Eupolis frg. 225 K. (I, p. 319)); Luc. *Dial.* D. 24, 2; Plut. *De Superstit.* 4 (*Mor.* 166d); Wallon, *Esclavage*, I, p. 314. In such a case there must have been some provision to keep the owner from preventing the sale by demanding an exorbitant price.

⁵ *Code* 6, 46 ff. 'Detention' (*εἶναι ἐπὶ τῷ ἀλλυσαμένῳ*): Zitelmann, p. 166. The fact that the amount was reclaimable only if the ransom was originally requested by the prisoner shows that the transaction was really a loan.

⁶ Harpoc. s.vv. *μετόκιον*; *ἀποστασίον*; [Dem.] 25, 57; Suid. s.v. *ἀποστασίον*.

non-payment of a twelve-drachma tax. The non-compliance with the regulation ended the tenuous legal position of the metic or freedman, and he was then subject to the same treatment as any enemy.

Of cases of enslavement under criminal rather than civil jurisdiction there are only two recorded. The first is the permission under Solon's legislation, already mentioned,¹ for the father to sell his daughter who had been detected in illegal sexual relations. The other is a law of Halicarnassus of *ca.* 457,² providing a settlement of a recent revolution and ordering that anyone attempting to repeal the law should be banished and his property confiscated, but if his property was not worth ten staters, he should be sold outside of Halicarnassus as a slave.³

Such are the various ways by which a freeman, through law and not through violence, could become a slave. It remains to consider the legal position of the slave, the most striking characteristic of which is his lack of legal personality. In Athens this lack was most clearly manifested in the fact that the slave could not bring suit⁴ or, ordinarily, be sued⁵ in his own name; in this he was no different from the foreigner or metic, both of whom had to transact business through a representative. In suits for damages where the master was alleged to have ordered the act and was sued directly the case was simply one of agency and was not at all peculiar to slavery. When the slave was sued in his own name the penalty was whipping,⁶ but the master must have been responsible for restitution of damages if, as was probable, the slave was incapable of this.⁷ At Syrus

¹ Above, p. 178, n. 3.

² W. Dittenberger, *Sylloge Inscr. Gr.*³ (Leipzig, 1915–21), 45, 32 ff.

³ The provision that the sale must be outside Halicarnassus was probably only to prevent civil discord; it was too early for the sentiment against the enslavement of Greeks by Greeks. Cf. the similar practice of the Thracians: Hdt. 5, 6, 1.

⁴ [Dem.] 53, 20; cf. Plat. *Gorg.* 483b.

⁵ J. H. Lipsius, *Das attische Recht*, etc. (Leipzig, 1905–08), pp. 794 ff. If the slave, however, was alleged to have done the damage *sua sponte*, the suit was brought against him directly, but the owner was attacked in the pleading: Lipsius, *op. cit.*, pp. 795–796; Dem. 37, 50–51; cf. below, n. 7.

⁶ Dem. 22, 55; 24, 167.

⁷ Hyperid. ed. Blass³, 5, 22; Lipsius, *Att. Recht*, p. 660. This is the explanation of the phrase *τὸν κληρον διώκειν* in Dem. 37, 51; cf. 55, 31.

the slave was whipped and the master was fined one hundred drachmas for a certain class of offenses.¹ At Andania the slave was both whipped and nominally fined,² although that the master was responsible for the payment of the fine is seen from the provision that if it was not paid he had to compound it by turning over the slave to work it out or else be liable for double the amount.³

The exact identity of the bases of the legal positions of the slave, metic, and foreigner is again shown by the laws concerning murder. The intentional killing of a foreigner or metic, or a slave belonging to another person, was not an offense against human law, for none of these classes possessed rights for the protection of which the state was liable. Yet the taking of a human life was blamable before the gods, no matter whose it was, and the Greek state took care not to offend the gods. Hence such a murder, being like the involuntary killing of a citizen, was tried before the same special court of the *Ephetae* on the Palladium and punished in the same way, by exile.⁴ Moreover, in order that the offense might not go unpunished, since Athens had no public prosecutor, the owner of the slave was obliged by law to prosecute the case.⁵ Nor was this principle violated in the least in the case of one who murdered his own slave.⁶ Since it was inevitable that occasions should arise when the killing of a slave was necessary, the state took no action in such a case, but the underlying idea of responsibility is the same; here, however, the individual is left to his own conscience.⁷ The Spartans alone of all the Greeks denied this fundamental assumption of the sinfulness of all murder.⁸

This view of the law of murder gives us the clue to the interpretation of the law of personal injury. The slave had no political right which was violated in his murder; neither was any political

¹ Ditt. *Syll.*², 680.

² Ditt. *Syll.*³, 736, 76 ff.

³ Lipsius, *Att. Recht*, p. 660, holds that there was a similar provision at Athens for composition by the surrender of the slave, citing Xen. *Hell.* 2, 4, 41. It seems certain, however, that this passage proves the opposite, for if there had been such a provision, Thrasylus would have compared the Athenians to slaves, not dogs.

⁴ Lipsius, *op. cit.*, p. 605: Schol. 2 in Aeschin. 2, 87; Isoc. 18, 52; Arist. *Resp.* *Ath.* 57, 3; cf. Eur. *Hec.* 291–292.

⁵ [Dem.] 47, 70; 72.

⁶ Isoc. 12, 181.

⁷ Antiph. 6, 4.

⁸ Isoc. 12, 181.

right violated when he was physically attacked. Since there was no religious sanction against mere injury inflicted on a man, whether citizen or not, it can be assumed that in general the prohibitions against injuring a slave were in no sense based on any right whatever inherent in him, but on the owner's right of protection for his property, the need of preserving order and educating the citizens in moral excellence,¹ and the continual fear of a revolt. The law forbidding *ὕβρις* against anyone, whether citizen or foreigner, slave or free, is preserved;² the penalty varied from a light fine to death. There was, of course, no protection for the slave against his owner except the religious one of asylum.³

Torture of slaves,⁴ although usually made much of, is in reality quite unimportant. The state could, in a matter of public concern, demand any slave for torture;⁵ since it could subject any foreigner to the same treatment,⁶ this is merely an additional illustration of the fact that the bases of the legal positions of the slave and the foreigner were the same.⁷ The fact that a private citizen could at will torture his own slave⁸ is only a part of his complete powers, based on the slave's lack of any legal rights. And torture was used against slaves in Greece, not 'weil ihnen die Fähigkeit sittlicher Selbstbestimmung abgeht,'⁹ but for the same reason that it has always been used against all except those whose political rights

¹ The latter reason is specifically given by Aeschin. 1, 17; Dem. 21, 46. Cf. Plato's reason for the same provision in his ideal state: *Legg.* 777de.

² Dem. 21, 47. Its authenticity is vindicated by Lipsius, *Att. Recht*, pp. 421–422, comparing Aeschin. 1, 15.

³ Thalheim in Pauly-Wissowa, *Realencyclopädie*, etc., s.v. *Δοῦλοι*: Poll. 7, 13 (cf. above, p. 178, n. 4); Ar. *Eq.* 1312; *Thesm.* 224; cf. Eur. *Herac.* 259–260. The right of demanding resale was religious and could be exercised only in the sanctuary of the Theseum: Poll. *l.c.*; Luc. *Dial. D.* 24, 2.

⁴ The entire subject is treated by Lipsius, *Att. Recht*, pp. 888–895.

⁵ Andoc. 1, 22; 64.

⁶ The principle is stated by Lys. 13, 27. Specific cases: Lys. 3, 33; 13, 54; Dem. 18, 133; Antiph. 1, 20; 5, 49; Thuc. 8, 92, 2; others cited by Lipsius, *Att. Recht*, p. 894, n. 118; p. 895, n. 122.

⁷ Until the archonship of Scamandrius (date unknown) even citizens could be tortured by the state: Andoc. 1, 43; cf. [Dem.] 29, 39.

⁸ Lys. 1, 16; Dem. 40, 15; 48, 16; 48, 18.

⁹ L. V. Schmidt, *Die Ethik d. alt. Griechen* (Berlin, 1882), II, p. 215.

prevented it, namely, because it was thought the surest method of attaining the truth.¹

The slave in Athens, then, is a man, and possessed of all the characteristics inherent in a man as such. He has none of the privileges, rights, and immunities of the citizen and in this he is exactly like the foreigner or metic. He has no legal personality, for this is a peculiarity of the citizen. Hence the foreigner, in becoming a slave, lost nothing, but merely came under the physical control of a master. In the case of the enslavement of a citizen, the loss of rights is to be considered separately and as a prior act to the enslavement, for the rights could be taken without enslavement. Since the slave has no legal rights, the force of the master can be used in any way the latter desires, unless some other specific factor prevents. Thus it is a mistake to insist too strongly on the analogy between the slave and the beast: while the *relations* of master and slave were practically those of owner and property, still this does not necessarily imply any similarity between the slave and other forms of property, a fact of which the average Greek never lost sight.² The emphasis placed by various theorists on the mutual advantage of the relation³ shows this most clearly. It must be kept in mind that there is little difference in theory between the free foreigner and the slave; the only real difference is that the one is in point of fact under the physical control of a master.

The great contrast between the Gortynian system and the Athenian is that the former grants to the slave certain personal privileges which are now thought of as belonging by right to the human being *qua* human, and not to the citizen only. It is, however, impossible to determine whether this status and these privileges were granted in recognition of a right, as an expedient making for easier control of the slave population, or simply out of pure

¹ Dem. 30, 37; Lycurg. 1, 29. But cf. Arist. *Rhet.* 76b32 ff.

² Aristotle comes the closest to denying this, but in so doing, as will be shown, he involves himself in great difficulties; and in admitting that friendship, even if only the analog of true friendship (*Eth. Eud.* 42a28 ff.), can exist between master and slave (*Pol.* 55b12 ff.; *Eth. Nic.* 61b5 ff.), he admits this distinction between the slave and other forms of property.

³ Below, p. 187.

humanitarianism. In most respects, e.g., the responsibility of the master for damages done by a slave,¹ the slave's representation in court and in all formal acts elsewhere by the master,² and the frequent repetition in various cases of the provision that the witnesses required must be free,³ the law is the same as the Athenian.

But there are considerable differences. The slave was permitted to acquire more property in his own right than was usual at Athens, for fines were provided up to one hundred staters.⁴ This property was apparently not subject to confiscation by the master,⁵ as it was under Roman and Athenian law. The slave had even a right of inheritance in his master's property if other heirs were lacking,⁶ 'eine Bestimmung, die neu und hochbedeutsam ist.'⁷ Most important of all, however, is the fact that in Gortyna the slave is granted full family rights. The slave family was not merely a permitted union, but a full legal entity⁸ with regular marriage.⁹ The father is the head during his life, and his sons assume control on his death; daughters belong to the family as long as they are unmarried; after marriage they enter the family of their husbands.¹⁰ The sanctity of this slave family is recognized and, if only by small penalties, protected.¹¹ Finally, no restrictions were placed on slave marriages: if two slaves belonged to different masters, the consent of the latter was not necessary to marriage,¹² and a slave could marry even a free woman.¹³ 'In der Hauptsache gleiches Recht wie für die freien Familien gilt auch für die Häuslerfamilien, nur dass hier überall die Gewalt des Hausvorstandes, weil derselbe Häusler ist, durch seinen Herrn ausgeübt wird.'¹⁴ Although this,

¹ *Code* 7, 10 ff.; cf. Zitelmann, pp. 167 ff.

² *Code* 1, 14; 2, 32; 43; 3, 54; 4, 5. Zitelmann, p. 64 and n. 42; pp. 79; 103.

³ *Code, passim.* Does this imply that in all cases where it is not specified that witnesses shall be free, slaves may be admitted?

⁴ *Code* 2, 2 ff.

⁵ Zitelmann, p. 64; *Code* 3, 42 ff.; 4, 35 ff.

⁶ *Code* 5, 27.

⁷ Zitelmann, p. 64.

⁸ *Id.*, pp. 114–115.

⁹ *Code* 2, 27; 3, 41; 4, 4; cf. Zitelmann, *l.c.*

¹⁰ Zitelmann, pp. 113; 115.

¹¹ *Code* 2, 2 ff.

¹² Zitelmann, p. 113, from *Code* 4, 3–6.

¹³ *Code* 7, 3.

¹⁴ Zitelmann, pp. 108–109.

as has been said, cannot be advanced as conclusive proof concerning the theory of slavery held by the Gortynians, yet the thoroughly regularized and legal status of the slave family is at least a strong indication in favor of the view that the privileges of the Gortynian slave were due chiefly to an admission that these rights were inherent in him as a human being. If this assumption is correct, it is the first example in history of the holding of such a theory, not by a few individuals but by an entire state.

V. POPULAR THEORIES

The examination of the developed legal codes of Athens and Gortyna has revealed the ‘popular theory,’ if it is proper to speak of such a thing, in practically its final form. In discussing these codes at this stage the chronological treatment of the subject has been abandoned in the hope of securing greater clarity. It still remains, therefore, to discuss the fragmentary evidence bearing on the development of the views seen in the two codes. Unfortunately, since there was no single line of development culminating in a single, universally accepted belief, it will be necessary to insert in their chronological places certain divergent theories, some of which seem to have neither predecessor nor follower. After this development has been traced to the time of the formation of the legal systems, the later popular expressions of the usual theory will be followed; the more complete and systematic justifications of Plato and Aristotle will be discussed in the sixth and seventh sections, and after these the arguments against the institution will be set forth.

In the Homeric world slaves were simply accepted as facts. The master was aware of his unlimited power and used it when he thought fit, but there is no evidence that he ever sought to justify it with a theoretical basis. Since it rested purely on force, it follows that the slave was not assumed *a priori* to be inferior in any other quality but that;¹ for this reason association with slaves in

¹ Plato's opinion (*Legg.* 776e-777a) notwithstanding: cf. Wallon, *Esclavage*, I, p. 361; Meyer, *Sklaverei*, p. 184.

household tasks was not deemed condescension.¹ It was fully recognized that a slave could possess the highest virtues,² but unless a slave had earned respect by individual merit, he was regarded as merely a piece of property.³ It was during the rise of the aristocracies that the new element entered which was to be so characteristic of almost all later thought. As has been seen, an attitude of contempt for labor and a classification of certain tasks as 'slavish' grew up during this period, and it was now that the theory appeared that a slave was by nature fitted for slavery and nothing else. This belief was amazingly confused with ideas on the physical appearance of slaves, and that was taken to be proof of their character.⁴ By Solon's time slavery had come to be looked on as worse than death.⁵

Some time after this Heraclitus propounded a unique theory. Holding that strife was necessary for existence, he believed that in the sociological field this strife must take the form of war, and slavery, the universal concomitant of war, was thus justified.⁶ *τῷ μὲν θεῷ καλὰ πάντα καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ δίκαια, ἄνθρωποι δὲ ἡ μὲν ἀδίκα ὑπειλήφασιν ἡ δὲ δίκαια.*⁷

There is no further evidence for this theory, and until the latter part of the fifth century all that can be found are further illustrations of the usual contempt for slaves, important because it was to be the real basis of the later theory of natural slavery. In 472 Aeschylus in his *Persae*⁸ shows the effect of this common feeling

¹ Incidents illustrating this: Hom. *ξ* 71 ff.; *π* 140 ff. A slave raised with the owner's own daughter: *ο* 363 ff.; *σ* 322 f. Warm affection between slave and master: *ρ* 31 ff.

² E.g., *ο* 351; 365; 370.

³ Odysseus, in complaining of the damage done by the suitors, puts the damage to the house first, the rape of the maids second: Hom. *χ* 35-37.

⁴ See especially Theognis 535-538.

⁵ Punishment by enslavement was abolished, although many offenses were still punished by death: Daremberg et Saglio, IV, p. 1261ab. Cf. the oath before the battle of Plataea, if it is genuine: *οὐ ποιήσομαι περὶ τλείονος τὸ ζῆν τῆς ἐλευθερίας*: Lycurg. 1, 81. Cf. Plat. *Gorg.* 483b. Compare with this attitude Achilles' famous speech to Odysseus: Hom. *λ* 488-491.

⁶ Gomperz, I, pp. 60 ff. See especially Heraclit. ed. Diels, *Frag. Vorsok.*⁵, frg. 53 (I, p. 162).

⁷ Heraclit. ed. Diels frg. 102 (I, p. 173).

⁸ 355.

when he calls Themistocles' messenger to the Persian king an ἀνήρ "Ελλην, 'als wäre es zu viel Ehre' for a slave¹ 'als Träger einer so folgenschweren Mission von der Bühne herab genannt zu werden.'² In the next generation Sophocles, in his earlier plays, follows the lead of Aeschylus and makes the slave roles unsympathetic. In the *Ajax*,³ for example, Agamemnon voices the greatest contempt for all slaves. But already the attacks on the institution were commencing; the period had ended in which there was only a state of mind concerning the slaves and the time had begun when definite theories, incomplete as they might be, were gaining general acceptance. There is no longer, therefore, a consecutive development of any sort, and the remainder of this section will be taken up with a discussion of the various schools.

The beginnings of the theory of 'natural slavery'⁴ lay in the early scorn of the physical appearance of slaves, combined with which was the belief that the tasks performed by slaves were in themselves both physically and morally degrading. These two factors — both, of course, utterly illogical confusions of cause and effect — led to generalizations concerning the whole class of slaves such as that found in Euripides,⁵ who as usual presents both sides of the case:

οὐτω γὰρ κακὸν δούλων γένος.
γαστὴρ ἄπαντα, τούπισω δ' οὐδὲν σκοπεῖ.

The character of the slave was completely without honor, shame, or any sound element at all (*ὑγίεις οὐδέν*).⁶ So evil was his nature that Charon even refused to carry a slave in his ferry, according to Aristophanes,⁷ and in Sparta the slave was considered baser than thieves and criminals.⁸ It was admitted, of course, that occasion-

¹ Hdt. 8, 75, 1.

² J. Schmidt, *Der Sklave bei Euripides* (Prog., Grimma, 1892), I, p. 95.

³ *Id.*, p. 99. Soph. *Ai.* 1228 ff.; 1235; 1289.

⁴ This term is used to mean that theory which held that an individual was definitely designed by nature for either slavery or freedom.

⁵ Frg. 49 N²; cf. *Or.* 1115; frg. 86.

⁶ Plat. *Legg.* 776e; Dem. 8, 51; [Dem.] 10, 27.

⁷ *Ran.* 190.

⁸ Isoc. 12, 214.

ally cases occurred where a person deserving of freedom was enslaved,¹ but obviously these did not prejudice the theory.

Of course, the rule of a natural inferior by his superior should result in mutual advantage,² and mutual advantage should bring satisfaction on both sides. This common benefit was taken by some to be the only justification of slavery, and the presence of good will was the proof of its presence. The Pythagoreans had first proclaimed³ that *τοὺς μὲν . . . ἄρχοντας . . . οὐ μόνον ἐπιστήμονας ἀλλὰ καὶ φιλανθρώπους δεῖν εἶναι, καὶ τοὺς ἄρχομένους οὐ μόνον πειθηνίους ἀλλὰ καὶ φιλάρχοντας*. An echo of this doctrine appears in Gorgias,⁴ and Xenophon frequently expresses⁵ the opinion that the master must rule so as to make the slave *εὖνοος* to him. A group of men mentioned by Aristotle appear, if it is possible correctly to interpret his confused account of their doctrines, to have held that a just rule of slaves was marked, not by the conditions under which it was established or by the character of the parties involved, but by the presence of *εὖνοια*.⁶ Thus the essence of this doctrine is not that *εὖνοια per se* justifies slavery, but that its presence proves that the relation is advantageous to both parties, and hence, practically by definition, is just.

From the theory that certain men, and only these men, were naturally fitted for slavery, there was bound to arise the belief that those who were not slaves by nature should not, even could not, be enslaved. The natural belief that the group of which one is a member is superior to other groups, and thus unfit for slavery,⁷ tended to make this inference effective first in opposing the enslavement of one's fellow-citizens; the results in this field have already been observed.⁸ But there has also been observed the growth of a feeling that all the Greeks formed one nation, and it was thus in-

¹ Soph. frg. 854 N²; Eur. frg. 831 N².

² [Plat.] *I Alcib.* 135bc; Menan. frg. 1093 K. (III, p. 265).

³ Aristox. frg. 18 Müller, *F H G*, II, p. 278a.

⁴ Plat. *Phil.* 58b.

⁵ *Mem.* 1, 2, 10; *Cyrop.* 3, 1, 28; 8, 2, 4.

⁶ See Appendix.

⁷ Dem. 8, 60; [Dem.] 10, 62.

⁸ E.g., in the growing restrictions on the enslavement of citizens for debt and in the right of the ransomed prisoner to purchase his freedom.

evitable that there should come a conviction that no one should enslave a fellow-Hellene. It is to be noticed that this opposition to the enslavement of Greeks is a product of the theory of natural slavery and not of the theory of the injustice of all slavery. Callicratidas' statement¹ at the siege of Methymna in 406, that no Greek would be enslaved if he could prevent it, shows at least that there were at that time a large number who would approve such a course. Plato adopted this theory definitely and emphatically.² Epaminondas and Pelopidas enslaved no Greeks,³ but freed the Messenians.⁴ There was general compassion for the Greeks enslaved by Philip at the capture of Olynthus,⁵ and dislike for anyone who accepted any of them as a present;⁶ the Athenians probably prohibited by law the purchase of any freeman so enslaved.⁷

The opposite of this theory of natural slavery is the admission that the institution rests on nothing but superior force. This, however, is by no means equivalent to an admission that it is unjust. Already about the time of the Persian wars Pindar was proclaiming the rule of the stronger to be just.⁸ The enslavement of the Helots and Messenians was admittedly based purely on force and it was an enslavement of Greeks, yet in Plato's time many approved it as *εὐ γεγονόντα*.⁹ The Athenians who argued¹⁰ against the Melians in 416 and a large group of lawyers and *σοφοί* of Aristotle's time¹¹ would certainly have held that slavery—or practically anything else—was justified by the ability to enforce it. Against these were ranged, with Plato¹² and Isocrates¹³ at their head, another group of lawyers and *σοφοί* who denied flatly that mere superior force gave any title whatever to rule.

The strongest proponents of the doctrine of the rule of force were the Sophists, whose general position was that everyone had

¹ Xen. *Hell.* 1, 6, 14.

² See below, p. 191.

³ Plut. *Pelop. et Marc. Comp.* 1, 1.

⁵ Aeschin. 2, 156.

⁴ Paus. 4, 26.

⁶ Dem. 19, 305–309.

⁷ [Plut.] *Vit. X Orat.* 7 *Lycurg.* 12 (*Mor.* 841f); Meier, *Vit. Lycurg.*, pp. 39–41; cf. above p. 176, n. 3.

⁸ Plat. *Legg.* 690bc; *Gorg.* 484b.

⁹ Plat. *Legg.* 776c.

¹⁰ Thuc. 5, 89.

¹¹ See Appendix.

¹² *Legg.* 690c.

¹³ 8, 69.

the right to follow his own inclinations if he had the power.¹ Callicles affirms violently and repeatedly that the stronger is identical with the better and that his rule over the weaker is according to the only just law, that of nature.² But as Socrates here points out to Callicles, this doctrine becomes hopelessly self-contradictory if it is not restricted to individuals; if Callicles had been dialectically pressed, he would probably have said that it was just for an individual to keep other men enslaved, but unjust for a state to keep a group in slavery.

There remain two justifications, so simple as scarcely to deserve the name of theories. The first is an application of the basic assumption of ordinary Greek ethics, that one should requite both wrongs and benefactions in kind.³ On this principle it would be eminently just to enslave one's enemies, and Socrates states this as if no reasonable man could be expected to raise a question.⁴ Another school, probably a small one, advanced an argument identifying justice and legality; since there was no doubt that it was legal to enslave prisoners of war, it was *ipso facto* just.⁵ Both these theories can be extended to include slaves other than prisoners of war by application of the principle that the normal relation between all states was that of war.

Thus until the enlightenment of the later fifth century there was no attempt to formulate a theory of slavery. At first a slave was looked upon much as any other human being, whose esteem was regulated by his merits. With the growth of scorn for certain tasks as slavish, there soon arose the need for a justification of the practice of forcing certain men to perform these tasks, and chief among the theories advanced was that based on the common prejudice against the barbarian, the theory of 'natural slavery,' to which both Plato and Aristotle adhered. But before examining the positions of these two, the curious and unique verses of Philemon⁶

¹ Zeller, I ii⁶, p. 1395.

² Plat. *Gorg.* 483d; 488b; 488d.

³ E.g., Eur. *Med.* 807–810; Sol. ed. Diehl frg. 1, 5–6.

⁴ Xen. *Mém.* 2, 2, 2.

⁵ See Appendix.

⁶ Frg. 31 K. (II, p. 486).

should be noted, where the entire universe is viewed as a hierarchy of slavery, in which one's place on the scale mattered but little.

'Εμοῦ γάρ ἔστι κύριος μὲν εἰς ἀνήρ·
τούτων δὲ καὶ σοῦ μυρίων τ' ἄλλων νόμος,
ἔτέρων τύραννος, τῶν τυραννούντων φόβος.
δοῦλοι βασιλέων εἰσίν, οἱ βασιλεὺς θεῶν,
οἱ θεὸς Ἀνάγκης. πάντα δ', ἀν σκοπῆς, ὅλως
ἔτέρων πέφυκεν ἡττον', ὃν δὲ μεῖζονα.
τούτοις ἀνάγκη ταῦτα δουλεύειν ἀεί.

VI. PLATO

Plato, as has been said, is an adherent of the school believing in 'natural slavery,' but his conception of the natural slave differs greatly from that of most of the other members of the school. It is not, as Aristotle later stated,¹ ὅστιν ἔστιν ἔργον ἡ τοῦ σώματος χρῆσις, καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστ' ἀπ' αὐτῶν βέλτιστον, but τοὺς δὲ ἐν ἀμαθίᾳ τε αὖ καὶ ταπεινότητι πολλῇ κυλινδουμένους whom his statesman εἰς τὸ δουλικὸν ὑποζεύγνυσι γένος.² In his *Republic*,³ those who are without the θεῖον ἄρχον, but not sunk in an excess of moral baseness, are to be citizens, not slaves. Thus three classes are distinguished, the highest of which is subdivided in the state into two parts. The first class, which includes the rulers and soldiers in his *Republic*, possess full moral excellence and are capable in private affairs of self-rule; those not possessing this capability are to be ruled by the wise and good,⁴ but the closeness of the rule will vary with the degree of incapability. To Plato, the *βάναυσος* is capable of personal self-rule, but not of the higher activities of politics and government; the slave is capable of neither. The inferior character of both these classes and the superior character of the full citizens tend very strongly to be hereditary;⁵ exceptions, however, do occur⁶ and, at least in the case of the artisans and probably in that of the slaves, provision is made to remedy any maladjustments.⁷

¹ *Pol.* 54b17 ff.

² *Plat. Polit.* 309a.

³ 463ab; cf. 442c; 552a.

⁴ *Id.* 590cd, comparing 463ab.

⁵ *Crat.* 394a.

⁶ *Ib.*

⁷ *Rep.* 415.

Although Plato concurred with the common views of his time in holding that as a rule Greeks should not be enslaved by Greeks, still he differed from most others in holding this theory with reservations and for different reasons than usual. The Greeks, he believed, were all one nation and hence a war among them, being between *οἰκεῖοι καὶ ἔνγγεις*, was *στάσις* and not *πόλεμος*. For this reason any such war should be prosecuted with the greatest moderation and ended as soon as possible. All permanent damages, even to property, should be avoided. In fact, all except the ring-leaders of the opposing faction are really the friends of those on the just and right side, and hence, when those leaders have been duly punished, no further vengeance should be taken.¹ It is for this reason that Greek prisoners of war are not to be enslaved in a body; there is, however, no evidence to show that Plato believed that no Greek was fit for slavery.

The slave has no 'human rights'; he is lacking in the most essentially human element of the soul. If a man kills his own slave, it is true, he should make expiation; but since the only penalty for killing another's slave is to pay double the value, it would seem that the only reason for the former provision is to delude the citizen into a belief which will prevent intemperance of any sort.² For the same reason, and also in order to make the slave population less troublesome in the city, slaves are not to be treated cruelly or flippantly, but firmly and in a dignified manner: by such conduct the character of the master himself is improved.³

The superficiality of this discussion of slavery is quite simply explained.⁴ The chief end of the Platonic as of the Aristotelian state is the attainment of moral perfection on the part of the citizens — in the case of the *Republic* the two upper classes. Plato is very nearly taking the simple view that whatever contributed to the attainment of this goal is *ipso facto* just and requires no further discussion.

¹ *Id.* 469b-471c. On the enslavement of friends cf. Socrates *ap.* Xen. *Mem.* 2,

^{2, 2.}

² Legg. 868a.

³ *Id.* 777d-778a.

⁴ E. Barker, in *C A H*, VI, p. 522.

VII. ARISTOTLE

Aristotle, as has been shown, followed the common conservative prejudice in admitting to his state only those whose leisure and training were sufficient to enable them to contribute their share to its functioning and to enjoy the benefits which it could confer.¹ For this reason certain tasks were to be given to non-citizen artisans (*βάναυσοι*), others to slaves; any task unfitting for a citizen would be given to that one of these two classes for which its nature rendered it appropriate. None of the productive industries are to be in the hands of slaves,² but they are presumably to be run by free *τεχνῖται*. The expediency of slavery for society is taken for granted; in fact, almost none of the ancient critics of slavery claimed that it was harmful in any other way than as a violation of the personal rights of the slave.³

Since the slave is not to come in any way into direct contact with the state, he is really more a matter of concern for the household, where he is of primary importance.⁴ *Oeconomy* is an art with a definite purpose, and like all other arts of that sort requires for its performance its proper tools; but the inanimate tools will not perform their functions by themselves. If they would there would be no need of slavery, but since they will not, the slave, who puts all the other tools into use, is *ώσπερ ὄργανον πρὸ ὄργανων*.⁵ Any *ὄργανον πρακτικόν*, however, is a *κτῆμα*,⁶ and hence the slave is a *κτῆμα*,⁷ although a *κτῆμα ἔμψυχον*,⁸ and part of the *κτῆσις*,⁹ the whole purpose of which is to aid in the enjoyment of life and not in production. The government of slaves is thus a part of the *κτητικὴ τέχνη* and not connected with that section of *oeconomy* which deals with the government of the other members of the household.¹⁰ And like other tools, the function of the slave is purely physical — in exactly

¹ *Pol.* 69a34 ff.; 28b37 ff.

² *Pol.* 54a1 ff. But there seems to be an inconsistency when Aristotle (*id.* 30a25 ff.) recommends slaves for agriculture, certainly a productive occupation.

³ Below, p. 199.

⁴ *Pol.* 53b3 ff.

⁵ *Pol.* 53b32 f.

⁶ *Pol.* 54a16 ff.

⁷ *Oec.* 44a23 f.

⁸ *Pol.* 53b32.

⁹ *Pol.* 56a2 f.

¹⁰ For this whole paragraph, *Pol.* 53b23 ff.

the same class, although differing in certain respects, as the function of beasts.¹

The man who is qualified to fill this position will be the natural slave,² and his qualifications must now be described. Physically he will approach the brute, with strength suited to the tasks he will have to perform, but not with the erect physique of the citizen. This, however, is only of minor importance; the real test of such a person is not so much that he is physically fitted for the task, but that he is mentally and morally unsuited for anything else; and sometimes the soul of a slave may be found in the body of a freeman.³ Such men are to be slaves, just as men with slave bodies but free souls are to be free.⁴

The definite mark of the slave is his lack of *τὸ βουλευτικόν*⁵ (the faculty of deliberating and considering in advance) and *προαιρεσίς*⁶ (the exercise of deliberate choice based on this previous consideration), two qualities greatly different from and much superior to mere cleverness or ingenuity.⁷ As to what share in reason the slave actually has, however, Aristotle is inconsistent within the limits of one sentence. He says:⁸ ὅσοι μὲν οὖν τοσοῦτον διεστᾶσιν ὅσον ψυχὴ σώματος καὶ ἄνθρωπος θηρίου (διάκεινται τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ὅσων ἔστιν ἔργον ἡ τοῦ σώματος χρῆσις καὶ τοῦτ' ἔστ' ἀπ' αὐτῶν βέλτιστον), οὗτοι μέν εἰσι φύσει δοῦλοι . . . ἔστι γὰρ φύσει δοῦλος . . . ὁ κοινωνῶν λόγου τοσοῦτον ὅσον αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἔχειν· τὰ γὰρ ἀλλαζόμενα οὐ λόγῳ αἰσθανόμενα ἀλλὰ παθήμασιν ὑπηρετεῖ. In other words, he simultaneously grants to the slave a participation in reason and denies it to him utterly, making him a mere body. His entire thought on this point is hopelessly confused: the slave was *κτῆμά τι ἐμψυχον*; now he is

¹ *Pol.* 54b24 ff.

² *Pol.* 54b16 ff.

³ *Pol.* 54b27 ff.

⁴ *Pol.* 54b37 f.

⁵ *Pol.* 60a12.

⁶ As Newman, *Pol. of Arist.*, III, p. 201, concludes, comparing *Pol.* 60a12 with *Phys.* 97b6 ff.

⁷ There is no contradiction in the granting to Asiatics of *διάνοια* (*Pol.* 27b27 f.) and the denial to slaves of the ability *τῇ διανοίᾳ προορᾶν* (*ib.* 52a31 ff.). The difficulty is one of language: the *διάνοια* of the Asiatics is inventiveness, ingenuity; that of the *φύσει ἄρχων* is the ability to decide rightly a high moral question.

⁸ *Pol.* 54b16 ff.

only *σῶμα*.¹ But, while he does not fully possess (*ἔχειν*) reason (*λόγος*), he participates in it (*κοινωνεῖν*),² and it is a part of the *ψυχή* which is involved.³

Criticism is ordinarily directed at Aristotle's remarks on friendship between masters and slaves; they can, as will be shown, be easily explained, and their inconsistencies are only the surface manifestations of the real difficulties and contradictions at the very base of Aristotle's idea of the characteristics of the natural slave. His account can be made consistent by assuming that he meant that the slave is like a man in possessing a part of the *ψυχή*, like a beast in lacking part of it, and is of neither species completely, but *sui generis*.⁴

The virtue⁵ of such a partial man will be only a partial virtue. As a tool he has, of course, the *ἀρετάι* proper to that tool for the performance of its functions; the only question is *πότερον ἔστιν ἀρετή τις δούλου παρὰ τὰς ὄργανικὰς καὶ διακονικὰς ἄλλη τιμιωτέρα τούτων, οἷον σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων ἔξεων, η̄ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδεμία παρὰ τὰς σωματικὰς ὑπηρεσίας*.⁶ Since the slave is an animate tool, he must have the moral virtues (*ἔξεις*) necessary for *ἀρχεσθαι καλῶς*; his *ἀρεταῖ* as a tool are merely those of his physical frame. He cannot participate fully in all the moral virtues, for to do so would be to exhibit that *καλοκαγαθία* which is the mark of the citizen, and he has no need for this; he needs only such virtues as will enable him to fulfill his purpose: to serve his master without inefficiency caused by *ἀκολασία* or *δειλία*. To this extent, then, he will participate in the moral virtues; the master will be the inculcator of these (*τῆς τοιαύτης ἀρετῆς αἴτιον*), undoubtedly through both precept and example; in the slave they will come to be automatic.⁷

¹ *Eth. Nic.* 61a34 f.; *Eth. Eud.* 41b17 ff.

² *Pol.* 54b22 f.; 60b5 ff.

³ *Eth. Nic.* 02b23 ff.

⁴ Of course under modern psychology such a distinction is impossible: differences between minds are of degree, not of kind (*εἴδει*). Aristotle would have recognized that this fact alone would upset his whole theory: *Pol.* 59b36 ff.

⁵ This paragraph largely follows L. Schiller, *Die Lehre des Arist. von d. Sklaverei* (Prog., Erlangen, 1847), p. 10. ⁶ *Pol.* 59b22 ff.

⁷ The problem of the virtue of the slave is very fully discussed in the long passage (*Pol.* 59b26-60b5) following that quoted in the text.

The slave, being only a *κτῆμα*, is like a *μόριον* of the master and thus has no existence apart, but only in reference to the whole.¹ He is apparently a part only of the *σῶμα* of the master and not of his *ψυχή*,² and thus his rule by his master is that of the *σῶμα* by the *ψυχή*, a despotic rule; the rule of the *λόγον* part of the soul by the *λόγον* *ἔχον* is, on the contrary, political and royal.³ It is probably this fact which has led Aristotle into the confusion noticed above concerning the nature of the slave: in relation to his master *qua* master, which is the converse of the relation of the master to the slave *qua* slave, he is *ἄψυχος* and only a part of the master's body; but in relation to the master *qua* man, the converse of the relation of the master to the slave *qua* man, — the essential point being that here they are considered as two individuals, whereas in the former case they are considered as *ὅλον* and *μέρος*, — he is *ἔμψυχος*. But this explanation, the best I can give, is not adequate: the *ἔξεις* exist in the *ψυχή*, not in the *σῶμα*; but the *ἔξεις* are necessary for the performance of his functions *qua* slave. This, then, is the ultimate cause of Aristotle's chief error: he tried to alter the common doctrine of slavery by making the slave only a part of the master, and to make one man part of another is, apparently, logically impossible.⁴ The necessary granting of *ψυχή* to the slave really indicates that his relation to his master should have been defined as that of the reasonable part of the soul (*λόγος*) to the unreasonable (*όρεξις*), absolute (*βασιλική*) but non-arbitrary (*πολιτική*).⁵

Thus we come to the problem of the possibility of friendship between the master and the slave. I believe that Aristotle's meaning here is quite simple: it would be also lucid were it not obscured by his contradictions concerning the nature of the slave. The slave, not having part of the soul, is not fully a man; true friendship can

¹ *Pol.* 54a8 ff.; 55b11 f.

² *Pol.* 55b9 ff.

³ Relations of parts of the soul and of the soul and the body: *Pol.* 54b4 ff. Relation of master and slave: *id.* 55b6 ff.; *Eth. Nic.* 6ob29.

⁴ Newman, *Pol. of Arist.*, I, p. 150, believes the difficulty lies in reconciling the two aspects of man and property. This would cause no trouble; the difficulty enters when Aristotle makes this form of property — which, as has been shown, was not in the common view identical with other forms — exactly like the others in being a part of the owner.

⁵ *Pol.* 54b2 ff.

exist only between men and hence not between man and slave. But the slave is also, having part of the soul, partly a man, and in proportion to the extent to which he is a man (*καθ' ὅσον ἀνθρωπός*) friendship towards him can exist, although it is only the *ἀνάλογον* of true friendship.¹ The confusion enters because Aristotle thinks of the slave as both having and not having a soul absolutely instead of partially: in his capacity of slave he is *ἄψυχος* — although, as has been shown, even in that capacity he employs his *ψυχή* — and hence *qua* slave there is no friendship; forgetting that to be a slave he must still be a man, Aristotle makes the aspect of man separate and says friendship exists with him only *qua* man. The underlying thought, however, is clear and simple: it is exactly what we mean when we say we are ‘on friendly terms with’ a person whom we would never own as a friend.

A final definition of the natural slave may now be advanced; this definition will not be Aristotle's, but it is the essence of Aristotle's doctrine made as consistent as possible. The natural slave is a being having that part of the soul (the *παθητικὸν μόριον*; *τὸ ἄλογον*) which shares in reason (*λόγου κοινωνεῖν*) to the extent of perceiving it (*αἰσθάνεσθαι*); he lacks that part (*τὸ βουλευτικόν*) which possesses reason fully (*λόγον ἔχειν*) and enables moral choice (*προαιρεσίς*) in advance of action (*τῇ διανοίᾳ προορᾶν*). Thus he is neither a man, who is distinguished by full possession of the soul, nor a beast (*θηρίον*), which is distinguished by its absence, but is *sui generis*. His whole function is to be a tool (*ὄργανον*) and possession (*κτῆμα*) of his master; considered in this aspect he is a part (*μέρος*) of his master, and, since he performs only physical tasks, a part only of the master's physical nature (*σῶμα*). But since he is a self-acting tool, he differs from other tools, and even in his actions in that capacity employs his *ψυχή*.

For such a creature to be enslaved is of benefit to him as well as his master,² for everything is benefited only by fulfilling its function, by reaching the *ἐνέργεια* in accordance with its own *ἀρετή*. No attention, therefore, is paid consciously to the good of the slave; the master looks out for himself alone, but the relation is so intimate

¹ *Pol.* 55b9 ff.; *Eth. Nic.* 61a32 ff.; *Eth. Eud.* 42a28 ff.

² *Pol.* 54b6 ff.

that a harm to one must be a harm to the other and the good of one likewise a good for the other.¹ Such is the natural slave. πότερον δ' ἔστι τις φύσει τοιοῦτος η̄ οὐ, καὶ πότερον βέλτιον καὶ δίκαιόν τινι δουλεύειν η̄ οὐ, ἀλλὰ πᾶσα δουλεία παρὰ φύσιν ἔστι, μετὰ ταῦτα σκεπτέον. οὐ χαλεπὸν δὲ καὶ τῷ λόγῳ θεωρῆσαι καὶ ἐκ τῶν γινομένων καταμαθεῖν.² The first part of the proof will, then, be *a priori* and deduced chiefly from analogies.

The distinction of ruler and ruled exists throughout nature, even in inanimate objects and abstract principles.³ Within an animal, this is the relation between the soul and body, or between reason and the passions.⁴ The same relation obtains between man and woman.⁵ Since the type of rule naturally depends on the characters of the ruler and the ruled, it follows that if two men differ ὥστε ψυχὴ σώματος καὶ ἀνθρώπος θηρίου, the relation between them should be the same as that between the members of those two pairs.⁶ Apparently the argument now continues: All those whose sole function is the use of the body differ from complete men by this much;⁷ there are (or, since Aristotle is arguing *τῷ λόγῳ*, does he mean: there must be?) men whose sole function is the use of the body;⁸ therefore there are men who should stand in relation to other men as body to soul. This argument is utterly invalid, and its fallacy lies in the major premise: no man can remain a man and be completely lacking in *ψυχή*, and therefore no man can differ from the complete man by the difference between *σῶμα* and *χυτή*. On the contrary, it has been shown (above, pp. 193 ff.) that men whose sole function is the use of the body employ a part of the soul in performing this function; they differ from complete men, therefore, by as much as the complete soul from the part which only shares in reason. The assumption of the minor premise, that men exist whose sole function is the use of the body, is at least possible. The conclusion will be, then, that there are men fit for the rule

¹ *Pol.* 78b32 ff.; cf. 55b9 ff.

² *Pol.* 54a17 ff.

³ *Pol.* 54a21 ff. Cf. *Philem.* frg. 31 K. (II, p. 486; quoted in text above, p. 190).

⁴ *Pol.* 54a34 ff.

⁵ *Pol.* 54b13 f.

⁶ *Pol.* 54b16 ff.

⁷ *Ib.*

⁸ This premise is apparently left to be assumed.

of the reasoning part of the soul over the ἄλογον portion, a rule which is *βασιλικὴ καὶ πολιτικὴ*.

Aristotle almost fails to take up the proof *ἐκ τῶν γινομένων*. He has already confessed that a slavish body, easy to distinguish, is no valid test;¹ the nature of the person's soul is to be the only criterion, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὅμοιως ῥάδιον ἰδεῖν τό τε τῆς ψυχῆς κάλλος καὶ τὸ τοῦ σώματος.² It is no wonder that it is hard to tell: Aristotle has assumed that the slave is completely lacking in a part of the soul, when all that there actually was to differentiate men was a difference in degree of intelligence. This very difficulty should have led him to the realization that no difference *εἴδει* existed. The differences which he did remark between slaves and freemen, between natural slaves and natural citizens, are rather the effect of slavery or the simple evidence of a low level of culture than signs of native fitness for slavery or unfitness for a higher culture. In reality his only argument is the simple assertion that all barbarians are natural slaves.³ This assertion, however, in view of its general acceptance by the Greeks, might be called an argument *ἐκ τῶν γινομένων* valid for his age. But some Greeks are to be enslaved, or at least will be by nature slaves,⁴ and how these are to be recognized he does not say. Probably the test would be their ability to perform any function not purely physical. This slavish character tends to be hereditary, but cases occur where good parents have inferior offspring and so perhaps also where slavish parents have free children;⁵ in the case of barbarians, however, it is apparently assumed that no exceptions will occur. The entire argument must strike any reader as an evasion. Aristotle concedes to the objectors that some are actually enslaved who should not be,⁶ but he does not give the impression of being very greatly interested in bringing about the remedy of this situation, although he was probably

¹ *Pol.* 54b27 ff.

² *Pol.* 54b38 ff.

³ *Pol.* 52b5 ff.; 55a28 f.; see above, pp. 168; 170.

⁴ *Pol.* 55b1 ff.; cf. 83a36 f.

⁵ *Pol.* 55b1 ff. Since, however, all barbarians are slaves by nature, the only chance for a rise in status would be in the children of Hellenic parents who had fallen into the class of natural slaves.

⁶ *Pol.* 55a5 f.

anxious that slaves of really eminent abilities should be freed. His only real concern is to justify the existence in his ideal state of the class of slaves necessary for its proper functioning.

VIII. THE CRITICISM OF SLAVERY

It is impossible to give a satisfactory discussion of those attacks on slavery which were the cause of the various justifications that have been set forth above, for of all these criticisms there are only three surviving scraps: a sentence of Alcidamas, a reference in Aristotle, and an echo in Philemon. And with such scanty material, it is impossible to follow the arguments of the critics; about all that can be done is to show that they existed. Of criticisms of the institution not as unjust but as undesirable socially there is just one: the Phocians violently disliked Mnason, the friend of Aristotle, because his thousand slaves 'deprived so many citizens of their necessary sustenance.'¹ While it might be argued that slavery was responsible for the generally low standard of living of the laboring classes in Greece, nevertheless it is a fact that there is not a single ancient statement of such a belief.

Many writers protested against slavery as it was, without having the least doubt of the justice of the institution if properly applied. Euripides is one of the most vociferous of those who proclaim that the slave is very often better than his master, implying that in such cases slavery is the height of injustice.² Since good and able children are often born of slavish parents,³ all hereditary slavery is probably to be condemned. But most certainly Euripides believed that there existed some whose nature was fit for slavery;⁴ thus his divergencies from such a conservative as Aristotle are only the rejection of the inferiority of barbarians as a class⁵

¹ Timaeus frg. 67 Müller, *F H G*, I, p. 208a.

² Among innumerable passages illustrating Euripides' sympathy for the slave, frgg. 511 and 831 N², *Ion* 854–856, and *El.* 369–372, are especially emphatic.

³ Eur. *El.* 369–372.

⁴ Frg. 57 N²: ὡ παγκάκιστοι καὶ τὸ δοῦλον οὐ νόμω (scripsi col. Arist. *Pol.* 53b21; λόγῳ codd.; τύχη Cobet) | ἔχοντες, ἀλλὰ τῇ φύσει (Jacobs; τύχη codd.) κεκτημένοι.

⁵ See above, p. 169.

and the refusal to believe even in a strong tendency for slavishness to be hereditary.

The first¹ of the thinkers categorically to denounce slavery of whom there is an extant record was the rhetor Alcidamas. In his *Messeniac* he defended the liberation of the Messenians by the Thebans in 370, proclaiming:² ἐλευθέρους ἀφῆκε πάντας θεός· οὐδένα δοῦλον ἡ φύσις πεποίηκεν. The grounds on which he based this assertion are unknown, but he may perhaps have been one of the apparently very considerable faction to whom παρὰ φύσιν (*sc.* δοκεῖ) τὸ δεσπόζειν, νόμῳ γάρ τὸν μὲν δοῦλον εἶναι τὸν δ' ἐλεύθερον, φύσει δ' οὐθὲν διαφέρειν, διόπερ οὐδὲ δίκαιον, βίαιον γάρ.³ Alcidamas was head of a group which opposed the school of Isocrates;⁴ Isocrates entered the Messenian controversy on the opposite side with his *Archidamus*, and it is possible that each was followed in the dispute by his own faction.

Although the Cynics in general disregarded slavery as external and therefore immaterial, Onesicritus, a contemporary of Alexander, held the belief that its abolition would be desirable.⁵ His reasons cannot be established, yet it may well be that he objected on grounds of social disadvantage rather than justice. But the widespread influence of the doctrine that slavery was an ‘accident’ not inherent in the character of the slave is shown by its presence in Philemon, a writer of the late fourth century, who expresses⁶ the idea almost in the very words of Alcidamas:

κἄν δοῦλος ἡ τις, σάρκα τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει·
φύσει γάρ οὐδεὶς δοῦλος ἐγενήθη ποτέ,
ἡ δ' αὖ τύχη τὸ σῶμα κατεδουλώσατο.

Such were the attacks upon the institution of slavery, which found its great defender in Aristotle. They are aimed almost ex-

¹ J. B. Bury, *A History of Greece to the Death of Alexander the Great*², students’ ed. (London, 1913), p. 582, claims that the Sophist Lycophron was the first; there is no evidence for this. He denied the validity of distinctions of birth (Stob. ed. Wach. et Hen. 4, 29, 24), but this implies a rejection only of hereditary slavery.

² Schol. in Arist. *Rhet.* 73b6.

³ Arist. *Pol.* 53b20 ff.; see Appendix.

⁴ Pauly-Wissowa, *s.v.* Alkidamas.

⁵ Strab. 15, 1, 54, p. 710.

⁶ Philem. frg. 95 K. (II, p. 508); cf. frg. 22 (p. 484).

clusively against one theory: that of natural slavishness, innate in the character of the slave. And elaborately as Aristotle might define the character of his ideal slave, it has been seen that he was unable to demonstrate his existence. The entire question turned on a matter of disputable fact, whether there were or were not men whose sole function was the use of the body and who lacked the ability to be their own moral guides. Their existence was affirmed by the defenders, denied by the critics, of slavery. And with this dilemma, probably incapable of settlement, this discussion may stop.

IX. SUMMARY

This final dilemma was a far cry from the beginnings of Greek thought about the slave. In Homeric times mankind had not been separated into Greeks and barbarians, nor had occupations been distinguished as servile or free. The slave, consequently, was thought of as an ordinary human being who had simply had the misfortune of falling under the domination of a master. In the eighth and seventh centuries the exploiting aristocracies in some of the Greek states brought all labor, which was performed by slaves or serfs, under a stigma from which it never recovered and which was reflected later even in some of the writers who belonged to states where this prejudice was not popularly held. In these other states, during the sixth and early fifth centuries, a similar contempt grew up, but was restricted to handicraft and trade. This was especially strengthened after the Persian wars, when many new slaves were acquired. Thus in every state of Greece certain occupations were considered by all, except those so unfortunate as to be engaged in them, as fit only for slaves; the next step was to consider slaves as fit only for these occupations.

Concurrently with this development, beginning with the eighth century, the Greeks were coming to regard themselves as distinct from, and later as superior to, all other peoples. This growth received its greatest impetus from the victory over the Persians; the contempt in which they thereafter held foreigners easily turned into a belief that these foreigners were fit only for servile tasks. Two factors strengthened this conviction: first, the voluntary sub-

mission of the Asiatic to absolute monarchy seemed to the Greek the equivalent of voluntary slavery; second, from the fact that most slaves in Greece were actually barbarians the inference was drawn that barbarians were best fitted to be slaves.

By the middle of the fifth century, then, three assumptions were being generally made: certain tasks were fit only for slaves; certain men were fit only for these tasks; all barbarians fell within this class of men (with the corollary that all Greeks were excluded). It remained only to explain the bases of the last two assumptions, and after a beginning made by Plato this explanation was elaborated by Aristotle. For him, the slave was a partial man, lacking the governing element of the soul and consequently needing to be ruled by someone who possessed this element. But already, toward the end of the fifth century, there had arisen an opposing group, who denied the existence of such part-men and refused to admit that anyone was in need of absolute government by another. Others, while not going so far as this, denied at least that race or nationality had anything to do with the determination of character.

Such was the main line of Greek thought concerning slavery. There were at various times divergent theories advanced, but they never received wide acceptance, and at the end of the period under discussion the two chief antagonists in the field were the proponents of 'natural slavery,' and the advocates of liberty for all.

APPENDIX

The passage in Aristotle's *Politics* 1255a5–26 is extremely difficult of interpretation and yet essential for the history of the theory of slavery. The problem comprises two parts: first, the determination of the meaning of Aristotle's words, and second, the separation of the theories which Aristotle is discussing from the adulterations which he has introduced into them. The best treatment is that by Newman in his edition, II, pp. 150–152.

First an attempt should be made to define Aristotle's interpretation. All parties, he thinks, would agree ὅτι τρόπον τινὰ ἀρετὴ τυγχάνουσα χορηγίας καὶ βιάζεσθαι δύναται μάλιστα, καὶ ἔστιν ἀεὶ τὸ κρατοῦν

ἐν ὑπεροχῇ ἀγαθοῦ τίνος, ὥστε δοκεῖν μὴ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς εἶναι τὴν βίαν. In other words, this ἀγαθὸν τι is at least a form or part of, if not all of or identical with, ἀρετή. Aristotle also believes that everyone would agree that superiority in ἀρετή implies a right to enslave. But now the differences begin.

(1) One party holds that the ὑπεροχὴ ἀγαθοῦ τίνος attendant on superior force is *per se* a ὑπεροχὴ ἀρετῆς and therefore confers the right to rule (*τοῖς δ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο δίκαιον* (*sc. δοκεῖ*), *τὸ τὸν κρείττονα ἄρχειν*). Aristotle believes that this view, justifying slavery by mere force, is the same as that justifying it by its legality.

(2) The other party holds that this ἀγαθὸν τι is only a part of ἀρετή, that the ὑπεροχὴ ἀγαθοῦ τίνος implied by superior force does not *per se* imply a superiority in ἀρετή and hence a right to rule. This party, Aristotle thinks, believes that the only proof of the existence of superior ἀρετή in the master is the evidence of *εὔνοια* between him and his slave (cf. *Eth. Nic.* 67a18).

Aristotle himself gives us the reason for the confusion in his interpretation of these beliefs: he is simply trying to follow his usual ethical and political method, i.e., to prove by the consensus of all thinkers (cf. *Pol.* 55a3; 55b4), and hence to admit that a large number of men were radically in disagreement with him would, in his mind, damage the validity of his conclusion. He must, therefore, assume that a doctrine which differed from his in any real essential would be simply absurd and could not be held by any serious thinker: *ἐπεὶ διαστάντων γε χωρὶς τούτων τῶν λόγων οὐτ' ἴσχυρὸν οὐθὲν ἔχουσιν οὔτε πιθανὸν ἄτεροι λόγοι, ὡς οὐ δεῖ τὸ βέλτιον κατ' ἀρετὴν ἄρχειν καὶ δεσπόζειν.*

Next, the true beliefs of these groups must be separated from Aristotle's adulterations. The starting point is to deny that all would agree that *οὐτ' ἴσχυρὸν οὐθὲν ἔχουσιν οὔτε πιθανὸν ἄτεροι λόγοι, ὡς οὐ δεῖ τὸ βέλτιον κατ' ἀρετὴν ἄρχειν καὶ δεσπόζειν*; secondly, to deny that all would agree that *ἔστιν ἀεὶ τὸ κρατοῦν ἐν ὑπεροχῇ ἀγαθοῦ τίνος, ὥστε δοκεῖν μὴ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς εἶναι τὴν βίαν*. The theories then are simply:

- (1) Force *per se* gives a right to rule, the Sophistic doctrine.
- (2) Force *per se* does not give a right to rule. This school splits into two divisions:

(a) Anything based on force is unjust (*Pol.* 53b22: *οὐδὲ δίκαιον, βλαυον γάρ*); therefore all slavery is unjust.

(b) The origin of slavery neither justifies nor condemns it; it is the character of the rule which does so. A proper and just rule of slaves is one which conciliates the *εὖνοια* of the slave; this proves the existence of *ἀρετή*, which is the real justification of the slavery.

(3) Anything legal is just. This is not to be confused with the doctrine that superior force confers the right to rule.

A NEW RAETIC INSCRIPTION OF THE SONDRIO GROUP

By JOSHUA WHATMOUGH

IT IS to the courtesy of Dr. F. Pieth, President of the Historisch-Antiquarische Gesellschaft von Graubünden (Chur) that I am indebted for my knowledge of a recently discovered Raetic inscription, which forms the subject of this paper, and for the accompanying photograph. The new text (which might be numbered 253 bis in the sequence of my *Prae-Italic Dialects*, ii) is epigraphically of the greatest interest, and it is a most welcome addition to the very scanty group of Raetic texts written in the Sondrio alphabet. Linguistically that group, which I have called "Western Raetic," is distinguished from Northern and Southern Raetic by showing more definitely Etruscanizing features (*P. I. D.*, ii, p. 57; cf. pp. x, 5, 548 f. for the Etruscan element in the otherwise mixed Kelto-Illyrian Raetic dialect), and the newly discovered inscription conforms to the same linguistic character as the other Raetic inscriptions (*P. I. D.*, ii, nos. 249–253) of the Western or Sondrio group. Its chief importance, therefore, is epigraphic, since it shows that the Sondrio alphabet is distributed over a territory wider than was hitherto known, though the caution may be added that the object bearing this new text is portable, and that the mere place of discovery is no guarantee that the inscription itself was actually engraved there.

The photograph shows the inscription running in a retrograde (i.e. right to left) direction on the rim of the lip or beak of a bronze flagon of the type known, from its prominent beak-like lip, as the "Schnabelkanne," and found in large numbers in La Tène sites, though the type is by no means limited to La Tène remains. In such remains it begins to appear commonly from the early decades of the fifth century B.C., and it has been shown that the Kelts derived the type from Etruscan rather than from Greek sources.¹ This particular specimen was found in the winter of 1935–36 in an Iron Age cemetery at Castaneda in the Mesocco valley (Misoxer Tal, Valle della Moësa, a tribu-

¹ The standard work on the *Bronzeschnabelkanne* is by Jacobsthal and Langsdorff, Berlin, 1929.

tary of the Ticino, which it enters above Bellinzona), already famous for other prae-Italic dialect remains (*P. I. D.*, ii, pp. 73 ff.). Of the cemetery Dr. Pieth writes to me: "das Grabfeld hat in über 50 Gräbern nur Funde von c. 450 bis 250 v. Chr. geliefert; La Tène I und II fehlen vollständig." He adds that the inscribed flagon was found in association with a Certosa-type fibula, and indeed its Etruscan associations are clear enough in its script.

The Sondrio alphabet is one of several Sub-Alpine or North-Etruscan alphabets, ultimately of Etruscan origin (*P. I. D.*, ii, pp. 511 ff.), and themselves, it would seem, the source of the Germanic runes (*ibid.*, p. 505, n. 1).¹ Characteristic of it is its symbol for *z*, viz. , which occurs several times in the text below, but is so far unknown in other scripts, though a somewhat similar form has been noted in a graffito found at Cenisola (*ibid.*, note xx bis, p. 631), and in a new Raetic text from Sura Naquane which is to be published in *P. I. D.*, Supplement ii (251 bis). Our knowledge of the Sondrio script itself is enriched, thanks to the present new inscription, by several new forms, namely , , and above all the curious four-stroke *e* (), to which last I can find no parallel except in the graffito from Gudo (near Giubiasco), *P. I. D.*, ii, p. 83, in the dubious Massiliot coins (*ibid.*, p. 617), and in what has hitherto been considered an interpunct in a Raetic inscription from Sanzeno (*ibid.*, p. 19). The forms of *a* (,) include familiar variants, though it is possible to doubt whether is simply *a* upside down, or whether it should be read as *v*; if the latter, it also is new to the Sondrio alphabet, but on the whole I am inclined to take it as an inverted *a*, for the engraver might naturally change his position as he approached the sharp bend in the rim of the lip, and in fact he did change the posture of the letters, as the apparently ligatured or conjoint *t* and *a* at that point (fifteenth and sixteenth letters) make clear. As for , it is almost certainly *k*, not *i*, though *i* in that form is not unknown (*P. I. D.*, ii, nos. 217, 281, and 266 bis [p. 629], the last on a "Schnabelkanne" from Giubiasco); but =*k* is already known in the Sondrio alphabet, in which *i* is . The form might be taken, standing alone, as possibly *p*, but in this text, in the sixth place, it seems to be certainly *l*, whereas at the beginning (the first letter) I am still in doubt as between *p* and *l*.

¹ See now also H. Arntz, *Handbuch der Runenkunde*, Halle, 1935.



INSCRIBED BEAKED FLAGON FROM CASTANEDA

If, however, the stroke which I detect between the two limbs of the letter is not illusory, then we should have *a* at the beginning, but that I hesitate to give, at least for the present, in my transcription. The remaining letters are ξ *s*, and \wedge *u*. As to χ , it is the familiar ψ upside down, and the form of *t* (\star) is a natural evolution of \dagger or \ddagger (\top) in an alphabet which has modified $\ddot{\text{f}}$ in the same way so as to produce $\grave{\text{f}}$. The writing is everywhere distinct in the photograph except the eighth and the seventeenth letters, which are *e* and *z* respectively as Dr. Pieth tells me ("die Photo zeigt all Buchstaben deutlich, nur an zwei Stellen kommen feine Striche nicht klar zur Wiedergabe, und es sind je nebenstehend die Ergänzungen in Bleistift angebracht").

The entire text, which seems to be complete, unless some letters have been lost under the patina at the end, may be read tentatively as follows:

pekezlsezt: aststaz: χ usas

The interpretation that follows is also tentative. It seems likely that *z* is used merely as a variant of *s*; so it is in Raetic *iasaziz* "Iassarius" (*P. I. D.*, no. 252, in the Sondrio alphabet); hence in *-zl* we may well see the Etruscan *-sl* termination ("genetivus genetivi"), and in *sezt* the equivalent of *sest* as in *Sesto-*, *Sestio-* beside *Sexto-*, *Sextio-*. In *aststaz* at least one of the consonants must have a syllabic value, as often enough in Etruscan writing. Thus we have, so far, "Beccii-filii Sexti Ast(u)sti (?) or Ast(u)stae (or the like?)," that is "(The property of, Belonging to, Given to, or the like) Sextus Astustus (or -a), son of Beccius (i.e. son of Beccus' son)." What is the remaining χ usas? Is it merely a proper name, *-as* being genitive (Etrusc. *-as*)? If so, we may compare *Cussa* (*C. I. L.* v, 4891 and 8896, from Idro and from Stazzona [in the Valtellina, whence the two Raetic inscriptions, *P. I. D.*, nos. 252 sq., in the Sondrio alphabet])? Or should we think of the Etruscan *cus-*, which seems to be the name of a drink in the Agram mummy text? Or of the Etruscan divine name *kulš*, *culšna*, *culšu*? The writing with χ instead of *k* or *c* would make no difficulty, for that is a common alternation, just as in the North Etruscan alphabets *p* represents both *p* and *b*, which justifies the comparison *Becco-*, *Beccio-* above; similarly, reading *lekezl* we should have "Legii-filii," and, reading *aekezl*, we should have "Aegii-filii."

SUMMARIES OF DISSERTATIONS FOR THE DEGREE
OF PH.D., 1935-36

CHARLES JOHNSTONE ARMSTRONG. — *De Epithetis compositis apud Epicos Latinos.*¹

THE purpose of this dissertation is to examine from a linguistic as well as a literary point of view compound epithets in all the Latin epic poets. I have limited the number of types considered, however, to those which contain only noun or verb stems, or separable adverbial prefixes; for the others (that is, those containing prepositions, inseparable adverbial prefixes, or numerals) afford more examples than could be discussed in one treatise, nor do they add anything of importance. Using as a basis for this study, with occasional modifications which appeared necessary, the phonetic, morphological and semasiological outline and classification of compounds given by M. Leumann,² I discuss all the epic compound epithets with regard to their various types and the details of their parts.

The compounds themselves were assembled by a careful perusal of the texts of all the epic poets from Livius Andronicus to Claudius Claudianus; then the lists obtained were checked where possible with indices of the poets. To determine the history of the compounds in other Latin literature the *Thesaurus Linguae Latinae*, so far as it goes, was used, supplemented by Forcellini's *Totius Latinitatis Lexicon*. The compounds were examined in relation to their context, and significant features are noted, as well as any important manuscript variants. All ἄπαξ εἰρημένα are indicated.

Although Latin and the Italic dialects inherited the IE facility for compounding, the practice was not adapted to the spirit of the language, as the ancients themselves perceived, and so comparatively early became curtailed and specialized. This tendency toward specialization is indicated by the increasing use among the Latin authors

¹ Degree in Classical Philology.

² "Lateinische Grammatik, Laut- und Formenlehre," in I. von Müller's *Handbuch der classischen Altertumswissenschaft*, München, 1928.

of epithets ending in *-fer* and *-ger*: out of a total of 194 different compound epithets used by the epic poets, 85 contain these endings. Moreover, Ennius has only 5, of a total of 21 different epithets, but nearly half the epithets used by epic poets after Virgil are of this type.

The majority of epic types were inherited from IE, while some were refreshed by Greek influence. Two new, uninherited types were created in Latin: verbal governing compounds containing a noun stem as the first part and a present participle as the second (as *omni-potens*), and verbal governing compounds having two verbal parts (as *terrificus*). Unique was the appearance of an exclusively Latin composition vowel in all compounds (with certain exceptions, as *-e-* before *-r*, *-u-* before labials). This came about through regular vowel weakening in medial syllables.

A consideration of the history of compound epithets in the Latin epic poets and in other literature revealed several important facts. First, considerable freedom and freshness in the formation and use of compounds existed even as late as Virgil, for nearly half of all compounds used by him are new formations, or at least do not occur previously in literature. Virgil moreover definitely fixed the standards of usage for compounds, to which all his successors faithfully adhered. Later some archaic formations re-emerged, as in Silius Italicus and Statius, but in general after the time of Virgil the formation and use of compounds was lifeless and colorless, conventional rather than original. The use of compounds was a peculiar and important part of epic technique, much more so than in prose or in other poetic forms; for the Romans discovered in an abundance of compounds one of the essential elements of lofty poetry. Finally, epic compounds generally were adopted from previous epic poetry, or poetry of epic type, and their use from the time of Virgil on was largely restricted to epic. Hence they tend to form a class by themselves.

An examination of the evidence of inscriptions of the earliest Latin, of the comedy of Plautus, who represents in literature the *sermo vulgaris*, of Pompeian wall inscriptions, and of dedicatory and sepulchral inscriptions of all periods from the first to the sixth centuries after Christ, shows that compound epithets were not only very common in the spoken tongue, but also in general more closely related to epic compounds than to those of any other literary form. From this I infer

that Latin inherited more of the IE facility in compounding than is generally supposed, and, indeed, more than is indicated by the extant evidence; for literary prose, and poetry other than epic, acted as a restraining influence on the use of compounds.

JAMES THOMAS BARRS.—*The ancient Names, local, personal, and divine, of Dacia and Moesia.*¹

THE first and main part of this dissertation is a collection of the ancient proper names of Dacia and Moesia; the second is a limited discussion of matters of linguistic interest evidenced in the names. The former aims at completeness, in order that such linguistic generalizations as belong to the second part may have increased support. The second part itself, besides considering one means of determining from a conglomerate mass the names and elements characteristic of the region, also suggests the purpose and necessity for making the collection, namely, the possibility of throwing some light on the affiliations and development of the languages spoken in Dacia and Moesia in pre-Roman as well as in Roman times.

The collecting began with an examination of the appropriate inscriptions in volume iii of the *Corpus Inscriptionum Latinarum* (*CIL.*); ancient authors and geographers whose writings and itineraries deal with this region were next consulted; finally, various journals devoted to archaeology, epigraphy, or numismatics were searched, as well as several special publications of the same nature. Thus the Latin (*CIL.*) and Greek (*IG.*) corpora of inscriptions have been supplemented and brought up to date.

The names are classified geographically, i.e., whether they belong to Dacia, Moesia Inferior, or Moesia Superior. Under each country they are then grouped as local, personal, or divine, and personal names are further divided into nomina and cognomina. Finally, all names, except doubtful ones, are classified according to frequency of occurrence.

For each separate instance of a name at least one definite reference is given to the publication from which it is taken — an extreme case

¹ Degree in Comparative Philology.

may involve 150 to 200 such references. Dates are generally added wherever an editor has been able to assign a date. Each name or variant is quoted in its original case unless its frequency involves more than one case; then the nominative is given. Furthermore, all variants of any particular name are given if found in this region.

The number of references used in the collection is approximately 25,000; the number of entries or names is, of course, much less, running, however, into several thousands.

A very large percentage of the names are purely Latin, Greek, or Germanic. As such they can generally be recognized and eliminated. The residue contains much that seems characteristic, a few examples of which, belonging to the second part of the thesis, will be given in the rest of this summary.

In the linguistic remarks an attempt is made, first, by analysis and comparison to isolate elements which in each case are common to two or more names, at the same time considering, for certain ones, their possibilities as elements or roots in the Indo-European system of languages; secondly, to note some of the phonetic alternations exemplified in variants of the same name or of the same element or root.

This isolation of elements, an idea by no means original in this paper, serves another purpose, in that it helps to determine which names are proper to the particular region, Dacia and Moesia. For example, it is significant if a personal name contains a root or prominent element which is common also to a local name, especially if the two appear in inscriptions or documents found in or coming from the same territory, or if in the ancient authors the one is assigned to a region which happens to be the provenience of the other.

A few of the phenomena which seem characteristic of the region follow (the numerals indicate the number of names, plus any variants in which the phenomenon occurs; two or more examples for each are given):

-dava (34) and its variants *-dova* (1), *-daba* (6), *-deba* (5), *-diba* (1), *-dapa* (4), *-depa* (1): *Bor-i-dava*, Κομ-ι-δαβα; *Pelen-dova*; Συκ-ι-δαβα; Ζικ-ι-δεβα; Ζικ-ι-διβα; *Cap-i-dapa*, Ζάρ-δαπα; Ζέλ-δεπα. The formant evidently means 'city, or town.'

dek-, -dekk-, (7+): *Aus-dec-ensis*; *Dec-e-bal-us*. If the *k* here represents an Indo-European palatal, then we have an argument against the

usual theory that the language of our region was *satem*, and in favor of *centum*. Decebalus was a Dacian king.

derz- (7): Δερζ-έλ-ας and Δαρζ-άλ-ας; *Derz-enus*.

-dina (6): Βελ-ε-δίνα, *Cum-o-dina*. This seems equivalent in meaning to *-dava* above.

diz- (15): *Diz-a*, Διζ-άλ-α-ς.

epta- (and its variants, *epti-*, *eptē-*, *esta-*, *este-*, *eti-*) (12): 'Επτά-κενθος, *Efta-centus*, *Efte-centus*, *Eti-centus*, 'Επτη-τράλις, *Epti-d-i* (dat.).

get-, -get-, (8): *Get-ae*, *Sarmiz-e-get-usa*. Cf. Skt. gá-tis 'a going,' Latin *ven-io* 'come,' Gothic *qim-an* 'to come,' Lithuanian *gim-ti* 'to come (into the world), be born.' So the root probably means 'family.'

-kent(h)os (8): Αύλού-κενθος, *Epta-centus*. Probably from **ken-* 'come forth fresh' as in Skt. *kan-īna* 'young,' Gall. *Cintus*.

kot-, kut-, (13): Κοτ-ήνσισι, Κότ-υς, Κουτ-ίλης.

l alternating with *r* (3): *Durostolon*: *Durostorūm*; Κούσκουλι : Κούσκανρι. Alternative formants with a nasal or liquid: *Lederata*, *Laederata*, etc., but also *Laedenatae*, *Laedemata*; 'Οκκοληνός : 'Οκονηνός.

mad-, mat-, (5): Μαδ-α-γάνα, Ματ-ός. Probably the same as Skt. *mád-ati*, Gk. μαδ-άω, Lat. *mad-ēre*, 'be wet or drunk.'

malū, *-malū*, (2), *Malu-esis*, Καπ-ό-μαλβ-α. Cf. Slavic *molǔ* 'river bank.' Dacia *Maluensis* lay along the Danube river.

mar-, -mar-, -mar, (13): 'Αμωρό-μαρ-ος, *Mar-is-ia*. Cf. Skt. *marīcī* 'ray,' Gk. μαρμαρώ 'gleam,' Lat. *merus* 'pure.'

mest- (8): Μεστ-ό-η, *Mest-ul-a*. Probably equivalent to *mad-* above.

mik- (8): *Mik-ov* (gen.), *Mic-ia*.

muka- (*moka-*, *muc-*, *moc-*) (25): *Moca*, Μοκά-πορ-ις, *Mucapor*.

mutzi-, -mutzi-, (3): Μουτζι-ανι-κάστελλον, *Ma-mutzi-m* (ablative!).

nap- (3+): Νάπ-αρ-ις, *Nap-oc-a*.

The existence of an ö-sound is indicated by variants of several names.

-para- (8): *Agat-a-para*, Δαρδ-ά-παρα. This suffix seems to mean 'market place.'

pie- (6): Πιε-γγ-ίται, *Pie-por-us*.

por-, -por-, (20): *Aulu-por*, Μοκά-πορ-ις, *Pir-o-bor-i-dava*. The meaning seems to be 'slaughterer, piercer.'

-pus (9), *Mau-pus*, *Muca-pius*, *Deo-bus*. Cf. *por* above.

τ (syllabic τ) (12): *Hrculanus*, *Prsentia*.

r velar (5): Αύλαχηνός : Αύλαρκηνός; *Lagiana* : *Largiana*. It seems to have merged with a velar consonant in these cases and then to have disappeared.

ram- (*ran-*, *rat-*) (7): 'Pau-i-dava, *Ran-ius*, *Rat-i-ar-ia*. Probably the same as Skt. *ram* 'tranquilize, rest,' Lith. *r̄im-ti* 'to grow still.'

resk(u)- (6+): *Rescu-turma*, *Rescu-por-us*.

sh-sound. Two names, *Sucidavensis* and *Σiamao* (abl.), begin with Σ, but the remaining letters are Latin and so is the context. Perhaps the use of Σ was an attempt to represent an *sh*-sound.

sik-, -sik-, (3): Σίκ-ωρσις, *Como-sic-us*.

sir-, (5): *Sir-o*, *Sir-i-bu-end-a*, Σίρ-αχος.

sis- (6): *Sis-es*, *Sis-ia*.

soz- (3): Σοζ-ει-μύον (gen.), *Soz-o-men-us*, *Soz-usa*.

spa-, -spa-, (5): Σπά-δακ-os, 'Αμώ-σπα-δ-os.'

sur- (12): *Sur-a*, *Sur-ill-io*, Σούρ-α. Cf. *sir* above.

tap-, tep-, (4): *Tap-ae*, *Tap-e-i-ius*; *Tep-ir*. Probably **tep-* 'be hot, hot' as in Skt. *tap* 'be hot,' Lat. *tep-idus* 'warm.'

tet- (4): *Tet-es*, *Tet-ul-a*.

til- (3): Τιλ-ικ-λων, Τιλ-θάξει (dat.).

-tok- (3): 'Αμά-τοκ-os, Σκόσ-τοκ-os.

tz-element (40): Λούτζολο, Τζάσκλις, *Tzinta*, *Tsinta*. The sound was probably a true affricate (cf. German *z*).

ut-, -ut-, (7): *Ut-us*, *Uth-is*, *Al-ut-a*.

vap- (4): *Vap-ir*, Οβαπ-ά-δακ-os.

z-sound: this turns up in a noticeably large proportion of names, about 300, exclusive of those containing *tz*. It sometimes alternates with *d* (followed by *i*), *g*, *rs*, *tj*, *t?*, *c*.


-za (-zes, -zis), (11): *Ba-za*, *Itha-zis*, Σθά-ζεις, Ζεί-ζας. This probably often indicates place of origin: cf. Gk. -*ios*, Lat. -*nus*.

zin- (3): *Zin-a*, *Zin-ama*, *Zin-enis*. Cf. Skt. *jānāmi*, Lith. *žinaū*, Gk. γιγνώσκω, 'know.'

Other points to be noticed include the frequency of intervocalic *f* (40 cases) and intervocalic *s* (very common). The local element *burg(o)* (11), as in *Bouργ-o-νόβο-ρε*, *Bouργ-ον-άλτον*, looks quite Germanic, as *rik* (in *Arda-ric-us*, *Athana-ric-us*, *Gebe-rich*) plainly is such.

RICHARD TREAT BRUÈRE. — *De Ovidii Metamorphoseon aliquot Codicibus recensendis.*¹

THIS thesis deals with the classification of the principal manuscripts of Ovid's *Metamorphoses* and with the question of the value of each in constituting the text of the poem, supplementing and



correcting the work of W. F. Smith and Brooks Otis² on these matters. It is divided into three parts:

- I. The Classification of the MSS.
- II. The Question of a double Recension of the Poem.
- III. A Table of suggested Readings.

¹ Degree in Classical Philology.

² See the *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, XXXVI (1925), pp. 183-184, and XLVI (1935), pp. 209-211, for summaries of Smith's and Otis' dissertations.

I

On the basis of the *apparatus critici* of Magnus,¹ Slater,² and Lafaye,³ supplemented by photostatic reproductions of many of the MSS. and a personal examination of codd. Parisini 8000 and 8001, the stemma of manuscripts given on page 215 has been established.

II

The theory of a double recension, supported by Helm⁴ and opposed by Magnus,⁵ is considered in detail. All passages discussed by Helm and Magnus can be explained without the aid of Helm's theory of two recensions or Magnus' of a genuine and an interpolated version.

III

In view of the newly-established relation of the manuscripts it is now possible to defend many readings approved by Heinsius⁶ which the nineteenth-century editors and Magnus condemned. Over a hundred changes in Magnus' text are suggested.

ALICE WHITING ELLIS.—*Reliefs from a Sarcophagus, decorated with an Amazonomachy, in the Fogg Museum.*⁷

SEVERAL substantial fragments of a sarcophagus decorated with an Amazonomachy are in the possession of the Fogg Museum of Harvard University. Three of these fragments comprise the front of the sarcophagus and the fourth belongs to the left end. The composition of the scene on the front is in three parts, the usual division of groups on sarcophagi with Amazonomachies. The figures of the front

¹ P. Ovidi Nasonis Metamorphoseon Libri XV, ed. H. Magnus, Berlin, 1914.

² D. A. Slater, *Towards a Text of the Metamorphoses of Ovid*, Oxford, 1927.

³ Ovide, *Les Métamorphoses*, ed. Georges Lafaye, Paris, 1928.

⁴ R. Helm, "De Metamorphoseon Ovidianarum Locis duplice Recensione Servatis," in *Festschrift J. Vahlen*, Berlin, 1900, pp. 337–365.

⁵ H. Magnus, "Ovids Metamorphosen in doppelter Fassung?" in *Hermes*, XL (1905), pp. 191–231.

⁶ Nicholas Heinsius published three editions of the *Metamorphoses* (Amsterdam, 1652, 1658, 1661) of which the last is the best.

⁷ Degree in Classical Archaeology.

are ranged in three tiers; those of the uppermost row are carved in the lowest relief, and the figures of the intermediate and lowest rows are brought out for the most part to the front plane. The top border of the front is decorated with a tendril runner of great sketchiness, and below, on the sima, is carved a frieze of trophies which are contained in the swags of garlands suspended from bulls' heads.

In respect to subject and types this sarcophagus falls in the Second Roman Group of Robert's Second Class of sarcophagi decorated with Amazonomachies (C. Robert, *Die antiken Sarkophag-Reliefs*. Berlin, 1890-1904).

An approximate dating is obtained in the light of certain technical criteria assembled by Rodenwaldt in a recent article (G. Rodenwaldt, 'Der Klinensarkophag von S. Lorenzo,' *Jb. Arch. Inst.*, XLV, 1930, pp. 116-189). He examines three indisputably Attic sarcophagi of the first half of the third century after Christ, and concludes that there are three characteristics of Attic workmanship in this period, namely, the technique of incising the contours of figures in relief, the incised eyebrow which forms with the upper eyelid, extended beyond the corner of the eye, a counter-curve, and the use of purely decorative bands of leaf and tendril ornament carved very lightly and sketchily on top borders and sockles of sarcophagi. This type of ornamentation appears toward the end of the second century of our era, when the architectural mouldings and stricter forms were giving way to the purely decorative. The peculiar counter-curve formed by the eyebrow and extended upper eyelid is the indisputable badge of Attic workmanship found in the second and third centuries of our era, and appears on the Fogg sarcophagus. The lightly carved tendril ornamentation, also peculiar to Attic sarcophagi of the late Roman period, adorns the top border of the Fogg sarcophagus. The contours of the majority of the figures and objects are incised.

A slightly closer dating may be obtained from the style and treatment of the relief. The figures are crowded and overlap and yet are pressed into the same plane. This tendency to flatten figures and keep them in one plane has been recognized by Riegl as characteristic of relief-sarcophagi of the later centuries of antiquity (A. Riegl, *Die spät-römische Kunst-Industrie nach den Funden in Österreich-Ungarn*, 2 pt., Wien, 1901-1923). Riegl analyzes this tendency on a sarcophagus

dated in the second half of the third century. The flattening of overlapping figures in one plane is due to an optical conception, as though the figures were seen from a great distance. Besides this characteristic of keeping the figures of the foreground in one plane on the Fogg sarcophagus is the conflicting attempt to create an impression of depth by carving figures in a lower plane in the background. This is a characteristic of Roman "illusionism," the attempt to suggest a crowd by placing one figure behind the other so that the shadows of the figures in the foreground will fall on those in low relief and the shadows of the background figures fall supposedly on the ground behind them. The background of the relief is denied and an impression of limitless depth is created. That this effect is not consistently striven for on the Fogg sarcophagus can be seen by the fact that many parts of the background are visible. We have, then, in the Fogg sarcophagus an example of a transitional work in which the older "illusionistic" tradition is partially adhered to and the later technique of flattening overlapping figures into one plane is introduced. The Fogg sarcophagus must then be assigned to the first half of the third century of our era and is of Attic workmanship.

CHARLES ARTHUR LYNCH.—*De Verbis alienarum Basium Adiumento suppletis in Lingua Graeca.*¹

WHILE the author does not reject the commonly accepted explanation of suppletion in Greek verbs, it is his purpose in this thesis to call attention also to certain phonetic and morphological difficulties which, he holds, tended to produce suppletion. A verb is suppletive if some of its tenses (or "aspects"), especially the present-continuous or the aorist-momentary (which would appear either to have been lost or else never to have been formed), are supplied from another base. Thus it is usually held that the inherent meaning of a base prevented the formation of such tenses or aspects; for example, **bherāx*, it is maintained, could give only a continuous aspect (present or imperfect tense). That this cause was operative is unquestioned; what is maintained here is that there are further causes comparable to

¹ Degree in Classical Philology.

those seen by Löfstedt (*Syntactica*, II, 1933, pp. 38 ff.) to have led to the replacement of *is*, *it* by *vadis*, *vadit* in Late Latin.

On the theory here proposed tenses were lost (1) if *two different verbs produced tenses of indistinguishable form*. Thus ἡρχόμην of ἔρχομαι gave way to ἦειν of εἰμι because it was indistinguishable from ἡρχόμην of ἄρχομαι. The similarity of ἔρχομαι and ἄρχομαι may explain the lack of a sigmatic aorist (*ἡρξάμην) or of a strong aorist (*ἡρχόμην) from ἔρχομαι.

(2) Again, tenses probably were lost or were not even formed analogically, if *two tenses of the same verb were indistinguishable*. For instance (*_Fεἱδον (or augmented, *ἔφειδον), the probable imperfect of the aorist εἱδον, would be identical in form with that aorist. Similarly *ἔφεπον, natural imperfect of the aorist εἱπον (from *ἔφεφπον), would be identical with that aorist.

(3) Tenses may have been lost if *two tenses of the same verb underwent phonetic change so notable that they grew apart*. Thus the Homeric aorist θρεξα of the verb τρέχω, at least in part because of the metathesis of aspirates, gave way to ἔδραμον. Similarly the present ὅσσομαι (meaning not only "foretell" but also "see") may have failed to be used as the present of ὅψομαι because ὅψομαι might be misunderstood as belonging to a present *ὅπτομαι.

(4) Sometimes an ancient but well-established form may have ousted a regular tense of another base, or have prevented it from becoming popular, e.g., Homeric πρίατο beside ὀνησάμην.

It is shown, in passing, that verbs made with both ν infix and *avo/ε* suffix (such as, for example, θιγγάνω and πυνθάνομαι) were made from bases from which an aspirate had been lost. The verb θιγγάνω from a base *dheigh shows an alternation not uncommon in the Indo-European languages. The verb πυνθάνομαι differs only in that the aspirate was lost from the initial position rather than from that immediately following the ν.

The above four causes are presented not in place of, but in addition to, the explanation which rests upon differences of "aspect-meaning." It is recognized that homophones are always possible; but it is argued that they are rejected once they begin to impair meaning or render language unintelligible, a result which brings to nothing the first purpose of human speech.

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